Building a More Cohesive Society in South Africa

Universities of Cape Town & Kobe

Workshop Report

18 & 19th March 2014

Executive Summary

In March 2014, an inaugural workshop to discuss and initiate an interdisciplinary national research agenda exploring social cohesion in South Africa was held at the University of Cape Town. The workshop aimed to surface some of the current research being undertaken in South Africa that speaks to various dimensions of social cohesion, and to use this platform to encourage discussions around the themes and cross-cutting issues that might be relevant to the study of social cohesion in the South African context going forward. The workshop was co-hosted by SALDRU and the GSDPP at UCT, and the Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration (RIEB) at Kobe Universities, and funded by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

The workshop began with a case study of Kenya and attempts to develop a social cohesion index (SCI) in this context. The focus then shifted to South Africa, beginning with a session on the implications of post-apartheid policy making on social cohesion. Academics and activists made presentations in subsequent sessions focused on thematic and cross-cutting issues in the South African context, fuelling lively discussion on the complexities involved in defining, measuring and promoting social cohesion. In the concluding session, workshop participants proposed establishing a network of researchers and practitioners to promote and enhance the visibility – and impact – of existing work in the domain of social cohesion in South Africa and encourage inter-disciplinary communication, debate and collaboration. A key goal would be translation of evidence on effective interventions into useful policy proposals and effective engagement with policy makers.

This report provides brief summaries of all presentations made at the workshop, followed by a section highlighting key issues raised and discussed, and concludes with a proposal for how to take this work forward.

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Introduction

Professors Crain Soudien, Deputy Vice Chancellor at UCT, and Takashi Kamihigashi, of the Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration (RIEB) at Kobe University, Japan, welcomed participants. Professor Hiroyuki Hino of RIEB, currently on assignment as Senior Advisor, Strategic Initiatives and Economy to the Kenyan Presidency, highlighted the link between social cohesion and economic growth, and the potential lessons offered by case material from Kenya in understanding social cohesion and ethnic diversity in the South African context.

In his opening remarks, Professor Murray Leibbrandt of SALDRU underlined the significance of the workshop. The event was intended to initiate an interdisciplinary national research agenda, exploring policy and programmatic options for building a more cohesive society in South Africa. This research will, in turn, feed into the wider C3 Investigation into Strategies to Overcome Poverty and Inequality.

The current report provides brief summaries of all presentations made at the workshop, followed by a section highlighting key issues raised and discussed, and concludes with a proposal for how to take this work forward.

Social cohesion in South Africa? Can you fix what you don't measure?

Alan Hirsch is director of the Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice at UCT. Until recently he managed economic policy in the South African Presidency, represented the Presidency at the G20, and was co-chair of the G20 Development Working Group.

Hirsch presented a snapshot of the findings for South Africa of the OECD Global Development Report. Social cohesion encompasses social inclusion, social capital and social mobility. Social cohesion supports economic growth, and the OECD report identified the following key areas of policy required in turn to support cohesion: fiscal/tax design, employment, social protection, civic participation, education, gender and migration. Overall, the findings on these key areas show significant, even impressive, achievements in South Africa since 1994.

In many important ways, South Africa is well-managed in terms of democratic rights, the rule of law, fiscal and monetary management, and even significantly declining crime levels and improved health indicators. Many social and social security interventions have been introduced to address inequality – social transfers, free basic water and electricity, public employment programmes, compulsory education, the largest government ARV programme and so on.

While indicators on inclusion, mobility and social capital are important and can provide valuable insights, there are limits to what benchmark social programmes can address and 'fix' in deeply fractured societies. Hirsch highlighted the 'risks of focusing on what

we can measure' and the need to look beyond general data and traditional aggregated indicators to deepen our understanding.

So why is South Africa still marred by rising inequality and deep divisions? Hirsch flagged several factors, including: high levels of unemployment, in particular among the youth (50%); persistent inequality; the intersection between race and class in creating a 'cappucino society'; inadequate service delivery to the poor; and the structural legacies of colonialism and apartheid that live on through migrant labour, spatial inequality and high levels of maternal mortality and sexual assault. These factors, coupled with poor forms of political representation and weak leadership and corruption, mean declining accountability. Turning to consider inverse measurements of social cohesion, the past few years have witnessed a rise in the incidence of 'service delivery protests' (especially around municipal services and governance), and the tendency towards violent protest.

Within this context, Hirsch explained that the workshop aimed to stimulate dialogue and discussion on some of the complexities – and fractures – underlying South African society, and to explore the prospects for developing more suitable indicators and proposals for policies aimed at building a more cohesive society.

Session 1: Kenya case study

Chaired by Professor Hiroyuki Hino, the first session presented the outcomes of research undertaken in Kenya over the past three to four years as a contribution to developing a coherent framework for considering – and measuring – social cohesion and identifying key determinants to improve cohesion in South Africa.

History of a Divided Nation

John Lonsdale is Emeritus Professor of Modern African history, a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University, and a highly respected and widely published African historian, specialising in Kenya.

Lonsdale presented a brief paper entitled 'Kenya, history of a divided nation'. He began by emphasising four key points of potential relevance in the South African context:

1) The worst possible context for social cohesion is a state and political economy creating fear – what the colonial state did in Kenya.
2) Fear is not only linked to political or gross inequality, but also intimate relations, that sets generations and genders at odds with each other.
3) Colonial economies and regional economies are characterised by gross inequality.
4) Ethnic hostility is not fixed – it can disappear and reappear.

Pointing out that the conflicts likely to be explosive in South Africa may have less to do with ethnic differentiation than location, he stressed that the point of this session was to provoke discussion.

For 20 years, Africanist historians have been debating the extent to which colonial rule was responsible for the original sin of political tribalism (politicised ethnicity) or whether ethnicity was just another form of moral/political community, equivalent to 19th century European nationalism? Lonsdale argued that he has sought to answer this question by delving deeply into African political thought, and stressed that memory, in particular how this is preserved in communities and acted upon, cannot be measured.

In precolonial tropical Africa there was an under population in relation to land, with wealth derived from assembling skills and people through strategic marriages and recruitment of 'clients'. Conquest created a colonial state, creating 'subjects' who (the British believed) shared a 'tribal' affinity. In Kenya, ethnicity became an aspiration. Kikuyu regional advantage, powered by an agrarian-educational revolution, spawned internal social conflict. The anti-colonial anger of the Mau-Mau insurgency was fired by a sense that Kikuyu moral ethnicity was being betrayed when a growing population of clients became less valuable than limited productive land. The brutal Mau-Mau war has haunted Kenya's ethnic history ever since. Since independence, a lengthening history of regional inequality has fostered 'ethnic feudalism'. But ethnic electoral loyalty and its political exclusions may represent only the most vocal expressions of fundamentally regional fears. Regional inequality reflects a revolution – a triumph by agriculture over pastoralism, creating a political economy in the process.

The single greatest change for Kenyans, like all Africans, is the extraordinary inversion of factor values – labour and land – over the past 20 years such that today labour is oversupplied and land is undersupplied.

Measuring social cohesion: The case of Kenya

Frances Stewart, Emeritus Professor in Development Economics at Oxford University, and Armin Langer, Assistant Professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for Research on Peace and Development at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, have conducted research and published extensively on the topic of horizontal inequalities, conflict and group violence.

Stewart and Langer began their presentation by outlining the meaning of the complex concept of social cohesion. At its heart is the idea that relationships among members and groups in a society are sufficiently good that all feel a sense of belonging, and that when differences develop, these can be dealt with peacefully. The European tradition emphasises *social inclusion* and therefore inequality/discrimination: '*Social cohesion is the capacity of a society to ensure the well-being of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding marginalisation*.' (Council of Europe 2007) However, the North American tradition emphasises *social capital* and interactions among people: Social cohesion '*has*

to do with the quality and nature of connections between people and groups' (Marc, Willman et al. 2013).

In addition to contributing to people's well-being, social cohesion also matters instrumentally through reducing the chances of conflict and potentially lending support to public expenditure, taxation and poverty reduction policies. As a complex and ill-defined social concept, it is by its nature difficult to measure. However, finding a suitable 'measure' for social cohesion is necessary in order to investigate it empirically.

According to Stewart and Langer, the critical elements of social cohesion include: relations and interactions between groups as well as individuals; inclusiveness (absence of discrimination and limited inequality, especially horizontal inequality); trust across and within groups; and a sense of national (as well as group) identity.

