RESEARCH ROUNDTABLE:

Governance, Society and Development in Africa

A Report of the Building Bridges Programme, Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice, University of Cape Town

August 2016

Back Row: Axolile Notywala (South Africa LPL2015); Albert van Zyl (South Africa); Fabio Andres Diaz (Colombia); Hannah Diaz (GSDPP); Alan Hirsch (GSDPP); Nancy Muigei (Kenya LPL2015); Chris Nkwatsibwe (Uganda LPL2016); Samson Itodo (Nigeria LPL2016); Emmanuel Ametepey (Ghana LPL2016).

Front Row: Dzikamai Bere (Zimbabwe LPL2016); Mabel Sithole (GSDPP); Gwamaka Kifukwe (Tanzania LPL2015); Nkosikhulule Xhawulengweni Nyembezi (UCT); Yusuf Shamsudeen Adio (Nigeria LPL2016); Marianne Camerer (GSDPP); Jake Okechukwu Effoduh (Nigeria LPL2016); Colm Allen (South Africa).

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Foreword

In August 2016, we hosted the first Building Bridges Research Roundtable and were thrilled when nine of the alumni from the 2015 and 2016 cohorts of the Leading in Public Life Emerging African Leaders programme answered the call. At very short notice alumni were invited to write up a 'case study' of their current work in practice and come to Cape Town to present it. This presented a unique opportunity for our alumni to commit time to write up and reflect on their 'work in progress', including current campaigns, advocacy initiatives, and donor-funded projects. Those who answered the call would present them in person to each other and other recognised governance experts.

'Case study' implies an academic offering, peer-reviewed, with a specific purpose, be it for teaching or academic publication. Purposefully, very little guidance was given to alumni, other than the framing questions (referred to in the introduction to this report) and that the written input be less than 15 pages. We were delighted when alumni from all of the eight countries covered by the first two years of the programme responded to the call. It provided a unique chance for these practitioners to reflect on their work, and for us to learn what had happened to them since the intense March residential leadership programme. In addition, it was a chance to reconnect in Cape Town, across years, and to use the elegant setting of Linkoping House, where the Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice (GSDPP) is housed, to host a research workshop which would exemplify the nexus between praxis, knowledge, and research with real examples of development and governance work happening right now on the continent.

Although housed at the University of Cape Town (UCT), Building Bridges is not an academic programme and successful applicants are rarely purely academic researchers. Whilst the March Leading in Public Life programme (LPL) is largely about tapping 'the knowledge in the room' – embodied by the 25 leaders from our ten target countries who over the two-week residential programme generously share their stories and their context specific experiences, often triggered by an inspiring speaker or public leader – the August meeting is different. Here the opportunity to convene builds on the trust which has already been established, having 'graduated' as alumni of the programme and the first research roundtable engendered a richer conversation that went way beyond what we had imagined.

GSDPP as a graduate school offers a Masters' degree, which some Building Bridges alumni are now pursuing, in this way linking the different pillars of the School. The GSDPP's focus is on Africa and practitioner knowledge in complex contexts and on how theories of development policy interact with actual practices on the ground. Connecting people, ideas and building trust amongst emerging public leaders and progressive reformers in Africa is what Building Bridges facilitates. Connecting reformers both inside and outside of government is a key objective of the programme. This quote from one of the roundtable participants sums up the challenge: "Both sides of the table are equally important … we have to find the complex coalitions that drive reform and include allies within government and civil society." Also that politics is important.

This report presents the result of an iterative process: initial abstracts were converted into draft papers which were then circulated to all the participants before the meeting and presented in person over the course of the day-long workshop where feedback was received by the group. A full transcript was shared shortly after the meeting to encourage participants to integrate the ideas that surfaced from the peer engagement with their initial papers. A final paper was submitted and lightly copy-edited so that the original voice and style of each participant still comes through vividly. The convening allowed participants to share their struggles and find connections and also to be frank about what is working, or not. It provided pointers to potential new areas of research, engagement, collaboration and activism in the areas of governance, society and development.

The roundtable would not have been possible without several factors: the generosity and flexibility of our funders (namely the IDRC and the Ford Foundation); the enthusiasm and commitment of GSDPP staff, in particular Mabel Sithole, Hannah Diaz, and the School's director, Professor Alan Hirsch. We are grateful to the four governance experts who listened critically and engaged with the alumni's papers, namely Colm Allen, Fabio Andres Diaz, Nkosikhulule Nyembezi and Albert van Zyl. Emma de Wet produced a faithful transcript of the workshop proceedings, Vaun Cornell painstakingly consolidated and copy-edited the inputs, Nica Cornell stream-lined the references, and Mandy Darling typeset and laid out the text, to culminate in the first Research Roundtable Report of the Building Bridges Programme. We are enormously grateful to all of them. But mostly to the emerging leaders who invested in reflective time and space to take a step back from their activism and share lessons learned in the field. Even the most seasoned academics and practitioners in the governance space can benefit from their insights. We look forward to the next research roundtable with alumni from 2015, 2016 and 2017 convening in Cape Town to share work in progress with their peers and find the solidarity and support needed to continue to engage actively in public leadership that makes a difference on the continent.

Dr Marianne Camerer
Programme Director: Building Bridges

Introduction

The objective of the Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice at the University of Cape Town is to provide specialised training for senior public servants and to operate as a centre of excellence in the art of strategic public leadership. The School offers an executive Master's degree for mid-career managers, executive short courses for public sector leaders, a research programme on governance and development and the Building Bridges programme. The Building Bridges programme focuses on connecting political stakeholders and research experts to address critical issues in Africa. The main objective is to build bridges and new networks of trust and expertise between influencers in Africa – political decision makers, policy researchers and civil society activists – and to enhance leadership through engagement, dialogue, and research.

Since 2015, Building Bridges has offered an annual leadership development course for young African leaders, Leading in Public Life (LPL). The two-week residential course emphasises the importance of leadership in an African and global context, acknowledging both the specific character of African development challenges, as well as the richness and diversity of African experiences of leadership thinking and practice. The programme's leadership model is based on four core propositions: Agency; Collaboration; Driving Change and Innovation; and, the African Context. Leading in Public Life aims to enhance the personal and professional development of each participant, to create an alumni network for sharing information and lessons, and to contribute to creating a community of leadership practice.

The programme aims to create sustainable leadership development programmes that serve an emerging class of African public leaders and engage strategically with relevant thematic issues, through an intra- and inter-country and expert exchange and growing alumni network. From 2014 to 2016, Building Bridges hosted several events on the programmatic theme of African Economic Integration attended by over 140 influential policy makers, decision makers and emerging leaders from over 20 African countries. In March 2016, a working theme was adopted – Governance Activism for Inclusive Democratic Development. This theme reflects on the collective action of citizens and non-governmental activist forces pushing for governance reforms aimed at pressing for accountability and delivery of key public services and their interaction with state actors who are similarly committed to an inclusive governance agenda that includes a commitment to open, participatory and accountable governance.

The focus area of inclusive governance that both captures the impetus of 'working with the grain' as well as the imperative to build institutions (beyond mere structures) to promote inclusive development, is a long-term strategic focus of the School. Whilst Governance Activism for Inclusive Democratic Development emphasises collective action, 'working with the grain', virtuous circles and an incremental approach to inclusive development, our future work with emerging leaders in Africa continues to stress an inclusive governance agenda that promotes accountability to address inequality.

The Building Bridges programme is hallmarked as a unique platform for governments, civil society, donors and researchers to explore solutions, identify virtuous circles and form 'surprising alliances' to address a plethora of development challenges on the continent. Civic space globally, and on the continent, is narrowing if not shrinking. There is an increasing call for real stakeholder engagement on governance related policy issues rather than mere participation. Navigating this tension requires public leadership from all stakeholders. In this context, public leadership tackles major public concerns and issues, and takes place within the public sphere rather than within narrow organisational contexts.

How do we want to govern and be governed? By whom, and how? These are critical questions in all societies, and particularly pertinent in places where significant transformation is taking place, often very rapidly, leading to changing values, changing priorities, and changing aspirations. Societies today are made more complex by increased connectivity to the world through the advances of science and technology and globalization, with increasingly complex social and economic links at every level, from the global community down to the individual.

With its focus on supporting governance activists, both in and outside of the state, Building Bridges aims to keep the door open and create space for engagement in a context of oftentimes mutual mistrust. As part of deepening engagement and broadening the conversation, 2015 and 2016 alumni from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe were invited to write up original reports on their work on the theme of Governance Activism for Inclusive Democratic Development.

LPL alumni from seven countries submitted and presented the following 'case studies':

- Gwamaka Kifukwe (Tanzania) State-Civil Society Relations in Governance and democracy: A historical perspective from Tanzania
- Dzikamai Bere (Zimbabwe) Building an Inclusive Coalition for Transitional Justice in Zimbabwe: The case of the National Transitional Justice Working Group in Zimbabwe

- Jake Okechukwu Effoduh (Nigeria) Governance Activism for the Inclusive Development of Security in Northern Nigeria
- Yusuf Shamsudeen Adio (Nigeria) Promoting Democratic Accountability in Nigeria: The Buharimeter
- Chris Nkwatsibwe (Uganda) The Citizens' Manifesto Case Study: Recounting a citizen-led advocacy agenda in Uganda
- Nancy Muigei (Kenya) Leading from the middle: Case study on the birth of a social justice movement, 'Sauti ya Umma'
- Emmanuel Ametepey (Ghana) Social Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (SPEFA): The case of Nsawam-Adoagyiri Municipality
- Samson Itodo (Nigeria) Strengthening Legislative Accountability and Local Governance: A case study of the #YLAPNG Project in Nigeria
- Axolile Notywala (South Africa) Building and Enhancing Participation, Transparency and Accountability in South Africa through Social Audits.

Presenters were asked to reflect on the following questions:

- With civic space on the continent narrowing, is it possible to create opportunities for effective engagement and dialogue between civil society and state actors in order to foster inclusive development?
- How can one avoid frustration of citizens with poor service delivery spilling over into violence and disengagement from democratic processes? What role can civil society stakeholders play in this regard?
- How can the governance space for engagement remain open?
- Can data play a role?

The 'case studies' were presented at a research roundtable in Cape Town in August 2016. Discussion at the roundtable helped inform our thinking and strategy in designing future activities convened by Building Bridges, our funding partners and regional stakeholders on the theme of inclusive governance and promoting accountability, our focus for 2017 – 2018.

Part 1 of this report provides a summary of proceedings at the roundtable, drawing on the presentations and discussion, while Part 2 contains the full case studies.

Roundtable Programme

Session 1: Framing the Issue – Governance Activism for Inclusive Development

Facilitator/Discussant: Mabel Sithole, GSDPP, UCT

Panellists:

Gwamaka Kifukwe (Tanzania), Dzikamai Bere (Zimbabwe) Jake Okechukwu Effoduh (Nigeria)

Session 2: Citizen-led Democracy

Facilitator/Discussant: Nkosikhulule Xhawulengweni Nyembezi, UCT

Panellists:

Yusuf Shamsudeen Adio (Nigeria), Chris Nkwatsibwe (Uganda), Nancy Muigei (Kenya)

Session 3: Promoting Accountability

Facilitator/Discussant: Hannah Diaz, GSDPP, UCT

Panellists:

Emmanuel Ametepey (Ghana), Samson Itodo (Nigeria), Axolile Notywala (South Africa)

Session 4: Reflections, Discussion and Way Forward

Facilitator: Marianne Camerer, GSDPP, UCT

Discussants: Albert van Zyl (IBP), Colm Allen (independent consultant), Fabio Andres Diaz (independent researcher)

Part 1: Roundtable Proceedings

Session 1: Framing the Issue – Governance Activism for Inclusive Development

The first session provided a framework for exploring the relationship between civil society and the state in Africa, through the lens of inclusive governance, drawing on case studies from Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Nigeria.

State-Civil Society Relations in Governance and Democracy: A historical perspective from Tanzania

Gwamaka Kifukwe is a civil servant currently working as the Programme Coordinator, Sustainable Development, at the Institute of African Leadership for Sustainable Development (UONGOZI Institute) in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He also hosts the TV interview shows 'In Focus' and 'Meet the Leader' – the former exploring sustainable development related topics (with a focus on Africa) with decision makers and practitioners from around the world; the latter discussing leadership lessons from, and biographies of, current and former Heads of State and major international organisations in the private, public and civil society sectors. In 2015, Gwamaka participated in the first LPL programme, and assisted in organising the first regional meeting on African Economic Integration, held in Dar es Salaam in August 2015, co-hosted by Building Bridges and the UONGOZI Institute. He was also a presenter and panel judge at the 2016 LPL programme. Gwamaka has been a member of the World Economic Forum's Global Shapers Community since 2013, serving as Curator for 2013/14 for Dar es Salaam, and is an inaugural (2014) YALI Mandela-Washington Fellow (Public Management track). He self-defines as a pan-Africanist, and is passionate about tackling the problems in secondary and vocational education facing Africa as well as addressing the relationships between government and the public on the continent. Gwamaka completed his PhD in Geography in 2012 at the University of Nottingham. His thesis was titled 'The Geography of Development Experts and Expertise in Tanzania: 1992 – 2007'.

The presentation sketched the history of state-society relations in Tanzania as a context for understanding and improving relations between civil society and the state. In Tanzania, debate about the legitimacy of civil society organisations (CSOs) and questions about their agendas and motivations persist. CSOs have grown as much due to financial and political incentives from development partners as they have in response to the failures of the state in service provision or addressing progressive social interests and movements. As a result, they struggle for legitimacy not only within official development networks but in society more broadly. CSOs have often served as a mouthpiece on particular issues, which has hindered their ability to critique policy (and indeed even aid) frameworks and interventions. As such, CSOs have become increasingly professionalised, shifting and 'growing' from community-based organisations to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and at times resemble consultancy firms rather than representatives of organised social movements.

That CSOs represent 'interest groups' is not in-and-of itself a negative characteristic because it is these interest groups that can provide specific and targeted insights into important issues. In addition, these spaces can help to develop and evolve ideas outside the rigidities of both the public and private sectors, which have their own broad agendas – in essence, civil society is the space for unofficial deliberation that can then be formalised in either of the other two sectors. Civil society is therefore necessarily a contested space, but a shared space outside of formal channels which often come with their own rules and procedures which can limit engagement.

Another challenge to moves towards inclusive governance in Tanzania is the clash in cultures between civil society and the civil service. CSOs are often seen as attention-seeking, and therefore untrustworthy and only self-interested, or even as 'alien' and imposed onto 'traditional' African social, cultural, and political configurations and governance models. The media often becomes the battleground for public opinion, with public officials fearful of being misquoted or conveying the wrong message. This mistrust can only be overcome in time, mostly through informal and personal channels, rather than overt and official dialogues.

The presentation highlighted the importance of understanding local context in improving relations between civil society and the broader public sector. Working together does not necessarily mean in agreement – effective and representative governance requires open deliberation on conflicting positions, where appropriate and possible, and a focus on implementation and 'working with the grain' to achieve gains.

Building an Inclusive Coalition for Transitional Justice in Zimbabwe: The case of the National Transitional Justice Working Group in Zimbabwe

Dzikamai Bere is a researcher for the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (the Forum), and has served as the Coordinator for the National Transitional Justice Working Group (NTJWG) since its launch in 2014. The NTJWG works across six thematic areas: gender, promotion of truth, justice and accountability, reparations and rehabilitation of victims, institutional transformation and memorialisation. Dzikamai played a key role in coordinating the establishment of the NTJWG by 46 organisations active in the areas of transitional justice, social cohesion, accountability and reconciliation. He is responsible for building advocacy cross-linkages among stakeholders, developing advocacy tools and initiatives for stakeholder involvement in policy issues across the six themes, and drafting policy proposals and recommendations for NTJWG, policy makers and the stakeholders in the sector. From 2009 to 2012, following the formation of the coalition government in Zimbabwe, Dzikamai was instrumental in the formation of the Transitional Justice Unit, which campaigned successfully for the establishment of a National Peace and Reconciliation Commission in Zimbabwe. Before joining civil society, Dzikamai worked as a magistrate in Bulawayo. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in History from Solusi University and a Master of Advanced Studies in Peace and Conflict Transformation from the Swisspeace Academy in Switzerland. He is an alumnus of the 2016 LPL programme, and is a Transitional Justice Fellow with the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.

The presentation outlined in detail the development of a transitional justice agenda in Zimbabwe, the challenges faced, and the successes achieved. On 22 May 2013, a new Constitution came into effect in Zimbabwe, which among other things established the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC), charged with ensuring post-conflict justice, healing and reconciliation. The Commission was the product of a lengthy advocacy campaign by many civil society actors.

A year after the promulgation of the new Constitution, civil society actors gathered in Harare to establish the National Transitional Justice Working Group (NTJWG) as a broad-based platform to provide an interface between official transitional justice processes[1] and transitional justice stakeholders. The NTJWG has since become the face of a reform coalition that predates its own birth. The presentation traced the political developments behind this unprecedented experiment to confront the paradox of transitional justice in a non-transitional state, and the role of the NTJWG in building an inclusive coalition for transitional justice in Zimbabwe.

In September 2015, the NTJWG launched a set of guiding principles for transitional justice policy and practice in Zimbabwe, the outcome of a decades-long dialogue between transitional justice actors and activists. In December 2015, the NPRC Bill was gazetted and the NTJWG subsequently conducted a review of the proposed legislation. Their report concluded that the proposed Bill violated several sections of the Constitution and failed to comply with United Nations guidelines on truth commissions.

According to the United Nations Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States on Truth Commissions, the legitimacy and public confidence that are essential for a successful truth commission process depend on the commission's ability to carry out its work without political interference. It further states that once established, the Commission should operate free of direct influence or control by the government, including in its research and investigations, budgetary decision-making, reporting and recommendations.

In contrast, the proposed NPRC Bill makes the Commission a ministerial taskforce and its commissioners dependent on the executive. For example, while the Constitution establishes an NPRC that is accountable to the Parliament, the Bill creates an NPRC that is accountable to the Minister of National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation. While the Constitution delegates the power to hire its own secretariat to the Commission, the Bill gives the Minister power to appoint civil servants to its Secretariat. In addition, while the Constitution creates commissioners with security of tenure similar to that of judges, the Bill creates Commissioners whose tenure can be terminated by the President after five years.

Another major concern is that the Bill failed to establish a distinct mandate for dealing with the past as envisaged by the Constitution. Although the NPRC had a specific mandate to deal with the past in a manner that facilitated truth telling, this point was not made clearly in the Bill as it confused it with the obligations of the Human Rights Commission. The Bill gives the Minister of Healing too much power including the power to decide what to do with the recommendations of the Commission. The Bill also ignored the need to archive information gathered by the Commission and it was unclear whether the public would have access to this information.

The NTJWG then launched a public campaign against the proposed Bill, and lobbied parliamentarians. The campaign raised awareness about key concerns, including inadequate public consultation and participation in the process, and the protection of victims of conflict, critical in a society which has been characterised by political violence. The Bill has subsequently been withdrawn, and Government has committed to reworking it in line with recommendations from stakeholders.

1 Official transitional justice processes refer to processes like the establishment of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the Gender Commission and other government-led initiatives to deal with past gross violations of human rights in Zimbabwe.

In addition to its leadership role in public dialogue on transitional justice, the NTJWG is actively involved in establishing mechanisms for public participation and accountability to assist in dealing with Zimbabwe's violent past and laying the foundations for a just and democratic future.