To develop an appropriate composite index, they identified three aspects that they regard as critical components of social cohesion:

1. The extent of inequalities, both horizontal and vertical (stemming from the European approach) – horizontal (or group) inequalities are particularly relevant in multi-ethnic societies because competition and conflict tends to run along group (often ethnic) lines while high/rising vertical inequalities can undermine bonds among people;
2. Trust: the level of trust among people generally, and particularly across groups, is a powerful indicator of how cohesive a society is (North American perspective). Where trust across groups is low, conflict is more likely and economic progress can be impeded;
3. National Identity: the strength of people's adherence to national identity in relation to their group (or ethnic) identity is important for multi-ethnic societies, especially where national boundaries have not developed organically and nations are not natural units. However, this need not imply that giving importance to localised group identity is inconsistent with social cohesion. In flourishing multi-ethnic societies, people value both their group and their national identities. A socially cohesive society requires both diversity and unity, with both group and national identity valued. Only where group identities take strong precedence over national ones is national cohesion likely to be threatened.

Based on these three components, Stewart and Langer presented a Social Cohesion Triangle, pointing out the two-way relationships between each of the vertices. They explained that a good composite measure of social cohesion should summarise complex multidimensional issues, comprise of distinct (relatively independent) elements, and should be used to rank different countries as well as track their progress over time. They also stated that the extent of social cohesion was essentially a matter of how people perceive the society in which they live and thus measures of social cohesion should focus on perceptions held by people, rather than any attempt to get at more

'objective' measures. Such a measure could be particularly beneficial to policy makers and would also facilitate communication with the general public.

Using this rationale, Stewart and Langer have developed a composite index, the Social Cohesion Index (SCI), which is a perceptions-based measure, based on data from the Afrobarometer surveys. In their presentation, they outlined their method of aggregation and some of the key challenges they had encountered as well as describing the evolution of the SCI and the need to adjust for variance (SCIVA). As a caveat, they pointed out that while the Afrobarometer surveys provided a wealth of data, they did not contain all the questions that would have ideally been included to best operationalise the concept of social cohesion.

They presented some of their results using the SCI, first for Kenya and then for three other African countries to aid in cross-country comparison. As political events and situations often have an important impact on people's views as expressed in Afrobarometer surveys, they related their findings on the SCI to key political events in Kenya during the period 2005 to 2011, including sharp ethnic divisions over a new Constitution, and post-election violence in 2008. The cross-country comparisons demonstrated that the SCI results were broadly in accordance with the researchers' socio-political assessments and countries' recent political histories.

Stewart and Langer shared their conclusions on the SCI, highlighting it as a useful tool and first attempt to approximate a very complex and multifaceted concept, despite the limitations of the exercise due to data constraints and inconsistencies. Lastly, they argued that a good composite measure was vital as it would improve our understanding of the causes and consequences of social cohesion and provide a useful tool for policy making.

Determinants of social cohesion in Kenya

Germano Mwabu is Professor of Economics at the University of Nairobi, Kenya. He served previously as co-director of the AERC project on Poverty Income Distribution and Labour Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, and has held the positions of Senior Research Fellow, Director, Public Goods Project of the World Institute for Development Economics Research at the United Nations University, Helsinki (1996-98), and Associate Professor of Economics at Kenyatta University (1994-96).

Mwabu shared findings on the nexus between social cohesion and national development in the Kenyan context, using survey and administrative data. According to his research, some of the key elements of social cohesion include equity, trust and shared national identity.

He argued that the defining attribute of social cohesion is characterized by multiple, diverse communities being together as one nation, one country or one society. Social bonds can produce this outcome only if the people involved: (a) *Trust* each other; (b)

are *fair* to each other; and (c) share a common *identity*. The above three attributes of good social bonds are the *minimal* constituent elements of social cohesion.

Mwabu explained that in measuring social cohesion we use people's perceptions of the quality of social bonds as the metrics for social cohesion. We assume people interact through numerous social relationships – which we are not interested in counting, but are rather interested in what they think about the *quality* of the relationships.

In Mwabu's study, people were asked simple survey questions to ascertain subjective and objective probabilities. The questions asked are: (a) *Can members of other ethnic groups be trusted?* (b) *Are you proud to be a Kenyan?* and (c.) *Are public goods fairly distributed?* Overall, Mwabu's research demonstrated that the level of social cohesion in Kenya is quite high (mainly due to how national identity is measured). More specifically, the findings showed that the overall SCI is higher in rural than urban areas, and is greater among men than women. Urban women were shown to be the least trusting group, while rural men were found to be most trusting. The dispersion of ethnic groups from Nairobi to rural areas was associated with a higher level of trust. In particular, a person from a particular ethnic group was more likely to trust people from other ethnic groups the greater the distance of his/her residence from Nairobi. Lastly, schooling was linked to higher levels of trust and shared national identity. However, the overall SCI was insignificantly correlated with schooling.

Mwabu suggested that social cohesion could enhance productivity by reducing costs associated with mistrust and conflicts in an ethnically diverse society. He concluded that while perceptions are key to the measurement of social cohesion, the number of social cohesion components should be kept to a minimum and restricted to processes of social interactions. He also argued that experimental or theory-based data are needed to measure effects of social cohesion on welfare or development indicators, including peace, income, happiness or human capital.

Worcester: Reconciliation and Restitution in a South African town

Francis Wilson, Emeritus Professor, has taught for over thirty years in the School of Economics at the University of Cape Town where he founded & for many years directed SALDRU. In 2001 he was also Director of the Data First Resource Unit and became Chairperson of the International Social Science Council's Scientific Committee of CROP, the international Comparative Research Program on Poverty.

Wilson made a brief lunchtime presentation describing a five-day workshop, arising from the C3 process, which brought together multiple stakeholders from a small rural town, Worcester, with a deeply divided political history, to discuss reconciliation and restitution. The case study illustrated the need to consider local context in building a more cohesive society, as policy is often formulated at a national level.

Session 2: Social cohesion and post-apartheid policy making

Chaired by Alan Hirsch, this session drew on inputs from presenters who are presently engaged with issues of social cohesion in academic and/or applied ways.

Considerations of social cohesion in post-apartheid Policy making

Adam Habib is the Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of the Witwatersrand, and is well-known as an academic, an activist, an administrator, and a political media commentator and columnist. A Professor of Political Science, his experience spans five universities and multiple local and international institutions, boards and task teams. He has also served as the Executive Director of the Human Sciences Research Council and as a Research Director on Governance and Democracy.

Habib's presentation drew on a book he published in 2013, '*South Africa's Suspended Revolution'*, in which he traces the transition to democracy, locating key actors in context and analysing the institutional constraints within which they operated, as well as the reasons behind the policy choices made. Habib identified the key challenges facing South Africa, with particular focus on the increase, year by year, of inequality, due only partly to economic inheritance, and also to the intended and unintended consequences of particular policy choices.

He argued that inequality is central to social cohesion, and of particular potency in the South African context. Inequality manifests in very particular ways, and the level of inequality has a fundamental impact on perceptions of one's satisfaction or 'relative deprivation'. Postponing economic inclusion for the democratic project, as has been done, could come back to threaten the very democracy we have achieved. This is graphically illustrated in rising levels of violent service delivery protests and the nature of strikes and demands made by workers. Available survey evidence clearly reflects very low levels of trust expressed in politicians or political structures, particularly at the 'lowest' level of municipalities or local authorities.

Habib explained that the real question or debate moving forward is what to do? There are currently three approaches to address this question: 1) Corporatist economists who say 'don't worry about it, it's the modern condition'; 2) A section of the ANC/Cosatu who acknowledge or recognise the challenges and need for action; 3) The dominant state view, consisting of people who are concerned but have no solution. This tension is evident in the National Development Plan (NDP): it raises important issues but ducks key questions, on the assumption that inequality will be dealt with by addressing poverty. Habib argued, however, that discrete measures are required to approach each burden separately. The NDP makes serious proposals about economics, but the dilemma of the past 30 to 40 years is that growth at the top is faster. This dynamic is not confronted in the NDP. Habib stated that there are only two ways to address rising inequality – by capping the top (social pact initiatives), or letting people 'grow' through the bottom faster, moving people from the informal to the formal sector, as was seen in

Western Europe with a massive investment in the social wage, and more recently in Brazil.

So we know there is a problem, but how do we conceptualise a research programme if it is just a collection of information? Habib suggests that, on the one hand, we need to learn from other countries' experiences (eg. Brazil) about what worked but, on the other hand, we also need to consider the unique challenges and context we face in South Africa.

He argues that one thing is certain,- we cannot postpone dealing with inequality. However, to deal with inequality will definitely run counter to the interests of powerful stakeholders, including BEE holders and corporates etc. The conversation around inequality in South Africa has become very polarised, often along the lines of capitalism versus socialism. Habib argued that there is a set of logical pragmatic interventions that could shift this conversation and create the social pact required. He added, however, that the political imagination and will has been missing. He illustrated this with the recent example of bid-rigging by construction companies, and the lack of creativity in devising an appropriate 'punishment' (for example, forcing them to do public construction of housing as opposed to simply paying a monetary fine). He concluded that we have become so 'rule bound' or bound by externally determined policy frameworks that we have lost pragmatism on how to address inequality.

Our future – Make it work. A Presentation on Nation Building

Mastoera Sadan is the acting Programme Manager of the Programme to Support Pro-Poor Policy Development (PSPPD) in the Presidency. She has worked in the public sector for over ten years, holds a Master's degree from the London School of Economics and was a visiting scholar at Oxford University in 2002/03.

Sadan sketched the background to the National Development Plan (NDP), which was drafted by the National Planning Commission (NPC) and submitted to Cabinet in 2012. The NDP contains a chapter on nation building which aims to deepen the understanding of what this means beyond constitutional values, the national flag and anthem, commemorative days and other traditional symbols of national identity. The NDP adopted a more nuanced view of social cohesion, recognising the critical need to deal with inequality and unemployment in order to address the deep divisions still inherent in South African society. However, according to Sadan, the narrow view of social cohesion among many, even in government, expressed as a 'hope' for change, poses a challenge.

The NDP was accepted as a national roadmap for the next 20 years, to achieve Vision 2030. Vision 2030 is a broad vision for a future South Africa committed to a shared set of values; building an inclusive society and economy; increased interaction and integration; strong leadership; and an active citizenry.

'In 2030, South Africans will be more conscious of the things they have in common than their differences. Their lived experiences will progressively undermine and cut across the divisions of race, gender, space and class. The nation will be more accepting of peoples' multiple identities.' Vision 2030

Sadan outlined the following six pillars through which the NDP aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality:

- Uniting South Africans of all races and classes around this common programme;
- Encouraging citizens to be active in their own development, in strengthening democracy and holding government accountable;
- Increasing economic growth, promoting exports and making the economy more labour absorbing;
- Focusing on key critical capabilities of both people and the country – including skills, social security, infrastructure, strong institutions and partnerships both within the country and with key international partners;
- Building a capable, developmental state; and
- Developing strong leadership throughout society that will work together to solve our problems.

Sadan explained that a social contract could help propel South Africa into a higher developmental trajectory as well as build a more cohesive and equitable society. But much of the discussion around the NDP and Vision 2030 has been polarised. People are asking – what do we need to do? Who has to give what up? How do we achieve this vision?

According to the NDP, transforming society and uniting the country requires active citizenry and strong leadership at all levels across society. Sadan argued that we need to create a common overarching identity, uniting us in our diversity, using constitutional values to build a non-racial, non-sexist country where all are equal before the law. Government needs to facilitate and encourage interaction across racial and class divides by improving public spaces and services. Universal access to quality education and skills training, health care and services, effective land reform and economic empowerment are essential to redress the deeply entrenched inequalities of the past. Sadan concluded with her thoughts on the Social Cohesion research project, saying that it is overdue and that it will challenge us to engage actively with the nuances and complexities of building a more cohesive society.

Culture, policy making and social cohesion

Barbara Masekela is a long-serving African National Congress (ANC) activist, cultural worker and diplomat. During 27 years in exile, she served the ANC in Zambia, Ghana, Britain and the USA, returning to the USA in 2003 as Ambassador. She played a key role in establishing the ANC Department of Arts and Culture in exile and in guiding its activities during apartheid, including organising the "Culture in Another South Africa" festival in Amsterdam in 1987. In 1995, she became South Africa's official ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation and served as the democratic South Africa's first ambassador to France from 1995 to 1998.

Masekela began by welcoming moves to develop an interdisciplinary study that draws on lessons from the experiences of others who are, like South Africa, also grappling with transformation in a shrinking world with its own competing demands. In her presentation she lauded the significant achievements of political and social transformation since democracy in 1994, and also pointed out that an active citizenry is essential in building a cohesive society and transforming communities. Apartheid sought to isolate the South African population from the rest of the world and, acording to Masekela, an active cultural programme is needed in South Africa to free its citizens from the dominant popular culture espoused through the global media. She explained that there are many simple pragmatic actions that can be organised to improve people's quality of life, for example, organising for children to visit the sea, see films and plays etc.

Masekela also pointed out the tendency to focus on tangible issues in the aftermath of liberation. She stressed the need to unearth and address the deep psychological scars of conquest. It is due to the complexities and risks inherent in measuring the 'intangible' that we have not grappled with the conundrum of the psychological impact of colonialism and apartheid violence on the collective psyche of South Africans. It is a trauma that is at the core of our identity as South Africans. The state of mind in South Africa and among its people is never measured or talked about. Indeed, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was a seminal process that began to uncover this pain and trauma. However, justifiably, there was a need to rush reconciliation and get on with the business of nation building.

Masekela expressed her view that we as South Africans have not dealt with the psychological dynamics that remained after independence. What have people gone through and how do they feel? What is in their hearts? The prevailing dominant stories do not capture the experience of dispossession and the pain of that history. The current tendency of most people in South Africa is not to talk about that pain and history, and hence, these stories are not shared with the younger generation. Part of the problem, Masekela argued, is that there is no government agency dedicated to addressing these experiences or problems from our past. We have too few social workers and psychologists, and only women who have been through extreme trauma like rape are able to access counselling. The trauma of the past – as experienced by black and white – has not been dealt with, hence the emptiness of the NDP declaration.

In comparison with other countries, South Africa is still at the early stages of nation building. According to Masekela, there is a dire need for agencies and skilled people to support transformation in communities. The building of the nation is not an exercise merely for central government departments; it requires citizenry that goes beyond the act of voting. Channels need to be established to facilitate the direct contirbution of citizens to genuine change.

Masekela pointed out that the 2010 World Cup reignited a sense of unity in South Africa as well as a sense of solidarity with other African countries, unlike the xenophobia that swept the land in 2008. While this was only a moment, it is an indication of what is possible in the country. In conclusion, Masekela explained that the social cohesion is about the quality of life. The lived culture of people can be enriched by their involvement in joint activities and shared goals. These activities are not merely recreational or entertaining; they lead to a better understanding of their physical lives as well as their ehtical values and make for a better and more lasting social cohesion.

Land and Power: Rural Women's Action Research Programme

Aninka Claassens has been engaged actively in land issues in South Africa for 25 years. As as a member of the ANC's land desk and as a technical expert to the Constitutional Assembly on land rights and the property clause, she has participated in working groups developing proposals pertaining to legislation dealing with restitution and the protection of labour tenant and farm worker rights. Dr Claassens founded the Rural Women's Action Research Project (RWAR), now based in the Centre for Law in Society at UCT. RWAR is interdisciplinary in orientation, employing qualitative action research methodologies built on partnerships with rural community-based organisations and other civil society institutions in the former homelands. Much of their research is done to complement strategic litigation and support advocacy around traditional courts, women's rights, land rights, citizenship, governance problems and the nature of living customary law.

Claassens began her presentation by highlighting the gap between, on the one hand, the rhetoric contained in the National Development Plan and current legislation with regard to the former Bantustans and, on the other, the new 'traditional' leadership laws. According to her, recent laws and policies have entrenched – even reinforced – the major divide between the former Bantustans and the rest of South Africa. This system of unequal citizenship and segregated property rights has its origins in the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, followed by Bantustan consolidation and forced removals after 1948.

Claasens referred to the following new laws and policies: the 2003 Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act; 2004 Communal Land Rights Act; 2005 provincial traditional leadership laws; the 2008 Traditional Courts Bill; the 2011 Green Paper providing for state leasehold; and the 2013 Communal Tenure Policy. She explained that rather than addressing the stark divides between the Bantustans and the rest of South Africa, these post-Apartheid laws and policies have reinforced them. They are justified today on the basis of preserving 'custom' and customary law, which is in turn justified on the basis of promoting social cohesion. The version of 'custom' embodied in these laws and policies is coterminous with chiefly authority and is

restricted to the boundaries of the former Bantustans. No other customary or communal identities are recognized.