Governance Activism for the Inclusive Development of Security in Northern Nigeria

Jake Okechukwu Effoduh is the Assistant Director of the Council on African Security and Development (CASADE), a non-profit research-driven collective of experts and academics that offers guidance and counsel to African ministries, agencies, universities and international organisations. He is also a consultant with Synceritas, the world's premier cyber intelligence and corporate risk consultancy. Jake has six years' experience in using the law for human development and 10 years' experience in traditional media for development. Since 2006, he has been a freelance radio presenter with the BBC Media Action, anchoring one of Nigeria's most popular radio programmes, *Talk Your Own Make Naija Better*, aired on over 120 radio stations with a weekly listenership of over 30 million Nigerians. Jake won the Future Africa Awards in Community Action in 2014, and the Africa Youth Choice Award for Human Rights in 2015, and was listed by ventureburn.com as one of 50 Africans who will transform the continent. He is an alumnus of the 2016 LPL programme. Jake holds a Legum Baccalaureus from the University of Abuja and a Masters in Law from the University of Oxford.

The Boko Haram insurgency has spread terror in Northern Nigeria and surrounding regions through the abduction, torture and killing of local people. The situation has contributed to the collapse of civil society in the region, and generated intense distrust between the youth, the police, and the government. To tackle this issue, the Abuja Global Shapers in partnership with the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria launched an inclusive model of activism to support government efforts and rebuild trust between the civilian population and security forces. The Amana Initiative established 22 concrete projects, with input from local communities, which were implemented within two yearly rounds in Northern Nigeria. The projects engaged about 400,000 people, including 28,000 youth and 2,050 members of government security forces.

The presentation explored the impact of the Amana Initiative (a Hausa word for trust) within the context of governance activism and inclusive development. It unpacked some of the historical, political and socio-economic factors that have shaped the evolution of Northern Nigeria and the Boko Haram insurgency, as a basis to explain the involvement of relevant stakeholders in the Amana Initiative local projects. The projects involved a range of activities including anti-terrorism campaigns, athletic competitions, town hall meetings, truth and reconciliation panels, media engagements, essay competitions, rallies, security trainings, policy dialogues, musical performances, and even theatre and art production. These activities raised awareness amongst the youth about their role in improving security in their communities, created an inter-sectoral platform for youth to engage positively with security forces and government officials and empowered youth to encourage their participation in identifying challenges and solutions to promote the inclusive development of security in the region.

The Amana Initiative demonstrated the importance of listening to the needs of the community and working with stakeholders at grassroots level. However, notwithstanding the improved level of trust between the youth and security agencies, there is still much scope for similar projects in the region and an insatiable hunger for professional development and training projects for personnel in the administration of criminal justice sector in Northern Nigeria. There is also ample room for similar initiatives directed towards inclusive development in areas beyond security.

The presentation also shed light on the daily realities of life and challenges faced by the civilian population during the insurgency. It provided valuable insights and lessons for the government to utilise in rebuilding confidence and improving security in Northern Nigeria. While the government announced the defeat of Boko Haram in August 2016, it will take a long time for the economy of Northern Nigeria, especially in the North East, to recover. Moving forward, the focus of the Amana Initiative is on scaling up this model of activism to continue to build bridges between the government, security forces and the civilian population.

Session 2: Citizen-led Democracy

The second session provided examples of initiatives to strengthen democracy and accountability through active citizenry and participation, with case studies from Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya.

Promoting Democratic Accountability in Nigeria: The Buharimeter

Yusuf Shamsudeen Adio is Senior Programmes Officer (SPO) with the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) in Abuja, Nigeria. In this capacity he has observed elections at local, sub-national, national and regional levels; conducted trainings for stakeholders on mandate protection; convened inter-party debates on national issues; conducted research on development issues in Nigeria; and engaged with the government for policy change. Through several projects implemented within Nigeria and other West African countries, Yusuf has mobilised and led advocacy campaigns to increase citizen involvement in decision-making processes, accountability and transparency. He

recently coordinated a civil society group campaigning against illicit financial flows to mark International Anti-corruption Day in Nigeria, and is currently coordinating efforts to engage with relevant committees at the National Assembly on the issue. Yusuf is the lead officer of the BuhariMeter project that aims to track and monitor the implementation of the campaign promises of President Muhammadu Buhari and his party, the All Progressives Congress. Yusuf is a member of DFID Voice for Change Project Research Advisory Group, Nigeria; an alumnus of West Africa Peacebuilding Institute, Ghana; and was a Junior Fellow at the Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique, University of Ibadan. He holds a Bachelor and Masters' degree in Political Science from Lagos State University and the University of Ibadan respectively, and has professional certification in peacebuilding, gender-sensitive governance and budget and monitoring tracking for CSOs.

There is a disconnection between elections and democratic accountability in Nigeria. Since the restoration of democracy in 1999, regular elections have been held, with a major threshold crossed during the 2015 general election. There has also been a significant shift towards issue-based campaigns during elections in which politicians reel out policy ideas to address development challenges and gain electoral support. Despite these accomplishments, the country faces major socio-economic and political challenges, including unemployment, poverty, insecurity, an infrastructure deficit, and an unstable political climate.

The presentation gave an overview of the Buharimeter, an innovative project to promote democratic accountability in Nigeria by tracking the implementation of sector-specific election promises made by President Muhammadu Buhari and his party, the All Progressives Congress, during the 2015 general election. Its key objective is to bridge the gap that exists between the government and the governed, thereby facilitating a process through which democratic accountability becomes the norm. The Buharimeter is the product of several interventions embarked on by the Centre for Democracy and Development, a regional research advocacy and training NGO in West Africa. It was explicitly designed to monitor government performance, mobilise and educate citizens, and provide a tool for policy analysis. The project aims to empower civil society and citizens to engage constructively with government through town hall meetings, policy dialogues and other fora. To date, the Centre has released five reports monitoring government performance in the first 30 days, 60 days, 100 days, 7 months and one year. The reports provide a critical analysis of government performance against electoral promises, highlight key challenges and make informed recommendations on pathways to consolidate democracy in the country.

The presentation reflected on the achievements of the Buharimeter to date, the challenges encountered, and how these are mitigated. It highlighted the importance of partnerships and citizen participation in strengthening accountability and democracy. It concluded by recommending replication of the intervention, adapted for other African countries, and emphasised the need to build synergy and share experiences in order to institutionalise citizen-driven accountability mechanisms across Africa.

The Citizens' Manifesto Case Study: Recounting a Citizen-led Advocacy Agenda in Uganda

Chris Nkwatsibwe is a Ugandan social activist who is passionate about justice and enhancing the contribution of young people to social change and transformation. He is the Resource Person at the Uganda National NGO Forum, working on the Campaign for Free and Fair Elections, Black Monday Campaign, NGO Operating Environment and the Citizens' Manifesto Initiatives, which among other things underscore the need for active citizenship and responsive leadership. Chris is an alumnus of the 2016 LPL programme, and was a semi-finalist in the British Parliamentary Track at the IDEA Youth Fellowship. He has founded and contributed to several initiatives to this end, including the Hope Initiative, the Green Light Movement, Youth Strategic Leadership Forum, Young Leaders Think-Tank, and Network Debate Africa, of which he is a founding partner. Chris has also conducted research into youth unemployment, measures of growth and development, a minimum wage and health insurance in Uganda.

Uganda faces systemic challenges including low levels of civic competency and citizen agency; patronage politics; poverty and poor service delivery; and a narrowing political space. These challenges highlight the need to strengthen citizen agency and encourage responsive leadership. The Citizens' Manifesto Initiative was launched in 2010 to contribute to these goals by creating a popular citizen-rooted agenda to increase the accountability of leaders.

The presentation provided an overview of the background to the birth of this initiative and its contribution to shaping democracy in a complex governance context. The Citizens' Manifesto Initiative placed citizens at the centre of shaping the political future of the country and involved a multiplicity of actors from civil society and government. Key elements of the initiative were civic education to encourage and broaden electoral participation and citizen activism to articulate demands at a household, community, district, regional and national level. Activities were undertaken over a five-year period from 2010 to 2015. Workshops offered training to civil society stakeholders tasked with organising community and citizen consultations on minimum demands.

Community and interest group consultations were held in 14 geographical regions. The demands and aspirations emerging from these events were synthesised to generate regional, interest group and national manifestoes, translated into local languages, and disseminated widely via the media and political leadership structures.

These demands formed the basis and agenda for nationwide citizen-leader engagements at different levels of leadership, to discuss and respond to the specific demands that emerged. The impact of the process was evaluated through information gathered by leadership audits, with results discussed at neighbourhood assemblies and across media platforms.

The Citizens' Manifesto Initiative played a pivotal role in raising public debate on governance issues in Uganda, promoting active citizenry and increasing pressure for democratic accountability in a context of deeply entrenched political patronage and widespread citizen apathy.

Leading from the Middle: Case study of the birth of a social justice movement, 'Sauti ya Umma'

Nancy Chepkoech Muigei is a Board Member of the Young Women Leadership Institute, a visiting Youth Mentor at the Emerging Leaders Foundation, Human Rights Practitioner and Researcher focused on East Africa. She has previously worked for the International Peace Training and Support Centre, researching security sector reforms in Somalia and training peace support operation staff. Nancy is specialised in election monitoring and has previously worked as a Media Monitor and Media Assistant to the Expert for the European Union Observations Missions to Kenya in 2007 and 2013. Nancy has worked in Kenya, Netherlands and Somalia.She holds a Masters in Development Studies with specialisation in Conflict, Reconstruction and Human Security from the International Institute of Social Studies in The Hague. Nancy has been a recipient of various awards such as the NORAD scholarship at the University of Oslo (2009) and the Netherlands Fellowship Programme (Nuffic). In 2015, Nancy was selected for the inaugural Building Bridges LPL Programme. In 2016 she was part of the annual residential school on governance and development part of the *Governance for Development in Africa* programme that is run by the School of Oriental African Studies of the University of London in collaboration with the Mo Ibrahim Foundation.

The passage of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution provided a new impetus for grassroots activism to demand greater accountability and transparency. Devolution in the Constitution aims to bring government closer to the people, and to promote broader public participation in this new form of governance, particularly for marginalised groups. However, Kenya still faces severe challenges including narrowing civic space, unemployment, corruption and impunity, signifying an underlying crisis of leadership and governance linked to economic liberalisation in Kenya.

Sauti ya Umma (Swahili for "the people's voice") is a social justice movement in Kenya, emerging in 2015 in response to the frustrations of many activists with the lack of progress in tackling challenges, coupled with widespread citizen apathy. Sauti ya Umma was inspired partly by the impact of protest movements such as #Rhodesmustfall, #Feesmustfall and the #Occupy movements and their effective utilisation of technology and social media in mobilising and connecting issues, campaigns and struggles.

The presentation situated the birth of this social movement within a global context, and within Kenya's recent political history and constitutional reform. Social movements in Kenya were at the centre of the liberation struggle, and continued to play a key role in the achievement of multi-party democracy. Social movements have the potential to provide alternative leadership and accelerate transformation if they can connect the 'grassroots' to the 'middle'. Inspired by the 2010 Constitution, this embryonic social movement is drawing in activists from existing movements to collaborate in connecting struggles, issues and actors to accelerate transformation towards democratic governance in Kenya.

Session 3: Promoting Accountability

The third session focused on promoting accountability in governance with case studies from Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa.

Social Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (SPEFA): The case of Nsawam-Adoagyiri Municipality

Emmanuel Ametepey is the founder and Executive Director of Youth Advocates Ghana-YAG. Between 2013 and 2015, he coordinated a Pan-African project to ensure the participation of African youth groups in shaping the post-2015 agenda, Voice Africa's Future. Emmanuel is the Ghana Focal Person for the West African Youth Network, which works to enhance youth participation in issues relating to governance, human rights and peace building in the region. He is a committed advocate for inclusive policies that enhance youth participation and has demonstrated his ability to mobilise and motivate young people to participate in key national and international policy processes. He is currently serving as a mentor for Restless Development Accountability Advocates project for Ghana, which empowers young people with the knowledge, skills and networks needed to analyse and generate data tracking progress towards national and international development commitments. Emmanuel is an alumnus of the 2016 LPL programme. He is studying for a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Development Studies at Presbyterian University College, Ghana.

The low level of citizen participation in local governance processes is a key structural challenge to decentralisation and financial management at a local government level in Ghana. The Social Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Project (SPEFA) is a local government capacity support project, initiated by the government

in collaboration with the World Bank to address this problem. The project provides capacity support to improve accountability and effective service delivery across all 46 Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies in the country, and to improve citizens' engagement with and perceptions of local government.

The presentation documented the implementation of SPEFA in the Nsawam-Adoagyiri Municipality over two years, and highlighted its achievements, challenges and the lessons learnt. The project involved a community mobilisation exercise to identify key stakeholders, a SPEFA learning forum for training civil society representatives, and Town Hall meetings where citizens and public officials engaged in a review of government expenditure and income.

The introduction of SPEFA in the municipality has led to increased transparency and accountability on the part of local government, and a marked increase in citizens' awareness of their roles and responsibilities in ensuring government accountability and effective service delivery. Another key achievement was the multi-stakeholder collaboration between a wide range of groupings including traditional authorities, community leaders, civil society organisations and political party representatives, with a marked increase in youth involvement throughout the SPEFA project.

The project underlined the effectiveness of a 'bottom-up' approach to social accountability, and the importance of communication in improving relations between citizens and their representatives. Consolidating these achievements and continuing to create spaces for local engagement will enhance efforts towards effective decentralisation in Ghana.

Strengthening Legislative Accountability and Local Governance – A case study of the #YLAPNG project in Nigeria

Samson Itodo heads the Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement, Nigeria's foremost youth think tank on democratic governance and citizens' participation. A lawyer by profession, over the past ten years Samson has worked on initiatives to deepen democracy and development in Nigeria and Africa. He was the pioneer National Coordinator of the Youth Alliance on Constitution and Electoral Reform, and has led election observation teams to Ghana, the United States and South Africa. Samson started the Amplified Online Radio, a Pan-African youth talk radio station, as a platform to widen youth participation in democratic processes. He is the co-editor of *African Youth Journal of Democracy* and a founding member of the African Movement for Democracy. Samson is an alumnus of the 2016 LPL programme; the International Visitors Leadership Program of the US Department of State; and the Swedish Visitors Leadership Programme. He has conducted research for local and international organisations, including International IDEA and the United Nations Development Programme. Samson has served on several committees focused on the reform of Nigeria's National Assembly, and is a regular political commentator and analyst on local and international media platforms.

The Young Legislators Accountability Project (YLAP) was designed as a civic education project to enhance legislative accountability through effective citizens' participation, and to create a hub for mentorship, peer learning and capacity development among young legislators. It aims to sustain citizens' participation in governance in the wake of the 2015 general election by creating platforms to bring legislators and constituents together and build a new social contract.

The presentation traced the origins of the YLAP project, its implementation, challenges faced and achievements. Three key actors drive the project – the Young Parliamentarians' Forum, a Technical Working Group and an Advisory Panel. The project leveraged on significant partnerships and collaborations with the following organisations to enhance its impact:

- the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) provided funding;
- the National Institute for Legislative Studies and Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre provided technical support and access to the National Assembly;
- the United States Embassy provided opportunities for peer learning and exchange between young legislators in the United States and Nigeria;
- the BuhariMeter Initiative of the Centre for Democracy and Development provided data to aid legislative oversight.

The first stage in the project was a Constituents Needs Assessment conducted to gather information about voter expectations of young legislators, priority issues for youth and to assess the level of awareness among citizens of legislative accountability. This formed the basis for a charter of demand highlighting needs and strategies to improve relationships between elected representatives and their constituents. A model for constituency accountability dialogues was developed, and Town Hall meetings were held at which legislators reported back on their performance and received feedback from their constituencies. A citizen-led performance audit was also conducted which generated scorecards on the performance of young legislators in the 8th Assembly.

Other key elements of the YALP project included peer learning exchanges between young Nigerian and US legislators, social media training for legislative aides and analysis of policy on thematic areas such as unemployment, entrepreneurship, constitutional reform and accountability.

The work of the project was publicised through various media platforms, including radio, online and social media, under the hashtag #YLAPNG. A notable achievement was the establishment of the Young Legislators Forum, which aims to increase support for progressive legislation and strengthen engagement between elected representatives and youth groupings. Despite its many achievements, the project still faces challenges in building trust among stakeholders, obtaining access to information in the National Assembly and addressing a lack of understanding of governance among the citizen population.

Building and Enhancing Participation, Transparency and Accountability in South Africa through Social Audits

Axolile Notywala is an activist with the Social Justice Coalition (SJC), based in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, and has held various leadership positions within the organisation. He currently heads up their Local Government Programme and has been centrally involved in the pioneering of social audits in South Africa as a community-led process for advancing participation, transparency and accountability. Axolile is a Non-Executive Director of My Vote Counts (MVC), a non-profit company campaigning to improve the accountability, transparency and inclusiveness of South African elections and politics. He is an alumnus of the 2015 LPL programme, and was a guest presenter at the 2016 programme. Axolile is a 2016 Mandela Washington Fellow in the Civic Leadership Track under the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI).

The Social Justice Coalition (SJC) is a grassroots social movement campaigning for safe, healthy and dignified communities in some of South Africa's largest, most under-developed and dangerous townships. Founded in 2008, the SJC comprises 15 branches, located mainly in informal settlements across Khayelitsha, Cape Town. Campaigns are based on ongoing research, education, and advocacy in two programmes: The Local Government Programme runs campaigns on sanitation, budgets, and urban land; and the Safety and Justice Programme runs campaigns on policing and the criminal justice system. A strong focus of the SJC's work has always been the involvement and participation of communities in issues of government and governance.

Since 2009 the SJC has led a campaign for clean and safe sanitation in Cape Town. The presentation gave an overview of the SJC's use of social audits as part of this campaign. The social audit is a process adopted from India and adapted by the SJC in the South African context as a tool to promote and enhance citizen participation in monitoring service delivery and democratic accountability on the part of local government.

The first SJC social audit was conducted in 2013, into the provision of communal chemical toilets in four informal settlements in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, South Africa. A social audit on refuse collection and area cleaning, which is outsourced to private companies, was subsequently conducted in partnership with CSOs from around the country, and a social audit of janitorial services for communal flush toilets, established by the City of Cape Town after a sustained advocacy campaign by the SJC. After attending a learning exchange on social audits in India with other CSOs, a Social Audit Network was established and a South African Guide to Social Audits was produced in 2015.

The presentation provided insight into how the SJC has used social audits to enhance citizen participation in monitoring service delivery, and accountability on the part of local government.

Session 4: Reflection and Discussion

In the closing session, participants welcomed the opportunity to share experiences and insight from their work in different African countries, and to discuss frankly critical questions about how to build effective leadership for progressive change.

Key themes that emerged from the presentations and discussion were: 1) accountability and its role in strengthening the institutional capacity of the state within existing constitutional, legal or social contexts; 2) the importance of context in understanding the role of civil society and state actors; 3) the need to build trust and strengthen links between civil society and state actors to ensure long-term sustainable, systemic change.