The outcome of this process, Claasens explained, is 'wall-to-wall' tribal authorities in former Bantustans, with ascribed identities as opposed to self-defined identities. The state retains control and ownership over land and minerals, ditching the recognition of underlying rights in favour of 'conditional rights'. Natural resources will be available for re-allocation as a source of ongoing patronage. Effectively, this means a segregated legal system, accepting and entrenching that different sections of the population have differential rights, where the population is no longer defined by race, but by Bantustan boundaries. People's identities are ascribed according to the bantustans in which they are located, and authorities are constructed as traditional authorities. Land rights are being taken away from people – with only 'use' rights under traditional leaders or 'leases'. This is justified on the basis of custom as a 'consensual' system, with ownership 'inimical to custom', belied by the draconian nature of powers conferred.

The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, for example, resuscitates all tribal authorities, supports and builds the capacity of traditional leadership and disbands all community authorities. Minerals – owned by state, can be allocated or reallocated or withdrawn

Though the former Bantustans are among the poorest areas in the country, they also have many rich mineral deposits, including platinum, chrome, vanadium, iron and coal. Indeed, there have been many disputes around the extraction of minerals in these areas, especially with regard to who benefits. Claassens outlined examples of resistance, including litigation, to chiefly 'overlordship' and the conflation of custom and chiefly authority. Among other concerns, in the North West Province, multi-billion rand 'tribal' accounts have not been audited since 1994, and royalties have been converted to shares. After litigation by ordinary people to access tribal accounts, they were instead interdicted from a meeting on the basis of undermining the official status of traditional leaders. The Traditional Courts Bill, supported by a traditional leadership lobby and President Zuma, is calling for a return to 'traditional' values. It is no accident that all of these laws were passed just before elections. On the positive side, there has been widespread opposition and mobilisation, across society, including by trade unions like NUMSA, the Minister of Women and masses of rural people. The Department has refused to transfer legitimate claims, despite court judgements and constitutional requirements. There has been a moratorium on transfer of land to CPAs, which, since 1994, along with trusts, have been the prefered vehicle for the restitution of land.

The Communal Land Rights Act was struck down by the Constitutional Court in 2010, but there are limits to litigation, along with issues around the changing composition of the court. On 18 March 2014, the day this workshop took place, the National Council of Provinces passed the Land Restitution Amendment Bill, enabling traditional leaders to challenge land restituted to communities. This is justified as preserving custom, but

resistors have made clear that they support customary laws, but not necessarily chiefly authorities.

Since land and rights affect the very poorest of the poor, and lie at the heart of our fractured history, these recent developments raise the critical question of what the possibilities might in negotiating or renegotiating 'custom', particularly in relation to the position of women, to oppose the reversal in law of the constitutional promise of equal citizenship and land reform.

Session 3: Understanding social cohesion in South Africa: Thematic issues

Sexual violence, gender based violence and violence in South Africa: Implications for social cohesion

Nomboniso Gasa is an independent gender and policy analyst. She holds a Certificate in Women's Studies and a BA in Political Science from the University of the Western Cape.

Gasa's presentation focused on the implications of sexual violence, gender-based violence and violence for social cohesion in South Africa. She began with a disclaimer, reminding participants that 'social cohesion' is not a new concept, and carries the burden of history in giving meaning to the concept in the South African context. We need to understand the different ways in which people are 'formed', and pay attention to whose voices are heard in this discourse. To illustrate this point, Gasa outlined the background to a national jamboree on social cohesion held in 2012, after a call by President Zuma for a dialogue on culture to understand differences. This call was made after public debate about the President's polygamy. The event was attended primarily by poor people and 'low-level' ANC members. Gasa was struck by the prevalent use of xenophobic language and stereotyping during an open mic session, in the presence of leaders whose obvious silences on these matters were problematic and could be interpreted by some as tacit approval. In addition, she noted the tendency for social and political protest on a range of issues to be conflated with the much-used term 'service delivery' protests, during the jamboree, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the non-service delivery issues being raised by activists.

Gasa quoted Albie Sachs, who said in the early 1990s, "the only truly non-racial institution in South Africa is sexism". To illustrate the point, she highlighted several cases of violence in South Africa:

1) Oscar Pistorius: despite the media fascination with this story, what is muted in the conversation is the context in which he grew up – the violence inherent in the family, the extended social cult context of the Afrikaners, and Calvinism as a particularly sexist ethos;
2) Anene Booysen: despite outrage and shock expressed across the nation at this brutal rape and murder, days after politicians descended on Bredasdorp, the

body of another dead young woman was found dumped there. This is not an aberration or unique phenomemon, and the mutilation in both cases speaks of frantic rage and drugs;

3) The rape, mutilation and killing of a six year-old by an uncle in a middle-class Afrikaans white community;
4) Zoliswa: a murdered black lesbian, one of many lesbians murdered in townships, despite the guarantees of equality in the Constitution.

Gasa made the point that in discussing social cohesion, it becomes evident that there are different issues around cohesion and coercion in different communities. Gasa stressed that in order to talk about custom, we need to look at the sacred space of the family, which is where much abuse and violation takes place, with women and children often the victims. Describing the powerful metaphor of 'the long skirt of motherhood', she explained that this had a powerful cultural resonance, meaning that women will 'sit on' or conceal the secrets of the family into which they marry. This entails self-sacrifice in the name of the family, community and a peaceful and cohesive social order. In contrast, a white blanket with red stripes is seen as a symbol for transition to manhood for Xhosa men, and also involves keeping secrets. Initiation involves more than just circumcision, and can involve psychological wounding, mutilation and even death, all in the name of culture and identity.. In some parts of the country, initiates are supposed to speak another language during this stage. Increasingly they speak in 'prison' language, which raises the question of what this means for masculinities? Returning as young men, they are urged to 'test' drive their manhood, and young women are the 'tarmac' for test driving.

Gasa pointed out that the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence in post-apartheid South Africa raises the question of whether this is a new phenomenon, or simply reflects that we talk about it more now? Moreover, we have not found a language in which to understand the extent to which our society has been wounded and what is taking place. A new language is needed to name and put these difficult issues on the table. This is difficult to understand because, in Gasa's view, there is a tendency to romanticise people who are oppressed or powerless. For example, it is difficult to use feminist language around power in instances where a 40 year-old man rapes a 6 year-old child (or perhaps even an elderly women), since it is unclear what "power" dynamics really exist? New dynamics are emerging in urban and rural areas, with women assuming new economic and social roles for women, generating a backlash by some young men. Similalry, the gendered dimension of xenophobia and what happens within those communities is cause for concern. Moreover, the high-profile Oscar Pistorius trial has shown that these same things happen in mansions beyond high walls, making this a universal issue for South Africans from diverse communities and backgrounds. Gasa concluded by saying that we are talking more now about social cohesion (a 'slightly wobbly concept') in South Africa and less about nation building. We need a new language to chase the elusive dream of freedom, to liberate culture and reclaim living custom.

The challenge of social cohesion through the lens of Zulu identity

Mbongiseni Buthelezi is a senior researcher in the Rural Women's Action Research Programme at the Centre for Law and Society, University of Cape Town.

Buthelezi presented on the challenge of social cohesion through the lens of Zulu identity, based on his studies of KwaZulu Natal. Since the end of apartheid, heritage has been made a central arena for 'renarration' of South Africa's past. However, the state's attempt to use heritage has opened a path for public contestations, a terrain of struggle to reclaim the past, with some invested in singular versions and others in alternatives.

Buthelezi spoke of how this is playing out in relation to Zulu identity and history. There has been an upsurge in groupings, since the end of apartheid, claiming that they are not Zulu but were rather colonised. These groups sprung up for different reasons and have been using different discourses to articulate their identity. People use ritual, ceremony and daily speech to contest Zulu attempts to erase this past, and emphasise their separate identity.

Buthelezi provided a fascinating narrative reflection on how Zulu heritage is currency in the tourism market in KwaZulu-Natal. He described arriving at King Shaka International Airport, completed for the 2010 World Cup, and the ubiquitous use of the theme of the 'Zulu Kingdom' in advertising, echoed in the theme of guesthouses, curio shops, praise poetry, and radio shows. Buthelezi was there to attend the launch of 'The Zwide heritage celebration', the culmination of 20 years of efforts by the Ubumbano lwamaZwide to mobilise Ndwandwe descendents into a cohesive group. The event brought together a section of the larger Ndwandwe diaspora – people from KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Limpopo, Mozambique and Swaziland – as part of their efforts to resuscitate the telling of the Ndwandwe past and contest Zulu-ist versions of the past. The Zulu king gave his consent to the day, which was attended by politicians from the ANC and IFP, amakhosi and academics.