> *"Both sides of the table are equally important …. I really appreciate how the conversation moved towards recognising that we have to find the complex coalitions that drive reform and include allies within government and civil society."*

In order to discuss meaningful participation in governance and accountability, we need to interrogate what these terms mean. In general, accountability is a relationship between an account provider and an account holder. In terms of answerability, the provider can be spoken about in the same way we talk about a supply side, as a duty bearer, and the account holder can be referred to as the demand side, a rights holder. The second aspect of the relationship is enforceability, or the capacity of the account holder to enforce corrective action on the account holder if they fail to perform according to some expected standard. The basic relationship of answerability and enforcement applies to many forms of accountability: political accountability relates to the relationship between elected representatives and voters; administrative accountability

is where paid public servants are obliged to take account and corrective action in response to their administration of public resources or provision of public services; and democratic accountability is a combination of political accountability and administrative accountability.

In the past 10 to 15 years, there has been a lot of discussion about social accountability. Social accountability refers to the ability of non-state actors to hold state actors to account, to obtain explanations and justifications for their use of available public resources to meet priority human needs. This derives from a rights-based approach to governance. If social accountability is conceived of as a fundamental human right – the right of any person (not necessarily even a citizen) within a state – then there is a basis for understanding the role of government to ensure that public resources are managed in ways that serve to realise people's needs. This provides a basis for understanding governance, which is about providing explanations and justifications for how resources are used, produced, disseminated and the engagement between state and non-state actors. Within this framework, we can start thinking more broadly about inclusive governance and social justice, beyond the mere existence of legislative provisions protecting social, economic, civil and political rights in a society, as the progressive realisation of those rights and needs.

"There is one important difference between government and civil society that makes the rules of the game for the watchers and the watched different. That is that civil society doesn't raise taxes and spend public money."

But civil society is not a homogenous entity. Groups and interests are not represented in the same way and all citizens do not enjoy the same or equal access to platforms where they can raise their voices. So another key question is: Who holds civil society accountable?

The International Budget Partnership (IBP) has undertaken research on efforts by civil society to influence government budgets, and released a report called "You Cannot Go It Alone". The first lesson learned is that analysis and information are not enough. Putting information into the public domain will almost never bring about change. The second is more controversial – the idea that in all successful campaigns there is a point where the campaign works **inside** the system. What happens in successful campaigns is that civil society have built interesting and surprising alliances, including with sympathetic insiders in government: it is this weird and wonderful and diverse web of relationships with surprising people across the political landscape.

The IBP has begun talking about an accountability ecosystem – a whole web of relationships and institutions that must be healthy for campaigns to achieve impact.

One of the key attributes of successful campaigns is that they can read the political environment, that they understand political opportunity – when to go hard, and when to back off. Campaigns often "sneak through" when there are elections and changes in key positions in government leadership, or financial or corruption crises.

During the presentations, we heard about interventions to stimulate demand and supply side accountability – to work at the top of the government system, and at the bottom of the system. The core question coming through was: What is the most effective role for civil society to play within the broader goal of inclusive, democratic development?

Civil society can act as a guide dog and play a support role to the government, helping them deliver what citizens need or want. Civil society can also play a watch dog role, exerting pressure and holding government to account, sometimes in an antagonistic way. There is also another role – that of interlocutor, creating spaces for meetings and finding synergy between the demands of citizens and the response by government. The question is what role civil society needs to play in each particular setting and context. We need to understand the full spectrum of politics and the specific contexts within which civil society organisations are operating. In a multiparty democracy, there is institutional accountability – how does the legislature or the judiciary relate to the executive? In addition, opposition parties and civil society play a role in terms of demanding accountability from those in power.

A key lesson emerging from the presentations is the importance of both issues-driven and evidence-driven interventions. However, this raises a broader question: What about systematic interventions? How do we deepen accountability work rather than have one-off interventions, and how do we connect different interventions happening in different places in ways that help us to connect political promises to plans and systems?

"That is something I will take strongly from here – the need for us to change our perception of government"

Participants raised questions about how issues and society are often fragmented – "That's an economic space, this is a political space, this is for government, this is the role of civil society". Politics is the field of discussion, dialogue, compromise and competition of ideas and positions and resources. Social issues are political issues. Civil society needs to stop complaining about government playing tough – political parties do this to each other all the time and they will do it to civil society. It's a good sign of a democracy working.
Questions were also raised about how to institutionalise civil society as a sector that has moved from activism on basic human rights activism to becoming a more professional sector: what are the implications of self-regulation of an entity that is itself heterogeneous in

nature? We need to build trust through relationships and alliances based on a common goal of inclusive governance and a commitment to transparency. The conversation around civil and political society needs to be reframed in a manner that does not paint either in a negative light or feed into antagonism between sectors.

Participants pointed out that there is an entire structure and framework within the state that was not addressed adequately in discussion. If the state is only seen in terms of institutions, we miss a crucial part of understanding how public resources can be translated into public goods and services that meet people's needs. This requires a whole range of underlying public resource management processes that systematically translate those resources into services to address needs in various policy sectors at various levels of governance.

The first step is the needs assessment process. This is a discursive, contested process with all sorts of power relationships involving competition and interest groups around determining priorities. Once priority needs are identified, the activities for implementation to realise those needs can be identified and decided upon within a strategic planning process. Once this in place, activities can be planned and costed, and resources mobilised from funding sources for implementation of strategic plans. Once resources are allocated and a budget established for implementation, there is need for tracking of revenue collection and expenditure, and monitoring performance and implementation. The state also needs processes for investigating resource leakages, corruption, and misuse of public funds to ensure an effective oversight function. This involves independent auditing, review of recommendations, and their inclusion in future strategic plans and budgets to ensure effective implementation.

"Countries are changed by people who know, learn and work and vote themselves for their betterment of their countries."

Discussion at this roundtable has focused on the ways we strengthen the position of civil society to participate within government without reflecting on key government and governance processes. In order to strengthen inclusive governance, we need to examine more closely the ideas, activities and capacities of both state and non-state actors within these key processes.

We need to focus not only on the institutional level of the rules and roles of political accountability, but also on the relationships between social institutions and underlying public resources management processes. State institutions are made up of people. We need to ask critical questions about whether we have capacity – both within state actors on the supply side and non-state actors on the demand side within civil society groups. We need a set of indicators for key sets of ideas together with indicators for key behaviour on the side of supply and demand actors as well as capacity, and processes to evaluate capacity within key governance institutions and processes. This would produce a more reliable set of standards against which to measure social accountability, and assess the contribution of various stakeholders, including civil society. It is also clear that people who are in government need to have confidence that there is a place for them in civil society when they leave government. Civil society needs to cultivate new partnerships and build a new set of skills to ensure its progressive impact. In a nutshell, we need to take the politics of the space in which we work more seriously.

"We want to tap into the resources of this growing network across Africa to promote dialogue, share experiences and develop effective leadership programmes"

Leading in Public Life is a unique platform for young Africa leaders working in the public sector and in civil society to engage in frank discussion around common challenges and explore and share solutions. Questions raised at the roundtable included: What can we do to address the leadership challenge in Africa? Can it be addressed through education and training? How we are socialised? What are the effects of our conflicted past on our societies today? How do we frame our identity as Africans? What is our shared long-term goal and vision of what the continent will look like in 10, 20, 30 years? How can we continue to collaborate in our goal of achieving inclusive governance and development in our own countries, and across Africa?

We want to expand the space for dialogue and engagement between leaders that we have created through Building Bridges. Through events such as this roundtable, we intend to tap into the resources of this growing network of emerging leadership across Africa to promote dialogue and share experiences that will help inform the development of effective leadership and find solutions to Africa's challenges.

Part 2: 'Case Studies'

State-Civil Society Relations in Governance and Democracy

A historical perspective from Tanzania

By Gwamaka R. Kifukwe[1]

Introduction

As our societies continue to develop and transform both globally, and here at home in Africa, it is important that we take a step back and reflect on what this means for us as citizens and as societies. How do we want to govern and be governed? By whom, and how? These are critical questions for any and all societies, though they are acute in places where significant change (transformation) is taking place, often very rapidly, leading to changing values, changing priorities, and changing aspirations. Our societies are made more complex, by increased connectivity and inter-dependency in the world.

This paper provides a historical perspective of how the relationship between the state and civil society has evolved since independence to the present day. Though specific to Tanzania, the lessons that can be drawn out may be of use in understanding some of the challenges in the state-civil society nexus when it comes to governance challenges in Africa.

It begins with defining key terms before exploring the Tanzanian context and the history of how Tanzania has conceived of governance, development, and by extension civil society organisations. The recognition of civil society as a potential social arena and (political) force was recognised immediately in post-independence Tanzania which lingered in the mind of leadership. With the opening up of economic, social, and political space at the advent of multi-party democracy in the early 1990s, it ushered in an era of civil society organisations mushrooming, leading to the present situation. The paper concludes with some thoughts on what the potential outlook is for Tanzania, as well as lessons that could inform future relations between the state and civil society in their joint pursuit of the development of the people of Africa.

Key definitions

To begin with some key definitions that will be used in this paper should be explored.

In this paper, **governance** refers to the institutions, both formal and informal, that define what the French social theorist Michel Foucault (1982: 220-1) describes as "the conduct of conduct" – the laws, regulations, norms, customs, cultures, institutions, and values that determine how authority is distributed, how decisions are made, and undertaking the follow-up of these decisions. Each society has, and is constantly revisiting, these and therefore governance 'best practice' is difficult to establish; principles may be agreed, and yet how these come to life in reality is a product of historical processes, individuals, and events that directed and are directing the evolution of a particular society.

The importance of an effective governance framework cannot be over-stated, whatever this may look like. Citizens are the stakeholders (shareholders) in the state and entrust public officials (management) to pursue particular collective objectives and meet certain needs. Fundamentally, governance is about the right to be informed of and involved in the decisions and actions that have both direct and indirect effects on your wellbeing, dignity, and ability to benefit from and contribute towards the community in which you live – whether local, national, regional, or global. As the world becomes more connected and inter-dependent, governance is a great challenge as societies are increasingly diverse, fluid, inter-dependent, and seemingly in a constant state of change. An additional challenge is the fact that due to globalisation, actions taken in one society can impact those of another, whether intentionally or not. Governance is inherently a political process.

This also highlights another nuanced definition that is used in this text. *Development* (with a capital 'D') is used in the deliberative sense – as a conscious effort to attain particular societal goals as opposed to *development* (lower-case 'd') which describes the ongoing and passive process of societal change that occurs. The former refers to the common way we tend to think of development – with plans, strategies, goals, roles and responsibilities – while the latter is what gives us diversity and ultimately is the reason why development is never linear, meaning it is never experienced in the same way by different people, in different places, or at different times. For the purposes of this paper, the former shall be used.

1 The views expressed in this paper are the author's alone. They do not reflect the views of the Institute of African Leadership for Sustainable Development (UONGOZI Institute) or of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are non-state, non-profit and not-for-profit, organisations. Though these vary greatly depending on context and legal frameworks, broadly speaking they represent organised and formalised social movements. A key characteristic is that association with them is voluntary. Within this, I consider two major types of CSOs: The former are often referred to as community based organisations (CBOs), which are domestic and national organisations that emerge from the specific context of a particular space and are broadly bottom-up in their outlook and trajectory – typically they are characterised by very fluid structures, volunteerism, being small in size, often rural, and with heavy community involvement; the latter are commonly known as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which refer to professionalised (and often internationally present) organisations that tend to work closely with governments in both advocacy and service delivery – typically these are top-down in their outlook. Both are important and have roles to play in the sustainable development of Africa. In many instances NGOs sub-contract or partner with CBOs for 'project implementation' due to the latter's closer ties to the local populace. One pre-requisite for CSOs is a shared consciousness in a society (or particular group) which becomes organised in pursuit of a particular goal or at least to change the status quo. In a similar vein to elected representatives in democratic systems, civil society elicits legitimacy from society and therefore relies on resources donated from individuals and organisations who 'believe' in the particular mission of the CSO in question. In terms of Development, CSOs have four crucial roles, these are: (i) raising awareness of rights and responsibilities of all development actors; (ii) enabling citizens to participate (effectively) in their communities; (iii) advocating on behalf of the marginalised and disadvantaged; and (iv) service delivery. The final key definition is **Sustainable Development** (SD) – the deliberate process of economic, social, cultural, and political transformation that a society goes through in order to increase social welfare, prosperity, and dignity for its constitutions. The most common definition of SD was provided by the World Commission on Environment and Development, also known as the Brundtland Commission, in the 1987 'Our Common Future' report:

> *Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.*

To complicate matters, the Commission's report goes on to state:

> *[S]ustainable development is not a fixed state of harmony, but rather a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with future as well as present needs. We do not pretend that the process is easy or straightforward. Painful choices have to be made.*

As a result SD means different things to different people and therefore looks and is implemented differently from one place to another. Having defined the key concepts for this paper, the next section will focus on the Tanzanian context.

Tanzania

The East African country of the United Republic of Tanzania was formed in 1964 following the merger of the Republic of Tanganyika (having gained independence from the British in 1961) and the Republic of Zanzibar (following the Zanzibar Revolution in 1963 which overthrew the Sultanate). It touches all three of the Great Lakes (Victoria, Tanganyika, and Nyasa) and is surrounded by Kenya and Uganda to the north; Rwanda, Burundi and the Republic of Congo to the West; Zambia, Malawi, and Moçambique to the south; and the Indian Ocean to the east. The total area of the country is just over 947,000 km,[2] making it similar in size to Nigeria, and the 31st largest country in the world. The capital city is Dodoma, though the largest city (and economic centre of the country) is Dar es Salaam, where most of Government is located. Tanzania is a member of the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Commonwealth of Nations.

The 2012 census revealed a population of 44.9 Million Tanzanians, though it is estimated to be around 50 Million at the time of writing, growing at a rate of about 2.8% per year (11th highest in the world). Christianity (mixed denominations) and Islam (predominantly Sunni) are the major religions though various other minor religious groups are also present. There are no official recordings of ethnic breakdowns, though over 130 ethnic groups (around 95% are Bantu) are known to exist, many with languages of their own although Swahili and English are the country's two official languages.

Tanzania is classified as a Low-Income Country, with a GDP per capita of just under USD1,000 (current estimates) and a Human Development Index score of 0.521[2] (ranking it 151 in the world). It remains on track to become a Middle-Income country by 2025 in line with the country's 'Vision 2025'. The GDP growth rate as of 2014 was 7% and this is projected to rise to 7.2 in 2016. Despite growth rates of above 5% since 2000, economic growth has not been reflected in a proportional reduction in poverty levels which the 2012 Household Budget Survey calculated to be around 28%.

The median age, which has been falling steadily for a long period of time, is calculated to be 17.6 with a total dependency ratio of 93.8 persons per 100 economically active people. Roughly 70% of the population is rural, though the pace of urbanisation (5.36% between 2010

2 According to the Human Development Report 2016, although when adjusted for inequality, this figure falls to 0.371.

and 2015) has increased due to both migration and population growth. The average life expectancy at birth is about 62 years (from 48 years at independence).

In terms of government structure, Tanzania is a Presidential Republic as of the 1977 Constitution (last amended in 2012), which is still in use.[3] It has 30 administrative regions, which are further divided into 169 districts. The country follows the English Common Law system and the country implements a unicameral national assembly.[4] The Executive (President) may serve a maximum of two five-year terms. Prior to the incumbent President, H.E. John P. Magufuli, there have been four Presidents,[5] two of whom have served since the advent of multi-party democracy. Tanzania has had peaceful transitions of power.

Tanzania has emerged out of a 'single-class' system under the leadership of Tanzania's first President, Julius Nyerere. Though he stepped down as President in 1985, he maintained control of the ruling *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM – translating to the 'Party of the Revolution') until much later, and his influence (though waning following his death in 1999) is still strong throughout Tanzanian society. Under Nyerere, Tanzania's leadership perceived Tanzania as a 'nation of peasants', in other words a 'class-less' society. Civil society in Tanzania is therefore emerging alongside the emergence of a Tanzanian middle class following the break of the state's monopoly over social, political and economic space. This occurred as a result of the Nyalali Commission's constitutional and legal framework review (completed in 1992).

An historical overview of civil society in Tanzania

> *In Tanzania, it appears that, while the Government is encouraging NGO growth, the new space for NGOs is not one in which they will be allowed to develop independently – their space will be constrained and manipulated by the state.*
> (Mercer, 1999: 251)

African Socialism and the single-party era (1964 – 1992)

Civil movements and CSOs (particularly trade unions) played a key role in Tanganyika's and Zanzibar's independence struggles. Their different histories will not be explored here, however the effectiveness of social movements and organised social movements were well-understood by the incoming leadership of the independent and newly formed United Republic of Tanzania. Following the union, the leaders of these struggles (which had become political parties[6]) joined to form the CCM (*Chama Cha Mapinduzi* – or 'The 'Party of Revolution' or 'Revolutionary Party') in 1977. Appreciating the (disruptive) potential of CSOs, the leadership appears to have conceptualised a governance system that would limit this so that the entire country could be mobilised for 'nation-building'. Across Africa, the liberation movement meant more than political independence, it spoke to the emancipation of black people – and so the liberation project was not considered 'complete' until the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa, symbolised by the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and the 1994 elections.

Under Nyerere, the state penetrated and dissolved most non-state actors resulting in their abolition or incorporation into the state or the ruling party. Religious associations were left alone, but warned to stay out of politics and the 'Chieftain' system was abolished in 1964 – with many chiefs given civil service posts, or political positions. This was deemed necessary as part of the nation-building process, for security, and to ensure the equal distribution of resources and services (by the state) to overcome the weaknesses inherited from the colonial era (Nyang'oro, 2006 and Thomson, 2004). What we now refer to as 'African Socialism', at least in the Tanzanian context, began with the 'Arusha Declaration' (1967) which outlined the principles of African Socialism and the vision for (Socialist) Tanzania. In 1976 the cooperative movement (which, alongside trade unions, had been instrumental in the independence struggle) was banned and the 'Union of Cooperative Societies' was initiated by the ruling party (the same was done for the women, youth, etc). The leadership did however encourage social cooperation and collectivisation, which made it easier for CSOs to establish later since organising for the 'common good' became culturally engrained (Michael, 2004).

Nyerere believed the state was the extension of the public's collective will and is therefore responsible for the just and fair management of Tanzania's collective resources to all citizens. In this conceptualisation, socialism **is** democracy. The state, therefore, was as much geared towards socio-welfare concerns as it was towards the Pan-Africanist liberation and emancipation (of black people) causes. Nationalism and Pan-Africanism were to be enforced as well as nurtured by the state. Following independence, organisation outside the formal structures

3 A constitutional review exercise took place in 2015 but the referendum on accepting it is yet to take place at the time of writing.

4 The National Assembly (Parliament) has 357 seats, 239 of which are directly elected by simple majority (first past the post), 102 seats are reserved for women and are elected by proportional representation, 5 are indirectly elected by simple majority from the Zanzibar House of Representatives, 10 are Presidential appointees, and 1 seat is reserved for the Attorney General. As with the President, Members of Parliament (MPs) serve five-year terms, though there is no limit for the number of terms they may serve. Cabinet is made up of MPs who are then appointed by the President. The Tanzanian Parliament enacts laws that apply to the Mainland (Tanganyika) and those deemed 'Union Affairs', the Zanzibar House of Representatives does the same for Zanzibar, which also has its own President (with no Union portfolio).

5 Julius K. Nyerere (1964 – 1985); Ali H. Mwinyi (1985 – 1995); Benjamin W. Mkapa (1995 – 2005); and Jakaya M. Kikwete (2005 – 2015).

6 In Tanganyika (now referred to as 'Mainland') this was TANU (Tanganyika African National Union), and in Zanzibar the ASP (Afro-Shirazi Party).

was understood as counter-productive to national stability and therefore security, as well as a threat in terms of a separate source of legitimacy in an era where establishing sovereignty was a principle concern. In such a framework, CSOs represent an alternative, or challenge, to the 'will' of the people and therefore are not compatible with the nation-building mission (of the state).

Political space was separated, confined, and controlled through membership and participation in the Party (CCM) rather than the result of an open and public engagement which we now generally consider as a fundamental component of (what would then have been termed 'liberal') democracy; where competing interests and ideas would be balanced out and compromises sought in line with complexities of society through a system of dialogue and negotiation. In a 'nation of peasants' (essentially a one-class society), how could NGOs exist without the presence of a 'middle class'? Their presence would represent a challenge to, or failure of, the state or even the entire governance structure of the country.

Following the collapse of the economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank were brought in and Tanzania implemented structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) under the 'Economic Recovery Programme' I (1986) and II (1989 – 1993). Many of these changes were implemented by Nyerere's successor, H.E. Hassan Mwinyi (President from 1985 to 1995). Among the changes; the reduction of government expenditure for social services provided an opening for CSOs to expand their activities from being involved solely in humanitarian work (and religious activities) into service delivery, and later into advocacy.

In 1991 the Government commissioned Chief Justice Francis Nyalali to review the 'Democratic System' in Tanzania and solicit views from the public on the possibility of implementing multi-party democracy. The commission highlighted 42 laws that were deemed 'undemocratic' ('The Societies Ordinance, 1954 Cap. 337 as Amended in 1969, 1991 and 1992' – which would be retained as was, but later evolve into the NGO Act of 2002). The Nyalali Commission is infamous for finding that more than two-thirds of the population did not want multi-partyism. Despite these findings, the laws banning political parties was abolished and the first multi-party elections were scheduled for (and carried out in) 1995, with new parties able to register from 1992 onwards. The government jump-started democratisation and liberalisation from the top-down (also with the SAPs) in order to manage the transition and maintain their political standing internally and globally (Tripp, 2000). The leadership had observed the 'wave of democratisation' sweeping across Africa and 'jumped' rather than being (inevitably) 'pushed'.

The era of Multi-Party Democracy (1992 – Present)

Since 1992 there has been an 'explosion' of NGOs in Tanzania. In 1978 there were 17 registered NGOs, by 1994 this had grown to 813 by conservative estimates (REPOA, 2007), and swelled to around 8,000 by 2001 (Michael, 2004), though the Office of the Vice President[7] reported roughly 2,000 registered NGOs in Tanzania.[8] As the growing realisation of the relative ease and securing of financing and other support spread, the number of NGOs grew exponentially (Lange et al., 2000), and concentrated in particular areas.[9] In the early days, much of the senior leadership within NGOs was staffed by civil servants who were retrenched as a result of the on-going public sector reforms characteristic of Tanzania in the 1990s (Lange, Wallevik, and Kiondo, 2000), some also as a secondary income stream to supplement their salaries. One effect of this is that in Tanzania a debate about legitimacy has always hung over CSOs with questions over whose agenda they were advancing and under what motivation. This persists to this day and various Afrobarometer Reports have found that citizens trust Government more than CSOs.

The phrase 'briefcase NGOs' is symptomatic of this problem. Research carried out between 2007 and 2010 for my PhD revealed a troubling phenomenon:

> *They came driving very nice cars, dressed sharply in a suit and carrying a briefcase to ask for money for some project. They were always well informed and would know what types of projects donors were keen on funding. If they successfully secured money, we often never heard from them again.* (Interview carried out with a Development Partner, 2009)

Financing and supporting CSOs is inherently risky, and many benefactors conveyed the challenge involved in identifying 'worthy' local partners to partner with. Benefactors also faced pressure from their own domestic constituents and national assemblies to spend their budgets, leaving an element of 'leakage' and scope for biases, unfair and even corrupt practices in the allocation of resources to local CSOs. These problems mirrored those in the public sector (corruption, incompetence, poor equipment, etc.) and ushered in the 'capacity building' agenda that tackles public and civil society organisations; it has more recently been extended into 'private sector development'. Ultimately the concern over CSOs (as opposed to the state) is centred around what the 'real' concerns of citizens are, who has the legitimacy to highlight and tackle them, and how. For citizens, questions

7 This has subsequently been moved to the Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Seniors, and Children.

8 Lange (2007) suggests that 'many more' (than the 2,000 or 8,000 estimated figures) existed on a 'part-time' basis. One explanation of this is that forming NGOs and securing support was treated as a survival strategy. As a response, NGOs become increasingly professionalized which ran up administrative costs (in the era when charitable contributions and aid were moving away from extending into 'overheads'). Another strategy to cope with this was to apply business practices to NGOs such as SMART principles, however the nature of social, cultural, environmental, and political issues is notoriously 'fuzzy' and difficult to monitor.

9 Tripp (2000) presents evidence that around 80% of all NGOs in Tanzania were involved in women's issues.

of legitimacy, credibility, and motive apply to both civil society organisations and the broader public sector.

It is important to note that although there were top-down pressures as outlined herein, there were significant bottom-up pressures for increased space for non-state actors. An example of this is the period leading up to the 'Fourth World Conference on Women Action for Equality, Development and Peace' held in Beijing, 1995. This conference, in addition to the general consensus in development theory and practice that highlighted the importance and impact of engaging women in development efforts, may explain why initially there was a rush of NGOs dealing with women's issues (as an aside, as climate change has emerged, so too has the number of climate change and environmentally oriented NGOs grown).

Another aspect to consider in the era of multi-party democracy was the advent of populism in the election process, which over time has eroded the sense of nation building. There is a valid question to ask as to whether the nation-building project was ever 'completed' (or even if it could be). In a similar vein, the re-emergence of tribal and ethnic consciousness has also become a concern, particularly following the death of Julius Nyerere in 1999. One of the (unspoken) functions of the state has been the deliberate 'management of diversity' (through the appointment of public officials, or composition of the Cabinet, among other methods) which is now subject to less control – stoking concern of the emergence of dominant ethnic-based networks. Without a moral beacon (ideally this should be represented in the President), and in the absence of the 'culture/moral police' found elsewhere in the world, people have reverted back to more familiar social relations that have been re-enforced by 'electing one's own' during elections and 'battling' for resources in this new format of democracy.

Finally, given the survivalist culture that prevailed following the collapse of the economy, and in combination with the above-mentioned and other factors, nepotism too became a challenge as access to resources diminished. The culture has turned out to be pervasive across public, private, and civil society organisations and cultures – though efforts have been, and continue to be, made to curb and ultimately eliminate this.

CSOs today and lessons from the Tanzanian experience

Tanzania has a long history of collective organisation at the grassroots for communal benefits as a result of the socialist era's insistence on self-reliance and collectivisation. This has made it easy for CBOs to establish and find members in Tanzanian communities, as the socialist regime did not consider these as alternative sources of power that could disrupt the nation-building agenda. However, as with elsewhere in the world, elites have been quick and able to use CSOs to their own benefits (Huntington, 1991), allowing them to capture CSOs as a vehicle for particular causes, or even to merely supplement incomes – though increasingly this in turn is shifting to establishing consultancies. Ideally, CSOs are associated with the genuine will and interests of (particular interest groups within) the public due to their emphasis on humanitarian and social issues, especially in the case of NGOs, as is (or, for some, *was*) the state. However, such a limited and simplistic understanding of them fails to convey the challenges CSOs face (**as** CSOs), including challenges in resource mobilisation, public legitimacy, and the 'North/South' divide (particularly in agenda setting).

Various factors and challenges must be taken into account in Tanzania, and many of these are familiar to other African (and non-African) countries: (i) Tanzania is a relatively 'young' democracy both in terms of its age as a country (52 years at the time of writing) and in terms of the multi-party system in place (24 years at the time of writing); (ii) there is a valid question as to whether there is such a thing as the 'Tanzanian nation' or 'Tanzanian identity' as a result of (an incomplete) nation-building process resulting in different value systems informing people's interpretation of governance in formal and informal senses; (iii) the challenge of populism; (iv) the structural transformation needed and taking place on the continent, and indeed globally, that is delivering new and blurring relations between traditionally civil society, private, and public spaces; and (v) the regionalism and regional integration.

The transition from a closed and 'isolated' to a more fluid and open political space takes time to become embedded in the local political and, by extension, governance cultures. Structurally, Tanzania has maintained the same Constitution since 1977, and though there are changes in the governance structure, much of it remains historically similar. In addition, the cultural shift has not fully taken places, so the on-going (sentimental) frictions between public, private, and civil society actors could last a while yet. It will be interesting to witness what emerges as the post-socialist generations come of age and begin to rise in the ranks across the different sectors.

NGOs, in Tanzania at least, have grown as much due to financial and political incentives from development partners as they have as a result of failures of the state in service provision or addressing progressive social interests and movements. As a result, they struggle for legitimacy not only within official development networks (including the public sector at large, and bi- and multi- lateral partners) as well as broader society. With survivability (sustainability) a key aspect of CSO considerations and operations, the role of NGOs has often been as a mouthpiece, following particular trends, and has hindered their ability to critique policy (and indeed even aid) frameworks and interventions. As such, CSOs become increasingly professionalised (as in shifting and 'graduating' from CBOs to NGOs) and

appear more as consultancy firms than as representatives of organised social movements. Alvarez (1999: 181) states this transition quite succinctly:

> *States and inter-governmental organisations have increasingly turned to feminist NGOs as gender experts rather than as citizens' groups advocating on behalf of women's rights.*

Given the unpredictable and gradual nature of social change, the 'results-oriented' nature of many NGOs may not be suitable for engagement in these long-term and grand-scale 'projects. Development, through often framed almost as a **technical** challenge, is in fact a **progressive** issue which is difficult to measure at the best of times.

Conversely, to assume that CSOs (and NGOs in particular) are mere tools and objects for contestation is to deny them a role as an (important) actor in Development (and development). As part of a healthy society, governments, politicians (and their parties) and the public at large benefits from the 'marketplace of ideas' which necessarily require organisation. Ideas matter, and it is an important part of democratic (and indeed any sustainable and effective) governance structure that citizens are able to gather, deliberate and fine-tune their concerns, as well as to voice those so that governments (and by extension the state) can then take these on board. That CSOs represent 'interest groups' is not in-and-of itself a negative characteristic, because it is these interest groups that can provide specific and targeted insights into issues. In addition, these spaces can help to develop and evolve ideas outside the rigidities of both the public and private sectors, which have their own broad agendas – in essence, civil society is the space for unofficial deliberation, that can then be formalised in either of the other two sectors. Civil society is therefore necessarily a contested space, but a shared space outside of formal channels which often come with their own rules and procedures which can limit engagement.

Civil society lend themselves to be closely associated with politicians and activists, often 'earning their stripes' through a particular image or set of activities that resemble 'heroic' leadership – charisma, oratory, bravery, defiance ('speaking truth to power'), morality, counter-cultural, etc. The civil service is in many ways the opposite, bureaucratic, defined, rigid, controlled, technocratic, and often viewed as conservative (though in the context of Africa, states and governments see themselves as progressive in the so-called 'bigger picture', particularly in countries where the liberation parties still hold sway and consider themselves 'vanguards') – bland, secretive, authoritarian, traditional (culturally-speaking), mechanical. One particular area where these two entities clash is their method of communication, that has caused and continues to cause friction.

Governments, and the civil servants within them, do not like surprises – preferring a slow, deliberate, and structured process by which actions are identified and executed. In contrast, CSOs are viewed as attention-seeking (whether to draw attention to an issue or themselves, to express and extract a more 'pure' and 'human' reaction, or otherwise) and therefore untrustworthy and only self-interested. In particular, the media becomes the battleground for public opinion, in and of itself a component of a 'healthy' (liberal) democracy. As a result, CSOs with good intentions find it difficult to solicit official positions and inputs from public officials, fearful of being misquoted or conveying the wrong message. This is overcome slowly over time, mostly through informal and personal channels, rather than an overt and official dialogue.

An example of why relations and cultures differ so greatly between public and civil society organisations can be drawn from one historical experience. One of the requirements for Tanzania to qualify for IMF and International Development Association's (IDA – an organ of the World Bank) 'Highly Indebted Poor Country' (HIPC) scheme is that consultation with civil society must be demonstrated and genuine – as such, the government has had to accommodate, and even encourage the growth of (loyalist) CSOs. As with nation-building before, this too 'feels' enforced (at least to some extent), rather than emerging organically. CSOs can therefore be (and often are) viewed as alien and imposed onto the 'traditional' African social, cultural, and political configurations (governance models) rather than having emerged from the 'real' configurations. Unfortunately, the (perceived) lack of a middle class in Tanzania (which is conscious of itself) hampers the pace of civil society fully maturing into how the sector is imagined in the literature. In the meantime, it may be seen as an expensive (and somewhat unsustainable) social experiment, that incidentally, cannot be allowed to fail due to the implications for the particular governance model associated with liberal democracies as encouraged by the (seemingly) global consensus on the 'good governance' agenda.

The idea that CSOs ought to be some form of 'loyal opposition' is also one that has a lot of currency in public circles – particularly as the 'direction' of the country comes into question. Although a vision document, the Tanzania Vision 2025, exists, the sense of ownership and purpose has waned since its launch in 2000. Technically, this has been encapsulated by the Long Term Perspective Plan (2010 – 2025), which encapsulates three five-year development plans. This sentiment speaks to the poor *popular* ownership of the country agenda, a sense which was much stronger during liberation and the 'nation-building' area. As the quote at the beginning of this section alludes to, the state (at least in practice) is directing development (and nation-building) by means beyond the formal state apparatus, which may (at times) include CSOs, or at the very least cooperation with them.

Although the role and importance in governance of CSOs is acknowledged, essentially the concern is the rise and fall of demagogues outside of formal political structures and channels (political parties in particular)

as the unions remain weak, though stubborn. Their potential for disruption is well known and respected, but dissent is still viewed broadly as 'trouble-making' or 'unpatriotic behaviour'. As with elsewhere in the world, many politicians transition between formal politics and civil society organisations (and now, consultancies too).

Ultimately CSOs have to balance their legitimacy with the Government, with their peers (being too friendly or critical can be seen as being pro- or anti-government rather than driven by a principle), or with their supporters (whether local, national, or international). NGOs in particular are accused of being 'arm-chair politicians' under the pay of external/foreign interests, with high salaries, unrealistic perceptions of the reality 'on the ground' and comfortable ('Western') working and living conditions. As a result, they are seen as a kind of 'local diaspora' that has its feet in both worlds, not committed to either and therefore not 'truly' Tanzanian.

Conclusions

Developing better relations between CSOs and the broader public sector is an important issue so that both sides of the divide can benefit. Working together does not necessarily mean in agreement, and the most effective and representative governance will be one that gathers and deliberates conflicting positions openly (where appropriate and possible). Understanding what CSOs are and what their (potential) role and value in society is important. Relying on CSOs to house 'experts' and implement programmes in order to gain legitimacy, share resources (within particular networks, both legitimately and illegitimately), qualify for support, or to rubber-stamp government-prepared initiatives is a great disservice to both CSOs and the public at large. Equally, CSOs must adapt to local contexts and focus on implementation, as Dr. Brian Levy (2014) suggests 'working with the grain'.

In addition, the complex interplay between civil society organisations and governance (for development) has historical roots that continue to shape the relations between the various key actors (whether public, private, or civil society). The initial purpose of the state, in the minds of the independence-era leadership, was as a vehicle for the emancipation of black people, and a pan-Africanist vision of an independent and united Africa that followed in the footsteps of Latin America and Asia. As such, the state was designed to marshal its resources to this end, in the case of Tanzania, heavy influences from Fabian (from the Indian experience) and Maoist thought (from China).

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Building an Inclusive Coalition for Transitional Justice in Zimbabwe

The case of the National Transitional Justice Working Group in Zimbabwe

By Dzikamai Bere

Introduction

On 22 May 2013, a new Constitution[1] came into effect in Zimbabwe, which among other things established the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC). The NPRC is charged with ensuring post-conflict justice, healing and reconciliation. This Commission was the product of a long advocacy programme by a number of civil society actors. A year after the promulgation of the Constitution, civil society actors working on transitional justice gathered in Harare and established the National Transitional Justice Working Group (NTJWG) as a platform designed to provide interface between official transitional justice processes[2] and transitional justice stakeholders.

Since then, the NTJWG has become the face of a reform coalition that existed long before its own birth. This paper presents the case of the development of this transitional justice coalition in Zimbabwe from the actions of a few organisations to a broad movement of 46 organisations pushing for justice, healing and reconciliation. The paper will outline in detail how the transitional justice agenda for Zimbabwe developed, how the actors structured the message, the challenges and opportunities faced, the gains and successes, as well as mapping the role of NTJWG in the future of Zimbabwe. The paper will also analyse the NTJWG as a tool for civil society in engaging policymakers in pursuit of justice, healing and reconciliation.

Background

While discussions around justice and accountability commenced as early as 1997 in Zimbabwe, the processes leading to the building of the current transitional justice coalition came about as a direct result of a transitional justice outreach programme which was led by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum[3] (the Forum). The outreach was an initiative by civil society actors in Zimbabwe with roots as far back as 2003 when the Forum, in collaboration with the Southern African Trauma Coalition (SATC), convened the Johannesburg Symposium on 'Civil Society and Justice in Zimbabwe' from 11 to 13 August 2003. The main purpose of the symposium was to address the question of how to achieve justice in the broadest sense possible for the many victims of past violations.

One of the questions raised during the deliberations at the symposium was the question of "'origination and ownership' – from where and how should these (transitional justice) discussions evolve, and who should be involved in developing and driving the process". Delegates at the symposium were unanimous that "civil society must play a central role in the development and ownership of processes that explore transitional [justice] options and solutions, and that an elite 'deal' must be avoided and countered wherever possible. In this regard, many participants stressed the necessity of engaging a broader cross-section of Zimbabwean civil society, to develop awareness and lay the foundations for legitimacy" (Lesizwe, 2004: 30).

In addressing the symposium, Professor Brian Raftopoulos (then Chairperson of Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition) emphasised the need to ensure that whatever actions are

1 Refer to section 252 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) Act, 2013, available at http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/attachments/article/56/constitution.pdf

2 Official transitional justice processes refer to processes like the establishment of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the Gender Commission and other government-led initiatives of dealing with past gross violations of human rights in Zimbabwe.

3 The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum is a coalition of 21 human rights organisations in Zimbabwe formed in 1998 in response to the human rights violations associated with the food riots in which the state security apparatus responded ruthlessly to public protests. The report on the food riots can be found at: http://hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/1998/01/consolidatedreportonfood.pdf, accessed 27 July 2016.

taken, they do not detract from the unequivocal standards and principles contained in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, but that they also reflect the ideas and interests of ordinary Zimbabweans (Lesizwe, 2004: 302).