The crowd heard the history of the people of Zwide from the South African perspective – "umlando" from the perspective of KwaZulu, and from Limpopo and Mpumalanga: the defeat of the Ndwandwe by the Zulu, Zwide's migration north, how the Nxumalo came to be leaders of the Tshangana (Shangaan) people. It also heard from the Mozambique perspective about the establishment of the Gaza kingdom, its later confrontations with the Portuguese, Nghunghunyana's imprisonment and exile in Lisbon and Samora Machel's efforts, which succeed in the end, to get Nghunghunyana's remains repatriated to Mozambique. Speeches were made in a combination of isiZulu, Shangaan and English, interspersed with exhilarating musical performances.

Buthelezi suggested that the deep sense of injury about subjugation of their ancestors by the Zulu poses a challenge to social cohesion. There is a need to reckon with the past and past injustices, going deeper than the state has done, particularly by setting the cut-

off date for restitution as 1913. People still feel strongly wounded by these contesting histories, with which we have not yet begun to deal. Exploring social cohesion requires thinking about diverging interests and layers of history.

"Asocial" Cohesion: Political Community and Social Capital in South Africa

Robert Mattes is Professor of Political Studies and Director of the Democracy in Africa Research Unit at the University of Cape Town. He is also a co-founder and co-Director of the Afrobarometer, a regular survey of public opinion in African countries. His research has focused on the development of democratic attitudes and practices in South Africa and across the continent.

Mattes provided a brief conceptual framework, before moving on to discuss empirical longitudinal mapping of social cohesion in South Africa. He stressed that social cohesion is a concept in danger of "conceptual overload", suggesting the need to refocus on the etymology of the term, and begin with a minimalist definition and operationalisation.

The term 'cohesion' (vertical) involves pride in the community defined by the modern state; acceptance of others as equal citizens; and little demand for territorial partition; while the term 'social' (horizontal) involves a dense web of associations to which people can belong, and through which they can participate and collaborate with others, particularly those who are "unlike" them; and a sense of trust, particularly in those who are "unlike" themselves. Mattes argued that social cohesion should be located at two levels: political community and citizenship (self and others as political actors).

Mattes shared data gathered for South Africa over the period 1995 to 2011 on questions relating to personal national identity and collective national identity. The data on personal national identity showed that even prior to measures like the National Unity and Reconciliation Act and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, over 90% of people saw being South African as a significant identity, raising the question of whether the preoccupation with nation building is 'knocking on an open door'.

Questions on collective national identity distinguished between whether it was 'desirable' to create a united South African nation, and whether it was 'possible' to do so, and whether people thought of themselves as South Africans first. While the data showed that the perception that it it was *possible* to create a unified nation was lower than the *desirability* of a unified nation, the data reflect a growing consensus of the desirability to create a united South Africa. When broken down by race, the desirability of a united South Africa was below 60% in 1997, but by 2011 had risen to 75% among white South Africans, whereas the same period saw a slight drop among black South Africans from a high of 85%.

Mattes also reported data on whether South Africans shared a sense of 'common destiny'. These required that interviewees assign a grade (out of 10) on how the country was governed under apartheid, its current system and the political system expected in ten years into the future. In 2008, positive expectations of the future political system

dropped strongly among all race groups, particularly minority groups. This is likely to be linked to tensions within the ruling party and the rise of Zuma, along with widespread electricity and power outages, which fanned minority fears once again. Despite this dip, over the period 1995 to 2011 there was a phenomenal rise in positive expectations for the future political system among white South Africans – from 25% to almost 75%, a sectoral change on a scale seldom seen.

Turning to the 'social' aspect of social cohesion, Mattes reported that whilst most countries exhibit a positive relationship between associational membership and trust, Africa tends to exhibit the reverse, with high levels of group membership (particularly religious organisations) but low levels of individual trust (between relatives, neighbours, people from one's own ethnic group or tribe or 'others'). Levels of trust in South Africa are especially low as recorded in these surveys.

In his conclusion, Mattes stated that South Africa, like other African societies covered by Afrobarometer, is likely to be "cohesive," at least in the minimalist sense of not coming apart. Moreover, this is due to much more than simply the policies of the OAU / AU in accepting the finality of colonial boundaries. It is due to the fact that citizens of post-independence societies have developed normative, psychological bonds with the political community as defined by their respective state. Thus, Africa's political communities are maintained by strong vertical ties between the citizen and state. Yet while the state is relatively cohesive, the societies within appear to be relatively "asocial". In other words, if by a "social" society we mean one in which people express trust in, and collaboration with others across predominant identity divisions, African society is not "social." Rather, Africa is characterized by "strong ties" of co-ethnics working together in local associations with relatively homogenous memberships, and low levels of horizontal ties that might otherwise bind together the citizens of the disparate cultural communities that make up Africa's heterogeneous states.

Mattes concluded by saying that South Africans do exist – but do they love each other? Social cohesion is a complex concept drawing on modernization, history, culture and institutions, and Mattes questioned whether there is a single reliable, valid empirical construct called 'social cohesion' that can be 'measured'.

Capitalism, city, apartheid in the twenty-first century

Ivor Chipkin completed his PhD at the Ecole Normale Superieure in France and was based at the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER) between 2001 and 2004. He received an Oppenheimer fellowship in 2005 and took up a position at St Anthony's College at the University of Oxford. During four years in the Democracy and Governance Programme at the Human Sciences Research Council, he acquired an intimate knowledge of government departments and agencies. In 2007 he published "Do South Africans Exist? Nationalism, Democracy and the Identity of 'the People'" with Wits University Press. He is the founder and director of the Public Affairs Research Institute at WITS.

Chipkin presented a case study of Roodepoort to illustrate how townhouses or sectional title estates have become sites of post-apartheid 'community', with body corporates assuming power and controlling these domains of sociality in particular ways. Condominiums or townhouses emerged in the US in the late 1960s, and in South Africa in the 1980s. They are a particular form of property rights that bring people together in a property relationship that binds them in a collective arrangement. Whilst you own your unit privately, you own from the inside of the brick inwards. From the middle of brick outwards is owned collectively in and through an institution (a body corporate). What it means is collective management governed through the body corporate, which regulates social life.

Chipkin explained that Roodepoort is an area in which large social change (in quantitative terms) is taking place, and provides a good site to examine what kinds of institutions are having an impact on the relations emerging there. Roodepoort is situated north west of Johannesburg, historically a city in its own right from 1977 to 1995, but now an administrative region of Johannesburg. Roodepoort represents the shift for the Afrikaner from the rural to modern industrial environment, and this is reflected in its architecture. Over the past ten years, vast tracts of peri-urban agricultural land has been developed into gated townhouse complexes, with around 1 million inhabitants moving in to face brick, small units that cater for the upper working class and lower middle class. The houses are about the same size as those in Soweto house, and cost between R450,000 and R1.2 million.

What is important is the particular institutional form of these complexes and who is moving in. These complexes tend to be very diverse demographically, with young white Afrikaners, moving out of homogenous white working class suburbs and young blacks, including from other parts of Africa, coming from other suburbs into these diverse, linguistically and racially mixed complexes. Agaisnt an historical context of extraordinary violence (familial, inter-personal and societal) and segregation, these individuals now must coexist, and are all members of the body corporate and subject to its rules and regulations. Chipkin expalined that there is tremendous ambivalence towards these bodies, with little interest in getting involved as members, but great interest in obeying rules and regulations, despite some resistance. Hence, increasingly,

large numbers of South Africans are falling under the jurisdiction of body corporates as social regulatory institutions, which, in the case of Roodepoort, have become increasingly interventionist in how they regulate social life over time.

Chipkin posits that these new instituional forms may be attractive because they translate into estates which are highly regulated, predictable environments, with laws that are enforced. This stands in stark contrast to the growing sense that life in South Africa is chaotic and disorderly, not just in terms of crime and physical violence but in terms of unpredictability. We are not a failed state, but the way that people experience the state is profoundly unpredictable. Chipkin argued that social cohesion, from an institutional perspective – not just personal perspectives or subjectivitiy – as normative as it sounds, must imply some predictability.

Hence, body corporates may not be producing social cohesion if we define this concept only in terms of a common identity in terms of norms or values or happiness, but what they are doing is producing social behaviour usually compliant with regulations, and mediating potential conflict through an institution. Chipkin argued that this seems to be a very powerful way of thinking about social cohesion and institutions, especially since some of the failures of social cohesion in South Africa appear to be less about identity, and more about the failure of the South Africa state to regulate every day life. Chipkin concluded by saying that if this is broadly correct, we might think of social cohesion in a slightly different way, namely, social cohesion becomes the ability of institutions to regulate and resolve differences peacefully, rather than to produce a common identity. This raises questions around what is meant by social cohesion. These sites are produced by private developers for profit, and body corporates are not democratic institutions. They are aimed at maintaining the value of the unit, yet they are producing specific kinds of community/social life. The challenge of social cohesion is thinking of practices to regulate social life at the level of daily life.

Session 4: Understanding social cohesion in South Africa

The story of Marikana is the story of deepening social alienation

Gavin Hartford worked for the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU), later the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), becoming a national organiser and negotiator. In the mid-1990s Hartford served as a National Senior Commissioner of the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). He is currently an Executive Director of The Esop Shop, a company providing expert advice on the design and establishment of broad based empowerment trusts, specialising in Employee Share Ownership Plans (Esops) and Community Trusts.

With his opening comment that Marikana is a mirror of South Africa's social alienation, Hartford underlined the essential link between social cohesion/alienation and social and economic inequality. Migrancy is a global feature for resource extraction. The basic structure of apartheid migrancy has been unaltered for over 150 years, only worsened

by structural unemployment and labour broking needs. Post-apartheid, the mines negotiated a living out allowance. But migrants face a triple burden: poverty and hunger at home in rural areas, challenges of life in the community near mine ('double' families, second 'wife', debts, bribery), and dangerous demanding work and long work cycles. These factors combine as socio-economic drivers for social alienation and industrial action.

Hartford presented a brief background to the trigger strike at Implats after the 2011 wage negotiation, when rock drill operators (RDOs) (chiefly Amapondo) learnt of an 18% increase for miners (many of whom are NUM branch leaders), tacitly approved by the NUM. The majority of migrant workers on the Platinum Belt are from the Eastern Cape, and mainly Amapondo from Lusikisiki/Flagstaff. These men are the real victims of apartheid – with limited or no schooling, still performing some of the most demanding work imaginable, working 12 months and receiving a month's annual leave. Two-thirds of workers on strike in 2014 were aged 45–55 years, with long service (25 years or more), while the other third were aged below 30**.** This combination – of old, functionally illiterate men and young, aspirant, angry men, all hugry for change – was explosive.

Hartford further outlined how the development of a union 'aristocracy' (at three times the cost to company) was fostered, and the impact this had on wage negotiation and stratification. After the introduction of labour laws post-1994, a subtle change began happening at the coalface of labour relations. This trend in labour markets countrywide saw a breakdown in relationships between management and employees, with employee problems becoming 'human relations' issues. Massive HR departments emerged, 'fire fighting' conflicts wherever they spring up. A heavy reliance on HR relations replaced conflict resolution by line management. No actual verification of union representivity and/or accountability to employees and/or verification of employee views. In the process, workers became voiceless in their own organisations, leadership became an extension of the company's human relations department, and this resulted in the effective collapse of union democracy. This alienation of employees from the union and the company led to independent structures being formed and inter-union rivalry, creating a climate for intimidation and violence.

The strike balance sheet on the Platinum Belt to date is appalling: rand losses of billions; a crisis around union legitimacy; inter-union rivalry, violence and deaths; deep anger and distrust amongst workers for both management and the old union leadership; the collapse of collective agreements and traditional, shop steward-based bargaining structures; and the potential of mass dismissals and retrenchments. Hartford stressed that while the 2014 platinum strike is said to be the costliest strike in South African history, the social costs and trust lost are immeasurable. In short, the end product is an industrial relations meltdown which will refashion the future of collective bargaining, union representation and company operation management into the future.

Hartford concluded his presentation by posing the question: How do we create a community with new and shared values and align interests between stakeholders? In his view, 20 years into democracy we are back on the ground floor. There is urgent need to establish a new language and culture of transparency and openness within industrial relations. There is urgent need to restore union democracy and create new shared values and align interests between stakeholders, including through remuneration and performance-linked pay, ownership options, profit sharing and assets and outsourcing.

Safe-hub strategy and social cohesion: Amandla EduFootball

Florian Zech is the founder and Joint Managing Director of AMANDLA EduFootball, an Executive Board Member of the Western Cape Network for Community Peace & Development; Member of the Sport for Social Change Network, Western Cape Chapter; and a Project Management Consultant for International Foundation Advisory. Florian was inspired to start the organisation in 2007 after a year spent living and volunteering at a Khayelitsha orphanage. Here he experienced first-hand the need to keep youngsters active and busy in the afternoons after school.

Zech shared the story of AMANDLA EduFootball as a practical example of promoting social cohesion in a local context, by creating safe spaces for bringing together football and learning opportunities to empower youth and change lives. The programme is based on five pillars: (1) community and youth participation; (2) shared expertise; (3) innovative thinking; (4) ongoing reflection and (5) replication. The underlying ethos is an attempt to tackle old problems in a new way.

Zech explained that poverty, inequality and unemployment lead to dysfunctional families and communities, producing youth without a sense of belonging, who, when experiencing boredom, are more prone to influence by deviant peers. This causes negative attitudes towards school and positive attitude towards violence, feeding an intergenerational cycle of poverty and unemployment. Gangs become attractive to young people because they provide identity, access to girls, alcohol and drugs. Zech exaplined that within this context, football was identified as an attractive and viable alternative, offered in a physically and emotionally safe space, by caring adult role models who also act as a safety net to youngsters (including referrals where needed). The programme offers regular and structured activities, including fair-play football, personal development and life skills to strengthen a sense of identify and hope for future, along with access to tutoring, accredited leadership training, and meaningful employment. The programme includes a structured M&E framework for measuring outcomes and trying to assess outcomes and anticipated impacts, framed by external research and data, developed in partnership with universities. In 2008 a site was selected in Site B, Khayelitsha, a global crime hotspot with the highest per capita rape and murder rates in the world, to build a football field and indoor youth centre to run an afterschool programme.

Zech outlined the key components of the safe-hub model as community buy-in, safety, holistic programme and quality facilities. Currently, the Khayelitsha safe-hub offers an

after-school programme every day of the week for girls and boys aged 8 to 19 years, with 1500 children a week playing 'fair play' football, in which they are rewarded for performance on and off the field. A night programme has also been implemented for around 500 young men, aged 16 – 35 years. Young men are both the main perpetrators and victims of crime and violence, and the times of the programme (Friday and Saturday from 8pm to midnight) were identified as 'peak' crime periods.

A second centre is being developed between Manenberg and Gugulethu with the specific intention to bridge these areas and enable cultural exchange. This is an exciting project in the South African context, where these communities have seen little interaction or exchange. Participants will be selected on a 50/50 basis from these two communities. The next project in South Africa is scheduled for Diepsloot.

The programme has shown promising results in Khayelitsha in terms of a drop in crime reported in the radius of the centre. Since 2008, the pass rate of pupils participating has improved by an average of 49.2% in Maths and English, while AMANDLA's partner school, Ikhusi Primary, was awarded the most improved school in the district in 2012. The programme was one of two selected by the International Committee of the Red Cross as a best practice model for addressing youth violence to participate in a longitudinal research study. Preliminary results show significant improvements in attitudes to schooling, and decline in substance abuse and tolerance towards violence.

AMANDLA's strategic objective is to create 10 safe hubs in Africa and the Middle East by the end of 2022, reaching 20,000 vulnerable children and youth in violent-stricken and slum areas.

Behavioural measures of Social Cohesion: A Snapshot

Justine Burns is an Associate Professor in the School of Economics at UCT, and an associate of SALDRU and RUBEN. She is a behavioural economist, with experience in the field of experimental economics, as well as applied labour and microeconomics.

Burns began by outlining the ways in which incentivized decision tasks (experiments) can be used to study elements of social cohesion, such as trust, inequality, and attitudes towards distributive justice. Whilst more traditional survey instruments may be useful in collecting data on a wide range of topics, they may be particularly prone to respondent bias when it comes to sensitive topics such a prejudice or discrimination. The advantage of experiments in this domain is that they allow for an examination of the ways in which identity might affect social interactions in a less obvious or less threatening way than traditional survey questions, and the incentivized nature of the tasks makes "politically correct" choices costly for the individual.