The symposium was held at a time when Zimbabwe's ruling party had won the controversial 2002 elections that were marred by political violence, voter intimidation and allegations of vote rigging. These elections were followed by talks between the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) facilitated by the then South African President Thabo Mbeki.[4] When the talks commenced, civil society was of the opinion that discussions around the Zimbabwean crisis must not be restricted to politicians but must be more inclusive. Despite strong advocacy initiatives, the talks remained restricted to politicians, raising fears among civil society actors that there would be an 'elite deal' between political parties.

To address this challenge, some initiatives were taken. At the Johannesburg symposium, civil society organisations agreed that an 'elite deal' that sacrifices justice and accountability must be avoided or countered. From 8 to 9 September 2008, when it was clear that a 'political deal' was imminent, the Forum convened the 'Options for Transitional Justice Workshop' which came up with a list of minimum demands for transitional justice in Zimbabwe. In general, the minimum demands set a clear position that no political settlement must perpetuate impunity or promote amnesty and amnesia (ZHRNGO Forum, 2008). Civil society demanded that a process of accountability, justice and reconciliation must commence. It was at this meeting that the Forum was tasked with ensuring that the civil society resolutions were implemented. A transitional justice outreach was designed to achieve these resolutions. It was a downward and upward outreach; to citizens and to policymakers; to victims at home and abroad.

In implementing these resolutions, two outstanding outputs can be identified. Firstly, on 22 May 2013, Zimbabwe adopted a new Constitution which established the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC), a body charged with post-conflict justice, healing and reconciliation. Secondly, on 23 May 2014, 46 organisations, representing a cross section of transitional justice stakeholders, established the National Transitional Justice Working Group (NTJWG) charged with ensuring that the values and principles championed by various stakeholders especially the victims, determine the direction of the NPRC. This case study documents that journey.

4 Talks between ZANU PF and the MDC commenced after the 2002 elections and stretched up to the 2008 elections when the conflict escalated following the 27 June 2008 election debacle in which over 200 opposition supporters were killed.

Why the justice question?

Before getting into the details of Zimbabwe's transitional justice journey, it is worth delving into the issue of why Zimbabwe should be having a discussion on transitional justice when the country is neither in a transition nor is it a post-conflict state. This question has been posed by many academics.

The question can best be answered when one looks into Zimbabwe's history. In his most celebrated work, *When the State Turns on Its Citizens: Institutionalised Violence and Political Culture*, Professor Lloyd Sachikonye (2011) chronicles the tragic history and legacy of violence in Zimbabwe. He identifies several forms of violence that have characterised the Zimbabwean state, including the colonial state, nationalist movements, the liberation movements, Gukurahundi, food riots, election related violence, Operation Murambatsvina, violent farm invasions, inter and intra-party violence, among others. He concludes:

> *Our narrative on political violence suggests that over the past 50 years it has been a major instrument of ascendancy to power as well as a bulwark against contenders for that power. But this necessitated that there should be a legitimation of political violence as both an instrument and an intrinsic part of the political system. It required that a supportive ideology be developed and disseminated to lend legitimacy to the recurrent use of political violence.*
> (Sachikonye, 2011: 42-43)

This narrative has shaped a tragic glorification of violence in the society. The tragedy reaches alarming levels when one considers that even respected clergy seem to believe that some of the violence is just – at least this is how Father Fidelis Mukonori SJ described the liberation war (Mukonori, 2015:55).

It is because of the legacy of violence that violence is viewed as having redeeming qualities in sectors that waged the liberation struggles, and that the independence so won was somehow superior to that obtained on a "silver platter" (Sachikonye, 2011: xviii). This history has made the struggle for post-independence democracy difficult to pitch within the non-violence discourse, as the ability to execute violence has become a badge of honour and those who do not carry this badge of honour are sidelined from participating in the welfare of the country and their voices are ignored.

On the sidelines of this tragedy are thousands of victims buried in unnamed graves, orphaned children, widows and many traumatised victims trying to come to terms with what their beloved Zimbabwe has become. For the past two decades, civil society organisations in Zimbabwe have worked with these victims to try and find justice. Between 1998 and 2016 the Forum received over 7,000 cases for litigation against various perpetrators. Around

the year 2000, it became clear that the victims were not going to receive justice through the individual efforts of litigation. Rather, justice was felt to be more than just a court victory for individual victims. It was felt that justice must have a broader meaning, embracing a transformation process that would ensure addressing the root causes of violence, dismantling institutions responsible for violence, a systematic programme of rehabilitation for the victims, guarantees of non-recurrence, prosecution of perpetrators and a comprehensive approach of dealing with the past, acknowledging it and finding closure for the victims and society as a whole.

Many actors believed in that ideal, but many more wondered whether Zimbabwe was ready for such a process of transitional justice without transition. Under the banner of the Forum, a number of actors decided to take the first bold steps and initiate the process of transitional justice. The reasoning for these initiatives was best captured at the Second International Conference Transitional Justice in Zimbabwe when Siphosami Malunga (2014) asked the interruptive question, "When is the right time for justice?" Delegates agreed that it is an injustice to watch an injustice continuing while waiting for an opportune time to commence transitional justice processes. This perhaps can help explain why civil society had already initiated the dialogue on transitional justice because sometimes, instead of waiting for perfect conditions, it is better to create the new conditions required to work on justice and respond to the needs of the victims. Hence in 2008, civil society organisations gathered in Harare and issued minimum demands for transitional justice in Zimbabwe, which among others demanded the creation of a commission to investigate past violations of human rights (ZHRNGO Forum, 2008).

Push for a Peace Commission

In line with the resolutions of the 2008 Options for Transitional Justice Workshop, the Forum commenced the Taking Transitional Justice to the People Programme. This programme, launched in 2008 and fully kicked off in August 2009, began the long road to a National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, which was later established through the 2013 Constitution.

New dialogue on transitional justice

Discussions around transitional justice commenced at a time when the crisis in Zimbabwe had reached dangerous levels. In 1997, the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) released the report, *Breaking the Silence Report, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980 to 1988*. In 1998 food riots broke out in Zimbabwe's major cities and the state responded ruthlessly. In 1999 the legitimacy of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (the Lancaster House Constitution) was challenged and Zimbabweans rejected the government-sponsored draft constitution. In 2000, a new labour-backed opposition was born, causing a serious upset in the political establishment. In the same year, violent farm seizures commenced in which over 700,000 farm workers were displaced and several white commercial farmers were killed. The electoral violence which followed these events deformed (as opposed to transformation which is usually positive) Zimbabwe into a war zone. After the disputed 2002 election, talks began between Zimbabwe's major political movements, ZANU PF and MDC.

As already alluded to in this paper, the talks had major defects including the exclusion of civil society and the ignoring of matters of justice and accountability. This drove civil society to seek new avenues for dialogue.

At a time when dialogue on justice and accountability was being choked by politicians from both sides of the political divide, civil society under the leadership of the Forum used the Taking Transitional Justice to the People Programme to make the transitional justice agenda a people's agenda. The programme took an agenda that had been rejected by politicians into the villages of Zimbabwe and invited the people to speak out on their views regarding transitional justice. It was felt that if the justice agenda was legitimate and politicians had no space for it on the table, then it must be made a people's agenda. The people targeted by this approach were the ordinary citizens of Zimbabwe, who have the electoral power to shape a political agenda.

The character of the transitional justice dialogue

The transitional justice dialogue in Zimbabwe took different forms at different levels. The first step was civic education on transitional justice. In 2010, the Forum, in partnership with the Africa Community Publishing Development Trust, published a small booklet, *A Peoples' Guide to Transitional Justice,* which was translated into vernacular. The booklet was used in conducting community workshops on transitional justice, bringing people into small study groups, and discussion experiences of other countries, analysing the local cases and brainstorming on the way forward. Facilitators were chosen from the Forum's 20 members, drawn from the communities where they live. Each meeting closed with a set of recommendations on the way forward for Zimbabwe. Meetings were held in 84 constituencies most affected by violence from August 2009 to November 2010. The final report was launched in Bulawayo in November 2010. The overriding plea of all the participants, as captured in the report, was for truth recovery and disclosure to address past human rights violations and in so doing foster true reconciliation.

The second level of the transitional justice dialogue was the national transitional justice survey which was designed to gather more focused views from the people. In this survey, the Forum spoke to 3,189 households

in 10 provinces. This survey gave a more scientific understanding of what the people of Zimbabwe expected. The survey report was launched in July 2011.

The third level of the dialogue was to use these views to develop policy positions. Two international conferences were organised in October 2012 and 2013, at which practitioners, academics and experts from other countries deliberated on the key steps for Zimbabwe. At the same time, representatives of civil society organisations organised meetings with the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Constitution (COPAC) and made presentations for transitional justice measures based on the expectations of Zimbabweans.

Calls for a Peace Commission

With the passage of time, transitional justice dialogue spread beyond civil society. As the constitution-making process gathered momentum, citizens who had participated in the Taking Transitional Justice to the People Programme attended COPAC meetings and made a clear demand for a Peace Commission. Several organisations joined the chorus and demanded a constitution that provided for a Peace Commission.

These calls built on the Taking Transitional Justice to the People Programme but most importantly on the reality of a society wounded by violence. Issues of past serious human rights violations are not a myth but a reality that many victims continue to live with. Independent Zimbabwe is fraught with serious violation of human rights such that as early as 1997, many human rights groups had started calling for a Commission to investigate these violations. *Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A report into the disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands* (CCJP & LRF: 1997) was produced in response to these calls for truth recovery that fell on deaf ears and the Chihambakwe Committee of Inquiry's failure to make public its findings. In 1998, following the food riots in Zimbabwe's urban areas, the United Nations endorsed the call by the Forum for a Committee of Inquiry into the conduct of the state in handling the food riots. In February 1999, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) called for "a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to deal with unresolved aspects of our past that hinder national integration" (Kondo, 2000).

In its 2008 election manifesto, Zimbabwe's main opposition the MDC promised a 'Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission'. It is no wonder that when the Forum took the message to the people from 2009 to 2011, many citizens agreed and made it clear that the time was ripe for such a commission. In December 2010, the Law Society of Zimbabwe in its model constitution proposed a 'Truth, Justice, Reconciliation and Conflict Prevention Commission' to investigate past abuses, provide remedies for victims, and prevent future conflicts. These proposals were presented to COPAC at its constitutional reform consultation meetings. The names given to these proposed bodies were not random but carefully selected to refer to the expected mandate of the commission to be formed.

Despite these clear calls for a 'truth', 'justice' and 'reconciliation' commission, COPAC and the constitution drafters opted for a 'national' 'peace' and 'reconciliation' commission. It is now open to speculation as to the reasons why this was the case. What is clear is that the path that led to the establishment of the NPRC had very clear messages from the people of Zimbabwe – whatever name was given by the drafters of the Constitution to such a body it must embrace the clear aspects of truth, justice, conflict prevention and reconciliation.

Push for platform to influence the Commission

In May 2013, President Robert Mugabe signed Zimbabwe's new Constitution into law. Section 251 of the Constitution establishes the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC), with its functions to include post-conflict justice, healing and reconciliation. While the name of the commission sounded out of sync with the expectations of the people, the mandate as captured in the functions seemed to reflect what many had demanded. So finally, Zimbabwe was to have a Commission to deal with the past.

On 31 July 2013, President Robert Mugabe held hurriedly organised elections where he won another term in office. On 22 August 2013, he was sworn into office, kick-starting the calendar for the temporary life of the NPRC. In October 2013, the Forum in collaboration with the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), and the Hague Institute for Global Justice (THIGJ) convened the Second International Conference on Transitional Justice in Zimbabwe. The conference took place in Johannesburg, bringing together 68 Zimbabwean organisations to discuss the prospects of Zimbabwe operationalising an effective NPRC which meets both the expectations of the people of Zimbabwe and the best international practices. Presenters at the conference came from Zimbabwe, South Africa, Kenya, Guatemala and Germany.

A key output of the conference was the need for stakeholders to establish a mechanism to monitor the operationalisation of the NPRC, engage government on the process, lobby for the accepted minimum standards to be met and provide an interface between transitional justice stakeholders and the official mechanisms. The Forum was tasked with coordinating the establishment of such a mechanism.

On 23 May 2014, with the participation of 46 organisations, the NTJWG was elected in fulfilment of the recommendations of the Second International Conference on Transitional Justice in Zimbabwe. Composed of eight expert members from different backgrounds, NTJWG

brings together a cross section of actors in the transitional justice sector to influence Zimbabwe's transitional justice policy. In the short period of its existence, the group has made several interventions.

Expanding the dialogue on healing

While dialogue on national healing preceded, and influenced the push for a commission, the NPRC in Zimbabwe is still beginning its work. However, dialogue on that work has already started as the NTJWG brought the NPRC to the centre of public discussion on healing through several interventions.

The minimum standards for an effective NPRC

These interventions include making policy recommendations regarding the operationalisation of the NPRC and general policy on healing and reconciliation. Soon after its formation, the NTJWG issued the Minimum Standards for an Effective National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (the Minimum Standards). These Minimum Standards were published on 2 November 2014, to assist stakeholders in monitoring the process of establishing the NPRC and ensuring adherence to local expectations and international standards. On 26 November 2015, the Minimum Standards were further presented to the Parliamentary Thematic Committee on Peace and Security. The standards have been widely accepted and utilised by stakeholders, lobbied to all parliamentarians, delivered to key strategic policy bodies, used in training for key thematic committees of the Parliament and have helped members of the public appreciate the importance of monitoring public processes.

Responses to potential threats against the NPRC

On 18 March 2015, the *Sunday Mail* reported that there were plans to change the Constitution and do away with some of the commissions (Farawo, 2015). The NPRC was mentioned as one of the 'unimportant' commissions. On 17 March 2015, the NTJWG responded with a strong policy statement, stating that the NPRC is a product of a wide consultative process that produced the 2013 Constitution. As such, the collective wisdom of all the people of Zimbabwe who participated in that process must not be overthrown by the fears of a few. The NTJWG engaged various actors on the matter because this is a fundamental issue in Zimbabwe's transitional justice process.

Highlighting key qualities for Commissioners

On 18 March 2015, Parliament published the names of shortlisted candidates for the prospective NPRC commission. On 20 March 2015, the NTJWG responded by addressing a press conference on the shortlist in which it outlined the key qualities for Parliament to consider when selecting NPRC Commissioners.

Observing the interviews for the commissioners

On 25 March 2015, Parliament interviewed the candidates. The NTJWG observed the interviews and compiled a comprehensive report and analysis. Extensive research was carried out on some of the candidates and with the help of the media, weaknesses in the process were highlighted to stakeholders.

Monitoring the process

Following all the identified transitional justice processes, the NTJWG launched the NPRC Watch, which is a monitoring report tracking and reporting on the process of establishing the NPRC. The report is published every quarter and serves to inform ordinary citizens on the critical issues emerging from the process and recommendations from stakeholders.

Guiding principles for transitional justice

On 24 September 2015, the NTJWG launched the Guiding Principles for Transitional Justice Policy and Practice in Zimbabwe,[5] the outcome of a long dialogue among transitional justice actors in Zimbabwe spanning the past two decades.

Analysis of the proposed NPRC law

On 18 December 2015, the government gazetted the NPRC Bill, the draft law to provide the legal basis for the NPRC. The NTJWG did an extensive analysis of the Bill in line with local expectations and minimum international standards. On 8 January 2016, the NTJWG issued a preliminary report[6] and lobbied parliamentarians to reject the Bill as it violated several sections of the Constitution. A public campaign was launched which brought citizens together to speak out against the proposed law. By the time of the writing of this paper, the Bill had been withdrawn and government committed to rework on the draft law in line with recommendations of stakeholders.

5 The report on the process leading to the adoption of the principles is available at http://www.ntjwg.org/ws/uploads/publications/Stakeholders%20Conference%20on%20TJ%20Principles%20Report.pdf, accessed 2 August 2016.

6 The media report and the Preliminary Report is available at http://www.ntjwg.org/article.php?id=161, accessed 2 August 2016.

Engagement with key parliamentary committees

Between November 2015 and June 2016, the NTJWG ran a series of training workshops with key parliamentary committees on transitional justice with specific focus on the law. These training meetings were designed to empower the legislature to play an oversight role over the executive and create a buffer zone for the NPRC against a potentially intrusive executive.

Many initiatives are ongoing as the NTJWG continues to play its role to influence Zimbabwe's transitional justice policy.

Process reflection

Why the drive for a transitional justice agenda in Zimbabwe?

The transitional justice advocacy has been met with much scepticism in Zimbabwe. Some academics and practitioners have argued that it is useless to pursue a transitional justice policy in a country where there has been no transition and no transition is in sight. This argument is also advanced in relation to the issue of political will in Zimbabwe to implement a comprehensive transitional justice policy. What some academics and practitioners fail to realise is the transformation of the transitional justice practice itself.

The UN Special Rapporteur Pablo de Greif noted that transitional justice has been transplanted from its original setting of post-authoritarian states to states in conflict and states in pre-transition context Practitioners working with victims have now realised the urgency of relief, intervention and information preservation without waiting for some perfect time in the future. Transitional justice is now understood, not in the narrow understanding of political transition but rather as a transformation in culture, practice and institutions. These transformations sometimes transcend political transition.

The NTJWG has adopted an approach that transcends the current political establishment and works towards the transformation of culture, institutions and practice in order to ensure justice and accountability. As recently alluded to by leading politicians, real change in Zimbabwe entails much more than a change of political actors (Ndlovu, 2016).

Changes already achieved like the establishment of the Human Rights Commission and the NPRC prove that it is possible sometimes to work within a restrictive context to push for key structural changes.

As regards political will, it has been argued that in politics there is nothing like political will because politicians will always be influenced by political objectives – what is required is political accountability. By creating tools for monitoring of the process for policymakers by stakeholders, the NTJWG is creating political accountability and generating public participation.

Is there a linkage between civil society initiatives and the common person?

Transitional justice initiatives by civil society in Zimbabwe are often treated as elitist processes that are out of touch with the common person in the street. Muzondidya (2011) says that a serious limitation in Zimbabwe's civic movement with regards to its capacity to mobilise citizens for democratic change is its lack of organic linkages with the masses. While Muzondidya was probably discussing the issue of the masses in the sense of political participation, his statement may not apply to all civic engagement by civil society. The statement however highlights some of the accusations levelled against civil society.

As regards transitional justice advocacy, civil society warned itself against making it an elite discourse. This explains why there has been so much emphasis on the process being 'victim-centred', a discourse which developed to become 'victim driven'. The transition in transitional justice is understood as a much deeper concept than just political transition, facilitating a journey for victims 'from victim to victor'. It was noted:

> *The challenge, therefore, is to facilitate the journey from victim to victor. The inclusion, participation and support of victims and survivors in discussions and processes intended to explore issues of justice and accountability, is a primary element in this journey which resonate both at individual and community levels. Failure to do so ignores the relationship between victimization and victimizing and lays the groundwork for deep-seated resentment and long-term complications.* (Morrell and Pigou, 2004: 6)

In practice, civil society in Zimbabwe has taken the tour down the uncommon road, not the elitist road as that is the common road, but the road of walking with the wounded and mourning with the bereaved. Many victims who found themselves on the firing line of the state and aligned militant groups have sought and found refuge in civil society. The work of such organisations as the CCJP and LRF during the liberation war and *Gukurahundi*, the work of the Forum during the 1998 food riots, the work of Amnesty International during Operation Murambatsvina, the work of the Counseling Services Unit and the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights during the 2008 bloody elections, cannot be said to be out of touch with the masses. These organisations work at the heart of the suffering of the masses and that has continued to date.

These form the bedrock upon which Zimbabwe's

transitional justice advocacy programme is designed. In the Taking Transitional Justice Programme, the Forum through its members reached the remotest of villages. Outreach teams came face to face with the ugliness of violence and at times fell victim to such.[7] Malicious prosecution was mounted against the then Executive Director of the Forum for undertaking such work. However, it was not outreach in vain as citizens in their masses turned up at COPAC meetings and demanded a truth commission to help carry the dialogue on justice and accountability to an official process. Even as the Parliament of Zimbabwe undertook its outreach on the NPRC law from 10 to 18 April 2016, they found the masses ready to take on the process and make meaningful interventions. These events, among others, are evidence that the transitional justice discourse in Zimbabwe has successfully built deep linkages with the masses in line with the recommendations of the Johannesburg Symposium.

Threat of co-option in search of collaboration

Some stakeholders have raised the issue that the NTJWG risks being co-opted into the establishment. This is because the NTJWG has sought to engage policymakers. In the NPRC Bill advocacy initiatives, the NTJWG identified key agencies of change, sometimes within the ruling establishment, who have made a difference in driving the process. This is a cause of fear for some actors who believe that the current political administration is incapable of reform and that civil society will end up compromising on principles.

These fears are justifiable. The eight members of the NTJWG have organised themselves along thematic areas, each led by an expert, and there is a thematic committee drawn from the 46 organisations that set up the NTJWG, which serves as the reference group for the thematic leaders. This is meant to ensure constant checks and balances so that the NTJWG's eight members do not run away with the vision of the stakeholders. Stakeholders maintain control of the NTJWG and determine the direction of engagement. A perusal of the NTJWG's interventions will show that to date the NTJWG has been able to engage policymakers from all political parties at the same time as issuing very strong statements that do not compromise on principles.

The NTJWG and a narrow focus on the NPRC

A review of the NTJWG's current initiatives suggest a primary, if not limited, focus on the NPRC. This creates a danger of ignoring other transitional justice mechanisms, some of which are established by the Constitution, including the Gender Commission, the Ethics and Integrity Committee and the Independent Complaints Mechanism.

This is despite the fact that the NTJWG describes itself as "an interface between transitional justice stakeholders and official processes" (n.d.), which seems to suggest that stakeholders working on transitional justice were not focusing only on the NPRC. Additionally, NTJWG's 2014 – 2023 strategy does not limit the NTJWG to the NPRC.

The narrow approach may be a result of limitations in resources and the taxing nature of the work on the NPRC. The NTJWG and stakeholders need to work constantly to broaden the scope of transitional justice intervention. Some interventions may not require financial support but building strategic alliances with partners working in the area, for example actors like the Centre for Applied Legal Research (CALR) who are working with the Ministry of Justice on constitutional realignment.

The next steps

Every single day that it becomes clear that Zimbabwe is going to have a peace commission, signs of hostility against the commission become more visible. Through the NTJWG, stakeholders have to keep their eyes on the ball to convince an unwilling government to confront its own past. It remains doubtful whether the NPRC will bear fruit but the world is not short of examples of regimes that have had to confront their own past record. In Sri Lanka, following the massacre of the Tamil Tigers in 2009, the government of Mahinda Rajapaksa was forced through local and international pressure to establish a truth commission to investigate the manner in which it executed the war. In May 2010, President Rajapaksa appointed a commission called the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission. Civil society involvement in monitoring the process brought the issue onto the United Nations agenda and facilitated the setting up of the Secretary General's Panel of Experts.

In a similar way and context, stakeholders in Zimbabwe seek to effect transitional justice in a non-transitional state and push the government to confront itself. The strategy of the future remains an insistence on minimum standards. The transitional justice process in Zimbabwe will be internationalised. Both the United Nations and the African Union have created tools for peace commissions. Under the United Nations Universal Periodic Review (UPR), Zimbabwe has committed to ensuring the setting up of an effective NPRC. The NTJWG can push that such a commission be established according to accepted UN standards.

NTJWG must also seek to continue with constructive partnerships with key institutions like the Parliament that are influential in ensuring the independence of the Commission.

The NTJWG needs to activate public participation in the dialogue on transitional justice. This is work which has been initiated by stakeholders through such programmes

7 See report on some of the incidents at https://www.justice.gov/.../annual_report_2011.pdf, accessed 23 September 2016.

as the Taking Transitional Justice to the People Programme. Through the NPRC Watch, the NTJWG can admit not just policy makers but also ordinary people, especially the victims, into discussions on transitional justice.

Recently, Zimbabwe witnessed an explosion of citizen consciousness on national issues of justice and accountability through such movements as #ThisFlag. This consciousness was reflected in the Parliament's public hearings on the NPRC Bill as crowds thronged to hearing venues and demanded a commission that listens to the needs of the people. This consciousness signifies a powerful rebellion against elitism in national processes and the NTJWG has to embrace that spirit and insist that government opens wide the doors of policymaking so that the process is as inclusive as possible.

Indeed, the NTJWG needs to focus on expanding the transitional justice advocacy to integrate other mechanisms besides the NPRC. With a movement of 46 organisations, it is possible to start looking at other strategic alliances to advance transitional justice in other areas.

Conclusion

The NTJWG is an unprecedented experiment as civil society seeks to confront the paradox of transitional justice in a non-transitional state. Can that be done, many ask? But that question is the beginning of a dialogue that Zimbabwe must have. Going beyond dialogue requires courageous leadership and strategic coordination. If the NTJWG plays that role effectively, the possibilities of moving towards justice increase. By natural means or otherwise, Zimbabwe is on the brink of a transition. Whether such a transition will be as barren as the 1980 transition to majority rule, or will deliver justice, will depend on what stakeholders do on the eve of the transition and on putting in place mechanisms to deal with the past and design a new future. On 27 January 2015, in marking the International Holocaust Remembrance Day, one of the survivors of the Holocaust, Roman Kent said, "We the survivors do not want our past to be our children's future." These words accurately reflect the feelings of many actors in the NTJWG that there is a need to end the pervasive culture of violence and create a new legacy.

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Governance Activism for the Inclusive Development of Security in Northern Nigeria

A case study on the Amana Initiative: A confidence-building project between civil society youth and government security agencies in response to the consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency

By Jake Okechukwu Effoduh

Introduction

In Northern Nigeria and the surrounding regions, Boko Haram has killed and maimed more innocent civilians in the past year than ISIS and Al Shabaab combined. In 2014 it killed 6,644 people, surpassing ISIS, which killed 6,073, thus making it the deadliest terrorist group in 2014, according to a report by Global Terrorism Index. Boko Haram, in carrying out its murderous attacks, makes no apologies for its nature as a threat to governance and development. This requires a critical and an all-inclusive response.

As the Nigerian military continues its commendable battle push against Boko Haram, the need for a human rights approach and the support of civil society becomes more apparent especially as the insurgent group comprising majorly youths have now raised their evil several notches with the incessant kidnapping of young girls, young boys and women, and an ISIS-esque obsession with taking over Nigerian lands and territories. The Nigeria Police Force that has been largely deployed to the affected areas is ill-equipped and facing exhaustion. They have also become victims, largely affected by the situation. Several deaths have been recorded of policemen who were killed whilst carrying out their duties fighting crime in the Northern part of the country. This situation has led to a civil society collapse, demotivation, and a huge distrust between the youth, the police and the government.

To tackle this issue of distrust and lack of confidence, the Abuja Global Shapers in partnership with the United States Embassy in Nigeria decided to create an inclusive model of activism to support government efforts by using civil society and local activist forces. We initiated an advocacy scheme titled: The Amana Initiative,[1] creating 22 confidence-building projects which all stemmed from local community ideas. The projects were implemented within 2 yearly rounds in the northern region of Nigeria and cumulatively engaged at least 28,000 civil society youth and 2,050 government security forces. The Amana Initiative, through activism and a series of human development advocacy initiatives, has greatly improved the trust and confidence between all stakeholders. This has supplemented government efforts towards ensuring security for good governance in the region.

This report first details the methodology of the study, and then reviews the existing literature on the essence of governance activism and inclusive development. Next, it presents the historico-political and socio-economic circumstances that have shaped the evolution of Northern Nigeria, describes the impact on the region of the insurgent activities of Boko Haram, and identifies the relevant stakeholders at play. The report then delves into findings by giving an account of the strides, challenges and achievements of the Amana Initiative in implementing various projects and how they have contributed towards inclusive development of security in Northern Nigeria. The report concludes with reflections on the significance of the confidence-building activities of the Amana Initiative thus far, and the role the Initiative is likely to play in future.

Methodology

The underlying objective of this study was to explore the interplay between activism and inclusive development

1 *Amana* is a Hausa word for Trust; Hausa is the predominant local language in Northern Nigeria.

through the lenses of the various activities carried out by the Amana Initiative in Northern Nigeria. It sets out to identify the extent to which youths could be helped to engage with, rather than antagonise, security agencies in achieving the common goal of improving the security situation in the region. The research objective was addressed through a combination of methods including a literature review, interviews and discussion sessions with stakeholders.

Calls for proposals to reputable youth-led organisations and individuals with demonstrated experience in youth projects in northern Nigeria were made online and via print media. Reviews of the submitted proposals were carried out to ensure that they met with the objective of the Initiative. The proposals selected demonstrated the ability to promote mutual understanding and build confidence between the youth, security officials and government officials in the region. Project examples included but were not limited to anti-terrorism campaigns, athletic competitions, town hall meetings, musical performances, policy dialogues, and theatrical productions.

Successful applicant activists were contacted and partnership agreements were concluded. The planning and implementation of the projects was done collaboratively in 11 of the Northern states in two rounds over a period of two years. Each local activist force carried out at least one activity with some carrying out up to four. An evaluation was done at the close of each activity, which included interviews with stakeholders on both the security side (the Police Force, Army, Civil Defense Corp, Road Safety officials, etc.) and the civil society side (youth groups, community leaders, trade union members, out of school youth, etc.).

In defining an appropriate mechanism for tracking and monitoring the impact of projects, two reporting mechanisms were adopted; these include assessing the theory of change through defining indicators in a project log frame, and utilising anecdotal sources to complement the results and outcomes realised, based on the defined indicators. The project log frame utilised key indicators as a basis for ensuring that the project objectives were met.

Definition of terms

Governance activism

There is a dearth of occurrence of the phrase 'governance activism' in the literature, at least with regard to public or political governance. Results from Internet searches yield no results for (public or political) governance activism but churn out a few results relating to corporate governance activism. Levy's (2014) work on governance activism is however very pertinent in this regard. He refers to "Governance Activism for Inclusive Democratic Development" as an approach and framing that reflects – and reflects on – the collective participatory action of citizens and/or non-governmental activist forces pushing for governance reforms aimed at pressing for accountability, including openness, transparency and delivery of key public services. It is "an invitation to citizens to work to shape their own lives and participate peacefully in the shaping of their societies, according to their distinctive visions of freedom and justice" (Levy, 2014). This, according to Levy (2014), is one of the benefits of democracy over authoritarian alternatives. Levy (2014) believes that to integrate governance and growth in development strategies, the starting point is to "work with the grain" by looking for entry points that can unleash an ongoing, virtuous circle of cumulative change.

Quite similar to Levy's (2014) perspective, this study also adopts a collective participatory and 'stakeholder' view on governance activism. The approach adopted is to avoid the tendency to equate public governance activism with 'political activism' because the latter, while seemingly synonymous with the former, is some inches away from the mark. The term being conceptualised as governance activism will be better understood by analogy with 'corporate governance activism' than 'political activism'. To further drive home the distinction, it is necessary to explain both terms.

Political activism connotes:

- Involvement in the political process for the sake of promoting, impeding or raising awareness of a certain issue or set of issues;
- Engagement beyond voting, whether it be through protest, demonstration or lecture (Reference, 2017) and
- Mundane non-compliance in daily life, legal and civil challenge, and overt resistance (Robers, 2004).

Corporate governance activism connotes:

- A focus on changes in a company's governance arrangements, executive compensation and social policy (Rose and Sherfman, 2014);
- That rather than merely being involved by anonymous speculation or trading in shares on the market, shareholders become owners with an interest in the company's progress, an interest in knowing its business or personnel and a commitment to its long-term success (Leech, 2002); and
- A brand of shareholder activism that focuses on corporate governance, primarily on how a company structures and compensates its leadership (De Kluyver, n.d.)

Like corporate governance activism, public or political governance activism makes citizens 'stakeholders' rather than mere reactors whose voices are only heard when things go wrong – it stimulates the people's responsibility for the manner in which they are governed.

Unlike 'political activism', political or public 'governance activism' as conceptualised in this study is more communicative (two-way) than reactive (one-way), more collaborative (two-way) than expressive or advocative (one-way). It requires dialogue between the government and the people and a form of accountability that is not postponed until periodic elections or provocative events. Unlike political activism, which is expressive, governance activism is both expressive and receptive. Political activism demands change in action or inaction, but governance activism goes a step further to also demand continuing communication and accountability in the entire and continuing process from which the action or inaction arose. It is a continuing process rather than an occasional activity that is triggered by the occurrence of an event or non-occurrence of a desired event. It is therefore a more effective tool than mere political activism in holding the government accountable for its responsibilities including the responsibility to provide security.

Inclusive development

Inclusive development aims at ensuring benefits for all, including minority, emasculated and marginalised groups. It has been described as a "pro-poor approach that equally values and incorporates the contributions of all stakeholders – including marginalised groups – in addressing development issues" (Oxfam, n.d.). It is "growth coupled with equal opportunities" (Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2009) or an approach to developmental issues that seeks to carry everybody along. It ensures that a person or group is not excluded merely because of cultural, gender, social, economic or other differences.

Governance activism for inclusive development

This provides an approach to governance that actively contends with social and economic exclusion to promote development for all. It is also the recognition that governance is not only dealing with technical challenges but also the process of creating adaptive wins. This involves a shift from using pure numeric data and indices to a more participatory approach in solving problems, which may border on purpose, negotiation and even dignity.

According to Levy (2016), governance activism for inclusive democratic development is an approach and framing which reflects on collective participatory action of citizens and non-governmental activist forces pushing for government reforms aimed at pressing for accountability, including openness, transparency and the delivery of key public services. It presses for incremental change, identifying islands of effectiveness for civic action, rather than grandiose plans for change. It focuses on what is actually working on the ground.

Historical and political context of study

Political and socio-economic landscape of Northern Nigeria

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a country in West Africa that comprises over 500 different ethnic groups and languages. Before the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorate by the British colonial administration in 1914, the protectorates were administered as separate colonies. Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960, after which it was ruled by several interrupted civilian and military governments. However, since 1999, the country has experienced an uninterrupted span of democratic rule.

Nigeria is made up 36 states which are broadly grouped into six geo-political zones: The North Central (loosely known as the Middle belt),[2] the North East,[3] North West,[4] South East,[5] South-South[6] and South West.[7] Although there are smaller ethnic groups in Northern Nigeria, the region is dominated by the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups. The region is also predominantly Islamic with 12 states adopting Sharia law.

Occupying about 70% of Nigeria's land mass and making up about 53.57% of the country's population, the economy of Northern Nigeria is majorly agrarian. Unlike the southern states, which host numerous multinational companies and a growing middle class, the largely rural North is significantly less industrialised. The textile, automobile and beverages industries that thrived in the 1970s and 1980s have collapsed, leaving a high rate of unemployment in their wake. The World Bank (2014) reports that while the poverty rate in the South has reduced noticeably, the poverty rate in the North West has remained stagnant, and poverty in the North East has increased. In addition to the high level of poverty and unemployment in the North, the region also features a high level of illiteracy and gender imbalances. Child marriage remains a common practice in Northern Nigeria.

The economic and social imbalance between Northern and Southern Nigeria makes the sharing of political power a sensitive issue. Due to the ethno-religious heterogeneity of Nigeria and the socio-economic imbalance between Northern and Southern Nigeria, the country occasionally experiences tribal and religious tensions, with the North often being a hotbed of such conflicts. One of such

2 Six states and the federal capital: Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau and the Federal Capital Territory.

3 Six states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe.

4 Seven states: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara.

5 Five states: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo.

6 Six states: Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta and Edo.

7 Six states: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo

conflicts later escalated into the civil war in Nigeria that lasted from 1967 till 1970. The most intense conflicts in Northern Nigeria tend to be religiously motivated, such as the violent protests that precipitated the moving of the Miss World pageant from Abuja to London, which left over 100 people dead and 500 injured. In recent years, Northern Nigeria has experienced an unprecedented level of civil unrest due to the terrorist activities of the Boko Haram sect.

Emergence of Boko Haram's insurgency

The group now infamously known as Boko Haram[8] is said to have emerged in 2002 under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno State. At the time, the proclaimed intent of the group was to end corruption and injustice in Nigeria which it blamed on Western influences. The group also set out to impose Islamic law. Pursuing this agenda, Yusuf set up a mosque and an Islamic school which became recruiting grounds for Jihadists. Yusuf attracted followers from unemployed and mostly impoverished youths. He is reported to have used the existing Izala[9] infrastructure to recruit naïve youth before breaking away from mainstream Izala after he split from the movement.

During the first seven years of its existence, Boko Haram conducted its operations in a relatively peaceful manner, withdrawing into remote areas. The government repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organisation. The police later began an investigation into the group's operations and in July 2009, they arrested nine Boko Haram members and confiscated weapons. There was a further clash with the police in a funeral procession during which the police were alleged to have used excessive force. In a surge of reprisal attacks, the group targeted police posts and other government installations, killing several police officers.

When the police were unable to quell the insurgency, the Nigerian army was deployed. In 2010, the federal government deployed a Joint Task Force (JTF), comprised of military and police personnel. The ensuing JTF operation resulted in the death of more than 700 Boko Haram members and destroyed the mosque that the group used as its headquarters. Yusuf and other leaders were arrested by the military and handed over to the police. A few days later, the corpses of Yusuf and his colleagues were displayed in public with no clear justification for their deaths. These extrajudicial killings infuriated the group. However, the group appeared inactive after this incident until late 2010 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.).

In 2010, having regrouped under their new leader Abubakar Shakau, members of Boko Haram began to assassinate police officers and other targets. In September 2010, the group attacked a prison in Bauchi state, freeing 700 inmates. Later that year, they attacked two churches in Maiduguri and detonated explosives in Christian neighbourhoods in Jos (ibid). The attacks soon increased in frequency and scale, commencing incessant waves of terrorist attacks that would terrorise several parts of Northern Nigeria, with most of the attacks affecting areas in the North East.

Various theories have been advanced to explain the survival and expansion of the group's strength and influence. Given the extremely high level of illiteracy and poverty in Northern Nigeria, it is not surprising that some have attributed Boko Haram's survival to unemployment, poverty and illiteracy in the north (Wikileaks, 2009). Others have characterised the insurgency as a northern rebellion against the loss of political power by the north to former President Goodluck Jonathan who is from the South-South geopolitical zone. Some politicians have been blamed for funding Boko Haram in its budding phase, using it as a tool to antagonise political opponents and abandoning the group after the elections when its help was no longer needed (Lamb, 2016). However, these claims have not been substantiated.