Burns went on to outline three examples of studies that had utilized experimental tasks to study the influence of racial identity on choice behaviour. The first experiment was a dictator game, a non-strategic interaction between two players, in which Player A is

given an endowment, and asked if they would like to give any of this to Player B. As such, the choice made by Player A provides a measure of unconditional altruism, and has been argued to reflect an individual's willingness to engage in the voluntary redistribution of resources between themselves and another. Evidence from the anonymous version of this task has shown that individuals regularly share their endowment with their partner. Moreover, offers increase on average when Player A knows something about their partner. Burns then presented three South African studies which had used a dictator game. In the first, a study using students from UCT, when Player A's were paired with a partner who was on financial aid from the University, Player A's were significantly more willing to transfer some of their endowment to their partner. In contrast, in a treatment where Player A's believed they had earned the right to their endowment through high achievement on a test, they were significantly less inclined to redistribute their endowment towards their partner. In the other two studies, the racial identity of Player A's partner was revealed, either through the use of photographs, or through revealing their surname. In both these cases, White Player A's tended to transfer higher amounts to co-ethnics than non co-ethnics, whilst for Black Player A's, the ethnic identity of their partner did not have as strong an effect.

The second task described by Burns was a trust game. This is a strategic interaction between two players. Both players receive an endowment, and Player A is asked if they would like to transfer any of their endowment to Player B. Whatever they decide to send to Player B is first doubled or tripled by the experimenter before it is received by Player B, who must then decide if they want to return any amount to Player A. There is full information on both sides about the choices facing each player. In this setting, any amount sent by A is interpreted as a measure of trust, since they are making themselves vulnerable to potential exploitation by B, who could simply take the tripled amount and return nothing. Similarly, any amount returned by B to A is interpreted as a measure of trustworthiness. Burns presented results from a study that used this game to measure the impact of racial identity of decision behaviour, using a sample of born-free high school children in the Cape metro area. Black Player A's made lower offers to partners than White Player A's, possibly reflecting either lower trust or worse socio-economic circumstances, thereby raising the material value of the endowment. (or some combination of both). Irrespective of these differences in the level of the offers being made, the startling result from this study was that all Player A's, irrespective of racial identity, made significantly lower offers to Black partners, apparently borne, at least in part, out of a stereotype that Black partners would remit less. To the extent that this stereotype existed, the remittance behaviour of Black Player B's demonstrated this to be an incorrect perception, since they returned at least as much as any other Player B.

The final experimental study presented by Burns presented evidence from a public goods game. This is a group game, where a group of individuals must solve a collective action dilemma of how much of their individual endowment they should contribute to the common pot. The structure of the game is that individuals stand to benefit materially by free-riding on the contributions of others in this regard. In the standard

versions of this game run in other settings, most individuals contribute between 40-60% of their endowment to the public pot at the start of the game, with contributions declining as the game progresses. Burns reported a study where the standard game was played, with the adaptation that the racial diversity within groups was varied. Some groups comprised only White students or Black students, whilst other groups contained an equal mix of White and Black students. Contrary to expectation, the racially homogenous groups did not outperform the diverse groups. Rather, all White groups appeared to reach a co-operative outcome in this setting quite quickly, especially when communication was allowed, followed by the groups containing both Black and White students. In contrast, the All Black groups appeared to have the greatest difficulty in maintaining contributions to the public account, even in the presence of communication.

Burns concluded by arguing that there is certainly potential in using experimental methods to measure aspects of behaviour relevant to social cohesion, and understanding how behaviours might be differentially affected in strategic (i.e. resource contested) versus non-strategic settings. Moreover, the emerging work in this field serves to highlight the importance of the multiple identities held by any given individual, and remind us that achieving homogeneity in one dimension may simply open up new cleavages in some other dimension of identity. All of this reinforces the work that institutions and/or interventions that promote bonding and bridging social capital may be particularly important in promoting social cohesion.

Concluding session: Charting the Way forward

Murray Leibbrandt thanked participants for their contributions and outlined that the objective of the concluding session was to discuss how to proceed with initiating an interdisciplinary study on 'building a cohesive society in South Africa'. He explained that the workshop originated from the Carnegie 3 (C3) national process to develop strategies to overcome poverty and inequality in South Africa, during which social cohesion (or the lack thereof) was identified as a particular area requiring greater focus and attention. Leibbrandt proposed that the individuals sitting around the table, including international advisers with experience in the field of social cohesion, were well suited to decide if this was, indeed, a worthwhile exercise for a two and a half year work programme and invited their ongoing participation in this initiative. There was broad agreement amongst workshop participants that such a research initiative was a good idea, and some discussion followed about appropriate titles for such an initiative.

Turning to specifics, Professor Hiroyuki Hino then presented a proposed outline for a book project, inviting contributions for a three-part volume. Part 1 would provide an overview and 'status' report on social cohesion covering race, class, gender and history in South Africa; Part 2 would focus on conceptualisation and measurement of social cohesion; and Part 3 would explore the relationship between social cohesion and

national development, including policy recommendations. (See appendix for full proposal.) In the discussion that followed, participants welcomed the proposal to analyse, document and disseminate findings on social cohesion in South Africa. However, some felt that work should commence more broadly before narrowing the focus. Others felt that the outline provided a useful framework and starting point for developing a concrete work programme, and could be revised in parallel.

The point was made that policy makers need evidence for interventions, and have to balance competing needs for resources and political interests. The C3 initiative could help build relationships with policy makers, and if appropriate policies for both social cohesion and national development could be developed, this would affect macro priorities and resource allocation. There was some discussion on the complexities of the relationships between investment, economic growth and social cohesion, and how to locate this within the proposed work programme.

It was also recognised that further research, partnerships and discussion are needed to explore and unpack social cohesion at various levels. It was agreed that this workshop event was a significant, albeit small, step in opening up discussion on the complexities of building a more cohesive society, but that further clarity was needed on the role of participants and how to broaden participation. The workshop proposed the establishment of an active network of researchers and practitioners, to promote and enhance the visibility – and impact – of the wealth of existing work in the domain of social capital in South Africa and encourage cross-disciplinary debate, collaboration and communication. A key goal would be translation of existing evidence on effective social cohesion interventions into useful policy proposals, and effective engagement with policy makers in working towards Vision 2030. The organisers agreed to draft and circulate a concept note suggesting how to carry the momentum and enthusiasm of the workshop forward. The concept note attached draws out key themes from the workshop and proposes a way forward in this regard.

Emerging themes for future work

This section outlines a number of themes that emerged during the presentations and discussions at the workshop as areas in need of further work. Many of these themes overlap, are by no means exhaustive, nor mutually exclusive, and simply reflect some emerging research opportunities.

1. Definition of social cohesion in the South African context

A key aspect of any agenda that aims to promote social cohesion must be definition and measurement. In order to assess whether any progress has been made in promoting social cohesion, one must know how social cohesion is defined, and how one will measure whether progress has, in fact, been made in this regard. Whilst there is an international literature in this regard, there is scope for research and engagement on this front with regards to South Africa.

There was broad agreement at the workshop that measurement and study of social capital at multiple levels would be useful, namely at a macroeconomic level (e.g. defining an appropriate social cohesion index for the South African context), a meso level (institutional level analyses) and a microeconomic level (including case studies and experimental work). Moreover, it was recognised that whilst social cohesion as an end in itself may be desirable, an important policy agenda for the network going forward would be to focus on social cohesion to promote inclusive development. This suggests scope for further work (building on the framework of Stewart and Langer, and Mattes) in thinking through what the appropriate components of a social cohesion index in South Africa would be. In particular, there was discussion around the possibility of conceptualising social cohesion through an institutional lens, where social cohesion is viewed as the absence of conflict owing to the presence of effective institutional arrangements that mediate daily interactions (as in the example of body corporates in Roodepoort).

Further points for discussion over the measurement of social cohesion include:

- the scope for using objective data as well as subjective data on perceptions in constructing such an index

- the trade-off of an index that is both contextually relevant for South Africa, but universal enough to be used in cross-country analysis. In addition, is there the possibility of defining an index in such a way that it could be usefully employed in studies at a macro, meso and micro level. Finally, there is a need to consider what the appropriate development outcomes are when assessing the extent to which improvements in social cohesion have promoted inclusive development. Since inequality lies at the heart of economic relations and structures that feed back in multiple ways into the issues around social cohesion and the structural fault lines that exist in South Africa today, marhsalling the evidence on the causes and consequences of inequality for social cohesion is another important work agenda.