Security situation in Northern Nigeria

Since the emergence of Boko Haram, its attacks have assumed an increasingly sophisticated and lethal dimension. The attacks are typically perpetrated using improvised explosive devices. The group's terror approach employs suicide bombings, kidnapping, raping and sporadic shootings. Women and children are sometimes coerced or indoctrinated to carry out suicide bombing attacks. The group has attacked government installations, churches, mosques, educational institutions, and innocent civilians, often in market places and leisure sites. Several villages have been raided and sacked, displacing millions of people. The kidnapping of more than 275 girls from a boarding school in Chibok, which drew worldwide attention, is just one of several instances of kidnappings by the group.

Security agencies have not been spared in the group's terror campaign as there have been several kidnappings of police officers, attacks on police stations, including the bombing of the headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force in the Federal Capital Territory in 2011. On January 20 2012, the group launched one of its deadliest campaigns of violence when it killed more than 185 people after

8 Boko Haram has been variously translated as "Western education is forbidden", "Western influence is sin" or "Westernisation is Sacrilege". *Haram* is Arabic for "forbidden" and *boko* is the Hausa word for "fake". Northern Nigerians have commonly dismissed Western education as *ilimin boko* meaning "fake education". The group's official name was ***Jamāʿat Ahl al-Sunna lil-Daʿawah wa al-Jihād,*** often translated as "Association of the People of the Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad." However, in March 2015, the group was reported to have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, rechristening itself as *Wilayat Gharb Afriquiya,* meaning "The Islamic State's West Africa Province". See Miles WFS (2014) "Breaking Down 'Boko Haram". Cognoscenti, 9 May 2014. Available at http://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2014/05/09/nigeria-schoolgirls-kidnapping-william-f-s-miles, accessed on 30 July 2016; Tilde AU "An In-House Survey into the Cultural Origins of Boko Haram Movement in Nigeria" (Gamji, Discourse 261), available at http://www.gamji.com/tilde/tilde99.htm., accessed on 30 July 2016.

9 *Izala* is a popular conservative movement advocating return to the "true practice" of Islam but not necessarily the creation of an Islamic state.

carrying out coordinated attacks in the city of Kano, targeting police stations and government offices.

The seemingly ubiquitous nature of Boko Haram as well as its inexplicable resilience frustrated efforts to quell the insurgence through military confrontation. The government also made several futile attempts at negotiation, offering amnesty in exchange for disarmament. However, the military recorded some progress in February 2015, when a successful offensive was planned and launched by Nigeria in collaboration with neighbouring countries which proved effective in uprooting Boko Haram from much of the area it previously held. This reduced the frequency of attacks by the group.

On July 20 2016, the Minister of Interior announced that Boko Haram had been defeated. It remains to be seen whether this military victory will restore lasting peace to the embattled parts of Northern Nigeria.

Socio-economic effects of the insecurity in Northern Nigeria

There are human rights implications to the insecurity in the North and the efforts to combat the insurgency. The Constitution of Nigeria (1999) guarantees several fundamental rights such as the right to life, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, fair hearing, personal liberty, peaceful assembly and association. Although the Constitution provides for derogations from these rights when justified by considerations of public safety and in periods of emergency, there have been instances of unjustified derogations by both Boko Haram and the government.

On the one hand, Boko Haram has notably infringed upon peoples' right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of movement and personal liberty. On the part of the government, the war against Boko Haram has made it inevitable that the government significantly limits the freedom of movement of inhabitants of Northern Nigeria. There have also been allegations that the JTF, in its efforts to counter Boko Haram, sometimes uses excessive force against innocent civilians and suspected Boko Haram members, occasionally resulting in extrajudicial killings.

Boko Haram's rampage in Northern Nigeria has left many in economic despair. Several farmers have had to abandon their farmlands while others have lost their cattle. Businessmen have also had their ventures interrupted and in some cases liquidated due to immeasurable losses suffered during the period of economic impasse created by Boko Haram. This has also affected workers as many have become unemployed.

Even if Boko Haram has indeed been defeated, it will take a significant period for the economy of Northern Nigeria, especially the North East, to recuperate. The region remains scarred by the social and economic assaults of the group's terrorist activities such as destroyed infrastructure, lost lives, internally displaced persons, lost or diminished means of livelihood, and restriction on the movement of persons and goods. Since the current insurgency started in 2009, the group is reported to have killed over 27,000 people and displaced over 2.2 million from their towns and villages (Akingbule, 2016).

The government is currently faced with the herculean task of financing major restorative programmes in the North East aimed at reconstructing destroyed infrastructure and rehabilitating its largely displaced population. There is also the challenge of improving education and creating productive jobs through both public and private sector intervention. The slow pace of job creation and youth engagement efforts has led to increasing frustration among unemployed youth and displaced citizens in the region.

State actors and other stakeholders

The state actors relevant to this study include:

- The Federal Government of Nigeria;
- Agencies of the federal government such as the Nigerian Police Force, the Nigerian Military, the Department of State Security, the National Intelligence Agency and other security agencies;
- State governments of the 19 states in Northern Nigeria;
- Local governments in Northern Nigeria;
- The Abuja Global Shapers;
- The US Embassy in Nigeria; and
- NGOs, CSOs, Mandela Washington Fellows, individuals and the media.

The Federal Government of Nigeria has so far taken some positive action to put an end to insurgency and unrest in Northern Nigeria and to ensure a safe return of those kidnapped by Boko Haram. The Federal Government's efforts have been implemented through its various security agencies. Activities such as military engagement of insurgents, on-the-ground technical assistance, intelligence gathering and expanded intelligence sharing have helped prevent an expansion of Boko Haram's sphere of influence. Although these efforts were not effective, until very recently, in diminishing the terrorist group's potency in the region, they have provided a foundation for the increasingly comprehensive recent approach to addressing insecurity such as the establishment of a rapid response security system as well as the setting up of a Presidential Committee on Security that have yielded more promising results. The security officials, through the support of the government and international partners have expanded the use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to aid Nigeria's efforts.

State and local governments in the northern region have strengthened the Federal Government's efforts majorly by helping to rehabilitate internally displaced persons through

the provision of necessities like food, shelter and some water.

The above-described government efforts, however, made a negligible impact at best towards building confidence and trust. It is in this regard that stakeholders other than state actors (specifically civil society organisations, youths, and media) have taken some action towards engaging the government on the need for inclusive development and the respect for human rights.

The Amana Initiative

In several countries challenged by insurgency, young people have the capacity to exert decisive influence in the fight against it, especially in cases of violent extremism. Through an inclusive development of security in the region the youth can help solve the problem, but this is less likely if there is distrust and lack of faith in the security apparatus of the government. By recognising the need to overcome this distrust, which is often instinctive and is fanned by many factors, the critical need for governance activism was identified.

Under the umbrella of the Abuja Global Shapers Hub,[10] an independent group of 29 young activists[11] with exceptional potential, achievements and drive to improve their communities, implemented and managed a total of 22 projects in 11 states. The projects were implemented within two years by initiating 47 local activist forces and civil society groups in the various communities and states where project activities were carried out.

Funded by the US Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria, the programmes engaged at least 28,000 youth and 2,050 security officials in confidence-building activities ranging from, but not limited to, anti-terrorism campaigns, athletic competitions, town hall meetings, truth and reconciliation panels, media engagements, essay competitions, rallies, security trainings, policy dialogues, musical performances, and even theatre and art production. The Amana Initiative created:

- An opportunity for youth groups in Northern Nigeria to develop initiatives to better understand their role in improving security and in engaging with the security forces and other public service officials that are responsible for protecting them;
- An inter-sectoral platform for youth in Northern Nigeria to engage with government officials at state and local levels;
- An opportunity for the implementers, funders, and the Nigerian government to gain insights into sociocultural dynamics at play in northern regions affected by insurgency; and
- Facilitation to direct consultation and collaboration between youth, security forces, and policy makers aimed at improving relations between all groups.

A call for proposals was sent out to the local communities in northern states where governance activists, groups and individuals were asked to apply for small pocket grants to carry out projects that would address apparent distrust between youth and security agencies in the fight against insurgency in their states.

By leading the project, a comprehensive review of the proposals was carried out, which involved professional deliberations, analyses and criticism of the projects to better develop and make them best suited to achieving the desired goals and impact. The local activist forces, civil society groups and individuals were visited and contacted at intervals to develop and harness the projects proposed. Partnership visits and requests were also sent out to the security forces which include the army, the police force and their counterparts.

The planning and developmental stages of the project were highly successful, especially with the endorsement of the Commissioner of Police of the federal capital who consented to launch the Amana Initiative, honouring a dialogue session with youths and civil society on the security situation in the country. The Amana Initiative covered 11 out of the 19 states in northern Nigeria with a two-year period for implementing two rounds of the project: 9 and 13 projects respectively.

Designed to provide catalytic support to the government through activism, this project implemented the activities outlined in the following section, amongst others.

Bridging the gap between youth and security agencies through sports

> *Games lubricate the body and the mind.*
> Benjamin Franklin (cited in Ballou, 1886)

In Northern Nigeria as all over the world, sports, especially soccer and horse riding, have become a tool for social integration in the society. The outcomes achieved through these sporting activities are crucial in a peace and trust building process, exemplified by the fact that 13 of the 22 projects held either soccer competitions, horse riding activities or morning drills. The post-event analysis carried out across several states indicated that the soccer matches provided a platform for building relationships between youth and at least five government security agencies. They also provided an opportunity to transcend the divisions that exist between the youth and security agencies.

10 The Abuja Global Shapers is an NGO that carries out developmental projects in communities in line with the mission of the Global Shapers Community, which is to "Improve the state of our world". The Abuja Hub is made up of exceptionally talented and diverse young Nigerians in both their achievements and potential, with skills ranging from developmental economics to sports, agriculture, law, health and entrepreneurship, to mention but a few. See http://abujaglobalshapers.org.

11 The activists were mostly aged below 30 years.

One man practicing sportsmanship is far better than 50 preaching it.
Knute Rockne (cited in Koos, 2014)

At a town hall meeting, one of the students from Baze University[12] narrated how he instantly became more inclined to playing soccer with the police team when one of the security agents deployed first aid skills to treat his hamstring injury following a morning drill mishap. This not only revealed the expertise within the police force but also demonstrated empathy and unity of purpose. Empirical evidence also showed that children and youth (largely under the age of 18) who have been victims of or susceptible to radicalisation require structured social activities. This engagement and interaction using non-verbal communication gradually minimises radicalization and aids in the integration of victims back into society. As a result of the Amana Initiative, a bi-annual football tournament between the Nigeria Police Force, Vehicle Inspection Office, Federal Road Safety Corps, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, and students from the University of Abuja Law Clinic was initiated.[13] This provided an opportunity for constant engagement amongst the security agencies for strategic partnerships, and also a platform for the students to learn how to better provide catalytic support to the security agencies.

Changing perception through dialogue

Trust is established by dialogue.
Paulo Freire (2000: 91)

The breakdown of trust between youths and security agencies across communities in Northern Nigeria was exacerbated by the Boko Haram insurgency. This led to a high crime rate because the youth felt that the security agencies did not have the legitimacy to act, amongst other negative perceptions expressed by the majority of the youths. More often than not, the interaction between youth and security agencies was adversarial and either party was always on the defensive resulting in avoidable negative outcomes.

The reality today is that we are all interdependent and have to co-exist on this small planet. Therefore the only sensible and intelligent way of resolving differences and clashes on interest, whether between individuals or nations is through dialogue.
The Dalai Lama (1997)

In a bid to harness collective efforts in building peaceful and safe communities, all 22 projects activities involved dialogue sessions on different scales and formats to collectively address the issue of mistrust. The dialogue sessions were carried out through town hall meetings, radio programmes, traditional and new media engagements with youth influencers and security experts.

The sessions provided a platform for the youth and security agencies to openly address each other on issues and the negative perceptions they had of each other.[14] The dialogue sessions were all interactive and structured to provide open communication on the security and youth relationship to rebuild trust.[15]

A project[16] was also established to bridge the gap between the security/criminal justice sector and Bauchi youth through a four-month radio programme, in English and Hausa languages, aimed at educating the public on the police procedures and the criminal justice system. It also featured a one-day *keke-napep*[17] rally and the presentation of suggestion boxes to the police. The radio programme was chosen as a platform to educate people on the justice system and procedures for reporting crime because the people in Bauchi are avid radio listeners. After one of the radio sessions, a listener called one of the grantees to report a rape crime; the victim noted that prior to the radio programme they were unaware that the police would handle such an act without judgment. Feedback received from the dialogue sessions also demonstrated better understanding and willingness to work together.[18]

Connecting security to the community

The general perception is that security is considered solely a state issue. With widely acceptable traditional institutions across northern Nigeria, they are critical drivers to community mobilisation. The promotion of social harmony through conflict management and resolution of dispute is an area of strategic interest and importance to traditional and religious institutions in Nigeria.[19] It is thus imperative for community and state actors to make concerted efforts in building lasting peace and producing mutually beneficial outcomes. One of the grantees adopted the age old tradition of organising horse riding Durbar dubbed *"kilisar amana"* in partnership with a state security agency, which is traditionally followed by visits to the traditional rulers. The security and community engagement facilitated a dialogue where the community members shared their security concerns and identified where specific

12 Baze University was one of the grantees that implemented project activities.

13 The Law Clinic of the University of Abuja was one of the grantees that implemented project activities.

14 On the part of the security agencies there were consistent complaints of disrespect from youth and poor working tools to aid them in performing their duties effectively. Youth on the other hand complained of over policing, corruption and also victimisation because they are young and perceived to be engaging in negative acts.

15 One of the project grantees invited a conflict resolution expert Maryam Aliko from the Modalili Institute of Professional Development to provide training on the role of communication and perception in peace building.

16 Iqra Foundation in Bauchi State.

17 *Keke-napep* is a popular local designation for commercial motor tricycles.

18 Youth that participated in the dialogue report: i) Better understanding of the processes involved in keeping the community safe and willingness to report crime using the available channels including police hot lines available in every state and FCT; ii) Increased sense of protection when they see security agents and willingness to co-operate in carrying out their duties; iii) Viewing the security agencies more as partners than adversaries. Security agencies that participated in the dialogue report: i) Increased understanding of criminal justice administration, especially the police and the bail conditions applicable in Nigeria; ii) Adopting the lessons learnt from the sessions in carrying out their duties and also making a conscious effort to carry out their duties with a human face.

19 Traditional Religious Institutions in Nigeria: Implications for National Security, His Eminence Alhaji Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar

attention was needed, with the aim of reducing the level of insecurity in the communities. This also encouraged adequate allocation of resources by the state actors.

While physical interaction of men and women during the trust building activities were limited, participation and contribution of both genders were not hindered. The integration between the security agencies of government and the traditional and religious institutions encouraged respectful and productive relationships between local authorities, security forces and communities across all genders. Whilst a gender-balanced activism was not the case in every community, it further highlighted the fact that a one-size-fit-all approach cannot work, given the inherent cultural differences amongst communities. Thus, a solid understanding of each community's gender norms in a local context must continue to be respected to achieve results.

Building capacity for multi-stakeholder partnerships

In present day Nigeria the issues are so interconnected that challenges can no longer be separated as only security or only economic. It is thus necessary to implement conscious and deliberate multi- stakeholder initiatives to harness collective efforts of civil society organisations, the private sector, traditional/religious authorities and local vigilante groups like the Civilian Joint Task Force. Research and activities carried out by the local activist forces show that increased training of security agencies, civil society organisations and other state actors enhanced their ability to work together.[20]

For example, traditionally Sokoto Caliphate has held the acquisition of knowledge as a prelude to governance and thus the spread of religious and traditional values is of prime importance to the *Sakwatawa* (people from the Sokoto State). The model used there was a higher based training session involving the leadership of unions, state/department associations, security units of the three higher institutions[21] on fostering citizen security and sustainable trust between youth and security agencies and enhancing understanding between the groups through confidence building and conflict management. Consequently ten 'Amana Peer Champions' were selected to develop the training and a common set of skills, concepts, and processes for working together, and to coach their peers. One of the peer champions also proposed the return of the Police Liaison Officer model in his district as a communication link between the agencies and the traditional/religious leaders.

The Boko Haram crisis in North Eastern Nigeria is directly linked to political, economic and social exclusion. Even if Boko Haram has indeed been defeated, it will take a significant period of time for the economy of Northern Nigeria, especially the North East, to recover. The region remains scarred by the social and economic assaults of the group's terrorist activities such as destroyed infrastructure, lost lives, internally displaced persons, lost or diminished means of livelihood, and restriction on the movement of persons and goods.

Outcomes

The introduction of the Amana Initiative came at a time when the trust between civil society, youth and security forces had broken down significantly. Stakeholders, grantees and the participants all concurred on the relevance of the initiative.

The projects executed under the Amana Initiative enhanced understanding of the youth perspective on security issues, what works in maintaining public order, and relations between security forces and youth in northern Nigeria. The programme also considered several reports of human right abuses in the region.

There was some delay in implementing some of the activities due to the general elections that took place across the country as well as scepticism on the part of security officials and young civil society actors. Notwithstanding this, the projects carried out reflected the reinforcement of the project objectives for the election period, a time when conflicts are usually on the rise.

The projects demonstrated relevance by identifying key challenges to security in the region. Some of the problems identified include:

- Lack of infrastructure and basic facilities;
- Disregard and exclusion of the customary system of governance and the roles of traditional rulers in community policing;
- Excessive reliance on the government and disconnection between governance and the people which leads to the apathetic tendency of regarding government as 'the government' instead of the stakeholder outlook of regarding government as 'our government';
- Lack of proper upbringing of children by their parents and guardians;
- Poverty and unemployment, especially amongst women and youths, which make them prone to crime and targets for recruitment;
- Incendiary and hate speeches by religious leaders and zealots;
- Negative perception of the Nigerian police by society due to police corruption and bad publicity; and
- Sectionalism and tribalism which leads to nepotism and corruption;

20 The participants reported that the training helped them to identify common grounds and also understand where their approaches differ. This also helped the civil society organisations improve their skills on conflict assessment and prevention to ensure local ownership and oversight of human security.

21 Usman Danfodiyo University, Shehu Shagari College of Education and the Polytechnic of Sokoto.

The projects also identified the following solutions to help overcome the challenges to security and safety in the region:

- Increased community involvement in ensuring security and safety of their neighbourhood through awareness campaigns;
- Community partnership and fostering of a synergistic relationship between the community and security enforcement agencies in the fight against terrorism and insecurity;
- Public-private partnership to provide basic facilities and rehabilitate dilapidating infrastructure;
- Inclusion of traditional rulers and leaders in community security and safety planning, as they are the closest to the people and have better knowledge of the geographical and social intricacies of their communities;
- A reorientation of the community regarding their role in governance, security and safety, as well as the need for them to take ownership of governance as stakeholders;
- Government policy, implemented through conventional and social media, emphasising work ethics, family values and the need for parents/guardians to give their children/wards proper care and discipline;
- Establishment and maintenance of women centres, youth centres, skills acquisition centres and other relevant school programmes to engage youths productively towards national development;
- Encouragement of self-reliance among youth and women through entrepreneurship to make them less vulnerable to recruitment by extremists or to use by politicians for criminal activities;
- Awareness campaigns and youth education on security and safety tips, self-defence, and the defence of the community against security threats;
- Training of religious leaders on their role as peace agents and the need to avoid inciting their followers to violence, as well as the need to encourage their followers to ensure the security and safety of the community;
- Dissemination of information on the value of Nigeria's diversity of culture, religion and language, and focus on harnessing them as uniting factors;
- Reorientation of the public on their perception of the Nigerian Police Force and internal training and retraining of police personnel to execute their duties in a manner that will improve the public image of the Force; and
- Recruitment of more police personnel.