• the need for critical reflection on the nature of the data being used to construct such an index, and the ways in which phrasing of questions in existing data sets might influence the construction of the index. Indeed, there was some discussion over the merits of developing an independent survey instrument specifically to measure social cohesion, as opposed to relying on existing data that may not be collected with this goal in mind.

• concerns over the way in which identity might be defined and included in the construction of such an index. Deciding which identities are salient is a contested issue, and may change over time, and this has implications for the construction of the index, as well as it's comparability over time. In particular, there was a fair deal of debate over the appropriateness of using racial identity within a South African context, amidst moves to eschew these apartheid classifications.

2. Politics of social cohesion

An emerging theme during the workshop centred on the need for critical reflection of the politics underlying the dialogue and policy around social cohesion. In many instances, government is simultaneously driving processes that are in contradiction to the NDP vision concerning social cohesion, and many of the institutional structures previously put in place to promote social dialogue (such as NEDLAC) have been systematically undermined with serious economic and social consequences. Case studies such as that of Marikana, and of land use rights and the role of traditional leaders, highlight the devastating consequences that arise when deliberate actions are taken by elites (be they in government, the corporate sector or union leadership) within and across institutions that are supposed to promote social cohesion, in the process remoulding those institutions and cutting out the base, or the intended beneficiaries. These developments reflect deliberate choices being made by decision-makers acting with agency, that leads to outcomes with particular intended and unintended consequences for different constituencies. There is a crucial need for critical analysis that highlights these developments, and provides insights on how to rebuild the necessary structures that will facilitate social dialogue and cohesion, economically and socially. For example, as Vision 2030 talks of promoting increased interaction, this raises the question of what kinds of policies could be pursued that would promote interaction and build social cohesion, both in the short- and longer term.

3. Institutions matter

The importance of institutions (defined broadly) in promoting or undermining aspects of social cohesion was another important theme to emerge during the workshop. Discussions highlighted both the positive role that informal and formal institutional structures can play in promoting trust, facilitating bridging social capital and building a collective identity, as well as the dark side of social cohesion which manifests when, often in the absence of formal, effective institutions, groups collectively engage in behaviours with negative consequences for themselves and others, be they intended or unintended. The absence of adequate formal institutional support at critical junctures

(e.g. the lack of sufficient psychological and trauma support services, the breakdown of supportive family and community structures), the emergence of alternative forms of collective governance as possible models to promote cohesion, and the role of informal institutions in mediating social relations were all highlighted as important policy issues deserving of more attention. One relatively under-explored question that emerged was the potential for policy to either crowd-in or crowd-out social cohesion. The case study of tourism marketing strategies in KwaZulu-Natal provide a stark example in this regard, and raise the challenge of how one designs and implements policy that meets economic development imperatives in a way that is socially inclusive, and promotes trust and a collective identity.

4. Identity and custom

The issue of identity was discussed repeatedly during the course of the workshop. To the extent that the construction of a social cohesion index incorporates identity as a key element, this raises the question of which identities should be included, and how should they be measured. Individuals possess multiple identities, some of which are inherited (e.g. gender) , some of which are inherited but socially constructed (e.g. race), and some of which are adopted (e.g. religious affiliation, or linguistic preference). The importance of any given local identity will vary depending on context, raising the question of which identities matter and how, and in which context. Moreover, these local identities present the challenge of how one effectively promotes social cohesion and nation building in a way that promotes a national or more global identity (e.g. a regional identity or national identity) without undermining a local identity, or promoting one local identity above another (as in the case study of Zulu identity in KwaZulu Natal).

In particular, there was debate around the issue of ethnicity and racial identity in the South African context. While some felt that ethnicity should be de-emphasised, others argued the need to measure this dimension in order to track whether progress was being made. This debate is particularly salient in debates around higher education admissions policies currently, and is an area requiring further critical reflection.

A particularly challenging issue is the tension between “custom” or “culture” and gender equality. A powerful view that emerged at the workshop was the extent to which the welfare of women and young girls are sacrificed in the name of cultural practice or custom, and a deafening silence on these matters owing to a deep-seated reluctance to tackle the domain of cultural issues, espeically inside the “sacred space of the family”, which are often steeped in patriarchy. In addition, custom is often used as an excuse to suppress critical questioning of particular policies, and to promote particular kinds of policies that benefit an elite few and further marginalise the poor, thereby undermining social cohesion and generating greater inequalities (as in the case study of land rights and transitional leaders).

In sum, debating the issue of identity and its role in promoting or undermining social cohesion is particularly challenging in the South African context where there has

historically been very strong identity differentiation, especially along racial lines, but also in terms of gender, language and class, and where culture or custom is increasingly being used as an excuse to suppress debate over policy. Making progress on how one goes about promoting social cohesion in such a society that has historically been so clearly differentiated and segregated is a key component of a future work agenda.

5. Psychological woundedness

The prevalence and devastating consequences of psychological woundedness emerged as a critical area in need of further attention during the course of the workshop. In particular, the lack of support structures and counselling services to help individuals deal with the psychological traumas of daily life in South Africa (be it exposure to crime, lack of employment and inability to provide for one's family etc) was highlighted as a key issue to be dealt with if individuals were to be able to fully integrate into their communities and make positive contributions. The absence of services that help individuals and communities communicate effectively, and engage in constructive problem solving undermines the goal of building a cohesive society, leaving psychologically wounded individuals feeling dislocated from their families and marginalised within their communities. This may be exacerbated in situations where some individuals are perceived to have benefited from economic shifts whilst others have not e.g. the stark example of increased domestic violence againt women in the context of growing employment opportunities for women as oppsed to men.

The dearth of skilled professionals in this sector as well as general inaccessibility of these kinds of services were identified as a key constraints to be addressed in order to facilitate the societal process of healing. In addition, exploring the possibility of marshalling artists and art (visual, music, drama) as vehicles to promote healing and social cohesion was touted as an avenue for exploration. Finally, exploring the transmission of trauma transgenerationally, as has been done in relation to the Holocaust, was raised as a useful avenue area of research in a South African context.

Taking the work forward: Establishment of research network on social cohesion

Given the energy and enthusiasm generated by the March 2014 inaugural workshop, the consensus view amongst workshop participants was that it would be useful to produce a draft concept note, outlining some ideas on how to carry the momentum from the workshop forward.

The proposal is to establish an active network of researchers and practitioners whose work speaks to the issue of social cohesion in South Africa in some way. By opting into the network, individuals are signalling that their research agenda falls broadly within the domain of social cohesion, and that as individual researchers, they have identified this as a key area where they would like to make an active contribution, and engage with their peers and policy makers in the short-to medium term.

Within this context then, the role of the network is to promote and enhance the visibility of the wealth of existing work that already exists in the domain of social capital in South Africa, and to offer researchers and practitioners an opportunity to connect, debate and collaborate on a regular basis, and across disciplinary boundaries. As such, the goal of the network would be to promote active engagement and inter-disciplinary collaboration between network members (and their graduate students); promote and give prominence to the work of its members; and to take seriously the task of translating existing evidence on effective social cohesion interventions into useful policy proposals, and to engage effectively with policy makers in achieving Vision 2030. A key objective would be to link this work to the national C3 agenda on reducing inequality and promoting inclusive development. In addition, the network would aim to generate public engagement and debate over key aspects of building a more cohesive society.

These objectives could be achieved in a number of ways, including:

1. **Social media presence**: A website will be established that serves as an additional portal through which the work of network members, and other associated resources pertinent to the debate around social cohesion, can be accessed. An associated blog (and other social media platforms such as Twitter) could be used to post short pieces by network members and be used to generate public debate and discussion.
2. **Local work programmes**: Whilst network members will continue to define their own research and work agendas, it is hoped that they would identify others from their home institutions or organisations who work in cognate fields and not only draw them into the network, but also begin a series of collaborative work efforts/discussions at a local institutional/organisational level. These could include initiating seminar series where work on social cohesion could be presented, and discussion/reading groups where individuals begin to explore some of the emerging themes of interest in a collaborative space. The end product could be to produce a series of inputs for the next workshop, alongside publications and policy briefs, which again, could be further disseminated through the network.
3. **Public events:** Organising public debates, guest lectures or panel discussions around critical aspects that relate to the promotion of social cohesion is an additional mechanism through which public debate and engagement could be stimulated. These could happen locally, but could be promoted and advertised through the network.

In the short-term, in order to launch the activities and presence of the network, UCT has allocated some resources towards the establishment of a web presence for the network, and for a co-ordinator who would take responsibility for organising subsequent workshop meetings.