The projects evidenced viability by demonstrating adequate demand and realistic projections especially through demonstrated youth and community prospects for future activities beyond the catalytic funding provided.

Due to the culture and religion of some of the participants, women and men tended to be separated as they scarcely participated together in the confidence building activities. In town hall meetings for instance, there was an obvious demarcation between where the males sat from where the females sat. However, this did not hinder effective contribution or participation by both genders.

The courtesy visits to the community heads or heads of the security agencies to introduce the project to the stakeholders, its purpose and timeline and obtain their consent and commitment to implementation, were unanimously successful as every stakeholder agreed that such an intervention was timely and important. As the first initiative of its kind, stakeholders exhibited enthusiasm and were keen to work towards solving the problem of distrust amongst themselves.

Overall, the programme was a success. Importantly:

- The projects were highly successful with most yielding successful outcomes and surpassing their targets.
- The programme has been described as the first of its kind covering several states in the northern region of Nigeria burdened by religious and security tensions.
- The project is reported to have actively engaged a minimum of 400,000 persons including 2,050 security forces, 28,000 youths and other stakeholders from private and public sectors respectively.

Conclusion

Post-Boko Haram reconstruction of the North East in the context of democracy, government transparency and the rule of law are essential components to improving the security situation of northern Nigeria. Transparency and the rule of law will help in building trust between the government and the governed but not without an inclusive model of activism to support government efforts.

The Amana Initiative, through public governance activism and a series of human development advocacy efforts, has greatly improved trust and confidence between all stakeholders, thereby promoting government efforts towards ensuring security for good governance in the region. The programme showed the invaluable importance of listening to the needs of the community and working with stakeholders at grassroots level. However, notwithstanding the improved level of trust between the youth and security agencies, there still exists a large vacuum for similar projects in the region and an insatiable hunger for professional development and training projects for personnel in the administration of criminal justice sector in Northern Nigeria. There is also ample room for similar initiatives directed towards inclusive development in other areas beyond security.

Moving forward, the focus of the Amana Initiative is now

on scaling up this model of activism by creating more opportunities for youth groups to develop initiatives that will help them better understand the police, security forces and officials that are responsible for their protection. This case study will also provide a unique foundation for the Nigerian government and its officials to understand and utilise governance activism for inclusive development as a key confidence building tool towards improving security in Northern Nigeria, as well as gaining better understanding of the realities faced by civil society and citizens in the North, affected by the negative effects of insurgency.

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Promoting Democratic Accountability in Nigeria: The Buharimeter

By Yusuf Shamsudeen Adio

Introduction

There is a disconnect between elections and democratic accountability in Nigeria. Since restoration of democracy in 1999, elections have been conducted regularly and improved over the years with a major threshold crossed during the 2015 general elections. There has also been a remarkable shift towards issue-based campaigns during elections in which politicians reeled out policy ideas to address development challenges in order to gain the support of voters. Despite these accomplishments, the country remains backward in socio-economic and political development. Unemployment, abject poverty, rising insecurity, infrastructure deficit, and an unstable political atmosphere, amongst others, have been the hallmarks of the country. Nigeria's predicament can be underscored as: 1) the inability of the government to be accountable to the citizens; 2) the inability of citizens to hold elected officials accountable to their promises; and 3) absence of a credible platform to promote democratic accountability. Buharimeter is thus conceptualised to institute accountability mechanisms in governance through tracking sector-specific election promises made by President Muhammadu Buhari in the prelude to the 2015 general elections to carefully monitor their implementation.

This paper reflects on the project's success stories (what works and how it works), challenges encountered, and how they are mitigated. It concludes by recommending replication of the intervention in many countries in the continent and emphasises the need to build synergy and regular sharing of experience in order to institutionalize citizen-driven accountability mechanisms in Africa.

> *Campaign promises are like helium balloons. They are big, full of gas, and once the party is over, they are absolutely useless.*
> Susan Gale (2014)

Rationalising Buharimeter: An introduction

What is known as Buharimeter today started with deeper reflections about Nigeria's predicaments, which seem intractable, interminable, and unending. Efforts to resolve the puzzle have put forward more probing questions that constantly beg for answers. Africa, particularly Nigeria, is naturally endowed with natural and human resources sufficient to stimulate development. However, the continent is retrogressing on many development indices. Despite its enormous resources and huge youthful population, Nigeria often appears on the lower ebb of the development ladder.[1] For example, economically the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) slid to a 25-year low of -0.36% in the first quarter of 2016, from 3.96% in the first quarter of 2015. The Consumer Price Index (CPI), otherwise known as the inflation rate, increased to a two digit percentage (11.38%) in February 2016 and in June 2016 stood at 16.5%. Unemployment, abject poverty, rising insecurity, infrastructure deficit, unstable political atmosphere, amongst others, are manifestations of the development challenges the country faces. From all indications, democratic governance restored in 1999 has not meaningfully addressed critical development challenges plaguing the country.

Elections have become an important part of democracy in Nigeria, and elsewhere in Africa. In fact, democracy in Nigeria has focused on the regular conduct of elections that give people the choice to elect those who will govern them for the next four years. Historically, this period has been characterised not only by violence and all forms of election malfeasance,[2] but also a semblance of *consciousness* for issue-based campaigning – the existence of party manifestos which outline priority

1 Although between 2005 and 2014 Nigeria HDI value increased from 0.467 to 0.514, an increase of 10.1% or an average annual increase of about 1.07%, this still puts the country in a low category of human development. See Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development, available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NGA.pdf, accessed on 27 July 2016.

2 Nigeria's return to democracy since 1999 has been characterised by violence, ballot stuffing and rigging, amongst other factors. This actually mirrored democratic practices in the first and second republics but the momentum it has gathered since its restoration raised serious concerns about the de-democratisation nature of democracy in the country.

areas and policy preferences of political parties. This phenomenon was improved upon during the 2015 general elections.[3] However, after the elections government did little to fulfil its campaign promises and made no apparent move to convert its manifestoes into practical policies. Experience over the last 17 years speaks volumes of our de-developmental-oriented democratic project.

There are three main challenges, which are represented as one: the inability of the government to be accountable to the citizens; the inability of citizens to hold elected officials accountable; and the non-existence of platforms through which accountability can be promoted. This project was conceptualised to address these three main concerns, which have lowered the quality of democracy in the country. Essentially, the Buharimeter seeks to address the following hypothesis that "the more the government is accountable to citizens, the higher the quality of democracy". It follows that the better elected representatives are at playing their role in intermediating between citizens and the rulers, the higher the quality of democracy (Schmitter, 2003). The project seeks to place accountability at the heart of democracy.

Theory of change

What are the specific changes we want to see happen? Indeed, we are hoping to see the President Muhammadu Buhari (PMB)-led administration be democratically accountable to the hundreds of campaign promises made to Nigerians in the lead up to the 2015 presidential elections. But, can democratic accountability be achieved merely by monitoring the implementation of campaign promises? Embarking on this noble task will indubitably provide evidence-based assessment of the administration and, to a large extent, stimulate a 'move-away' from public discourses rooted in political, ethnocentric or religious sentiments to those that are constructive, methodical, systematic and solution-driven. Success cannot be demonstrated without making the political space open to Nigerians and civil society groups alike to engage freely in a robust conversation on national issues with government, drawing from findings of the assessment. This cannot happen without providing the media with credible information and reliable content that clearly demonstrates popular concerns. This is what strategic dissemination of the assessment's findings can achieve. Thus, the theory of change for this project is:

Theory of Change

If *there is an independent, systematic assessment and strategic dissemination of findings of the implementation of election promises of the PMB-led administration in Nigeria;*

Leading *to increased public awareness and knowledge of the administration's commitment to achieving those promises;*

Then*, discourses and debates on governance, policies and social audits will be strengthened in public and media spaces;*

This will in turn *improve quality of governance and enhance democratic accountability in the country.*

Buharimeter: Aligning our thought with universal phenomena

Promise tracking has become an evolving phenomenon in the world as a mechanism for holding governments accountable to their campaign promises. In North America, South Africa, from Europe to Africa, academic institutions, the media and civil society groups are deploying information technology-based data collection systems to gather information about the actions and inactions of incumbent administrations in order to systematically and scientifically judge their performances against election promises. The focus of these initiatives differs: for example, in contrast to the MIT Centre for Civic Media promise tracking project in Brazil which primarily focuses on local government, similar interventions in the United States of America (Obameter), Egypt (Morsimeter), France (Lui President), Nigeria (Buharimeter), Senegal (Mackymeter), Burkina Faso (Presimetre), Iran (Rouhameter), amongst others, focus on measuring and assessing the performance of national government. Nonetheless, fact-checking remains an integral part of these interventions. However, for us, Buharimeter is not just a promise tracker, it is also a tool for citizens' mobilisation and education,[4] and for policy analysis.[5]

3 Although, there were incidents of hate speeches major political parties demonstrated their political will by issuing and discussing their plans and programmes at different campaign tours. The presidential candidates of the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) even released separate campaign pamphlets detailing their programmes and priority sectors if elected.

4 Unlike other monitoring initiatives, Buharimeter transcends mere monitoring and mobilises citizens through knowledge building and creating awareness for collective actions to demand democratic accountability.

5 The policy analysis component of the initiative allows for better understanding of what the government hopes to achieve and how this aligns with election promises made during campaign trail.

Buharimeter, not just out of the blue!

The Buharimeter is the product of several interventions embarked upon by the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), a regional research, advocacy and training non-governmental organisation for West Africa, located in Abuja, Nigeria. It builds on related interventions that methodically took stock of election promises made by the All Progressives Congress (APC), and its presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, in the prelude to the 2015 general elections and created spirited awareness about election promises amongst the media, civil society groups and citizens.

In the lead up to the elections, CDD launched a project called 'the Nigerian Political Parties Discussion Series (NPPDS)', which opened up a debate on crucial national issues between the two major parties – the APC and the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP). Seven series of debates were convened between December 2014 and March 2015, focusing on security, economy, power, education and health, amongst other issues. This marked a remarkable shift to conversations on sector-specific policy ideas rather than debate that broadly cross-examines the policy preferences of candidates. Through the NPPDS platform, party representatives reeled out sector-specific programmes and plans, and reassured Nigerians of their commitment to fulfilling promises made, if elected.

Alongside the convening, CDD consciously and carefully tracked and documented election promises made at different campaign tours by parties and their candidates in all states of the Federation. The Centre analysed thoroughly party manifestoes and campaign pamphlets produced and released by their presidential candidates. For example, during the campaign the APC presidential candidate's team released *My Covenant with Nigerians* to complement and elaborate on the content of the party's manifesto. All these were deliberate efforts made by CDD to gather credible and reliable data on campaign promises of the two major political parties. The opposition party, APC, and its candidate made over 200 campaign promises cutting across different sectors[6] of Nigerian economy.

Setting the stage for monitoring and assessing the campaign promises in the post-election period is the most difficult part of the project. We are very clear on what we are measuring: the performance of PMB against election promises made. However, we also have to tackle the complex questions of how to get the methodology right to guarantee the credibility of the engagement. What standards or ratings should be used in ranking the performance? Can the promises be quantified? Does actualisation of the promises have specific timeframes?

6 The sectors include agriculture, security, health, education, sport, youth and women development amongst others, while other socio-economic issues include corruption, politics, equality etc.

Relatedly, at what point can the promises be said to have been achieved or not achieved? What are credible sources of data for ascertaining efforts of the government towards achievement of the promises? How do we analyse or process information gathered? How can citizens of a highly polarised country be carried along on this noble cause? These are some of the questions we grappled with at the preparatory stage.

To respond to these methodological questions, CDD researched similar interventions globally and held several staff, fellows and partners meetings/workshops to deliberate on the questions. These eventually led to the formulation of metrics and provided clarification on how other questions can be credibly responded to. On the standards or ratings, it was obvious from measuring system of other 'metering' interventions globally that government actions cannot be pre-empted in order to formulate indicators measuring progress. Therefore, a ranking system was created which CDD also adopted. In doing this, CDD developed four categories of rating to estimate degree of performance of the incumbent administration. These include 'achieved', 'not achieved', 'ongoing', and 'not yet rated'.

On the question of the timeframe, APC and its candidate did not specifically communicate the timeline for achieving campaign promises. Nonetheless, Section 135 of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution clearly provides for a term of four years for any person elected as the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, though they can be re-elected for another one-year term. Following this constitutional clause, it was agreed to discuss the issue that the promises can only be ranked as 'not achieved' after the end of four years, and 'achieved' is subject to the capacity of the government's actions to actualise specific promises within this period.

We also agreed to prioritise monitoring of news reportage in the media, reviews of relevant published reports, spot-checks of projects and programmes, surveys and focus group discussions (FGDs) – where necessary, amongst others as sources of gathering data. Information gathered will invariably inform ranking of the government's performance. Effective use of both the new and traditional media to popularise the intents, outputs and outcomes of the project was proposed and agreed upon.

Our strategies

Since the launch of the initiative on 1 June 2015, the Centre has carried out a series of activities to advance discourses on governance, policies and social audit and thereby improve the quality of governance and democratic accountability in Nigeria. We have adopted various strategies, sometimes driven by circumstances, but at the design stage a good number of plans were developed. These can be categorised into four broad engagements, including monitoring and analysis of government actions

– policy interventions; awareness creation; facilitation of good governance forum; and building synergy for uptake of findings.

Monitoring of government's performance

The incumbent administration made 222 campaign promises cutting across different sectors including agriculture, security, industrialisation, transportation, power, housing etc. There are other socio-economic issues, such as corruption, that the administration sees as critical to addressing development challenges confronting the country. In carrying out this task, we by no means consider election promises and policies as separate endeavors. This is because policies of the government provide a clear guide on how it intends to achieve its election promises. For example, the government promised to create a phased social insurance scheme to certain groups in the population with social welfare payments through a phased programme. In order to achieve this, the President launched a National Social Safety Net Programme and appointed Special Adviser on Social Investment, Mrs. Maryam Uwais, to coordinate its implementation. Against this backdrop, the Centre has been monitoring the implementation of policies and programmes espoused by the administration as a way of establishing degree of implementation of campaign promises.

Amongst sources of data gathering is tracking of media reports from traditional (including television, radio and print newspapers) and online media. On media tracking, we keep records of government's policy pronouncements reported in different media platforms on a daily basis to establish a link between it and the campaign promise made. Of course, whatever data is gathered through the media is inadequate in rating the performance of government. We see media tracking more as the beginning of an entire chain of data gathering. As such, there is also rigorous analysis of policy enunciated by different government ministries, agencies and department. We collect and analyse policy documents and relevant reports. We also carry out in-depth interviews with government officials to validate and further enrich our understanding of their policies and actions.

More so, civil society groups are interviewed to possibly gather alternative perspectives on what government is doing and a survey was conducted to elicit citizens' understanding and perception on the fulfillment of election promises. Citizens' surveys are conducted to ensure that their voices are heard above the din of partisan politics. In fact, a multi-pronged method of data gathering is adopted in monitoring the implementation of campaign promises. Information gathered through these means informs our judgement on the ranking of performance; whether election promises will be rated as ongoing, achieved or otherwise.

Over the last year, the Centre has released five reports: 30 days' report, 60 days' report, 100 days' report, 7 months' report, and a one year report. These reports provide a critical analysis of government performance, measured against its election promises, highlight governance challenges and proffer informed recommendations on pathways to sustainable and consolidated democracy in Nigeria.

Create awareness and stimulate consciousness about election promises and performance

Building the consciousness of the people and government is a critical aspect of the project. For us, this cannot be achieved without strategically utilising the media space (especially the new media with over 2 million users). Thus, we adopted a multi-faceted approach to creating awareness about project's outputs and outcomes with the government and citizens. These include:

Demystifying and visualizing the election promises

Prior to the launch of the project, we collected and collated election promises made by the President and his party, APC, and categorised them into different sectors. These were then simplified, infographics developed, and widely circulated through social media platforms to acquaint and familiarise Nigerians with these promises.[7] An animated cartoon[8] was produced for similar purposes.

Weekly radio programme

Strengthening the interaction between the government and the citizens, and bringing to the fore divergent perspectives of the citizenry on policies is critical to this engagement. In Nigeria, especially in the northern part of the country, radio is the most useful media platform to raise citizens' consciousness about national issues. Given this fact, we launched a weekly phone-in programme called 'Buharimeter' on Nigeria Info (95.1FM), Abuja. Since its commencement, we have featured key government officials, politicians, experts and civil society actors to deliberate on government policies and the Budget, amongst others issues. Key government officials and politicians featured include the Special Adviser to the President on Social Investment, Mrs Maryam Uwais; Senior Special Adviser to the Vice-President on Media and Publicity, Mr Laolu Akande; the then Publicity Secretary of APC, now Minister of Information and Culture, Alhaji Lai Muhammed; and the Publicity Secretary of PDP, Chief Olisa Metuh.

Social media

Facebook, Twitter, Google+ and Instagram have been successfully deployed to communicate the findings of our monitoring exercise to the general public as well as to stimulate conversation on critical policy issues. We organised regular tweet-meets and used them to disseminate outputs of other sub-activities such as a documentary, animated cartoon, and so on. Nigeria is

7 Full infographic on Buhari's campaign promises is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QfOiyh0KOmI.

8 The animated cartoon on the Buhari campaign promises is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9ssdN1wzTSM

a youthful population with many social media users. In 2014, Internet penetration in Nigeria stood at 30% with over 50 million Internet users. 72% of this population visit social networking sites (Africapractice, 2014). We are improving on the use of social media and hope to utilise these platforms better as we progress in our journey to promoting democratic accountability.

Production of documentary
We commissioned and released a 15-minute video documentary on 'The State of the Nation' which reflected on challenges and prospects of incumbent administration in the first eight months in office. The documentary documented three priority areas in which government's election promises are made – the economy, security and corruption.

Simplification of output to ease communication
In order to address the challenge of the sensationalisation of the Buharimeter findings in news reports, and to ease communication of the findings, we often develop feature stories from the reports and share these widely with the media. This has helped significantly to effectively communicate our submissions, concerns and recommendations to the government and Nigerians alike.

Facilitate a platform for periodic engagement with government

Good Governance Forum – Buharimeter town hall meeting
This forum was conceived to complement the radio programme engagement and strengthen the interaction of the government with Nigerians. Through this forum, five Ministers of the FRN have given account of their stewardship to the people who had the opportunity to ask questions and seek clarifications on government policies and programs. In convening the town hall meeting, we adopted Davos and head-to-head models, which allowed sectoral experts to make short interventions after report-backs from government representatives to stimulate robust conversation. The event was broadcast live on national television and radio as well as live-blogged.

Policy conversations
This is sector-specific engagement in which we conduct thorough situational analysis of socio-economic and political issues and convene a conversation around key revelations. For example, we recently looked at the evolving insecurity challenges arising from the resurgence of Niger Delta militancy and movement for the succession of Biafra from Nigeria and the quest for national unity in the country. The analysis historicises the situation, examines current dynamics and government strategies, identifies challenges, and makes recommendations on practical steps government needs to take to address the seemingly intractable problem. The conversations that are organised around the issue bring together government officials, civil society groups, experts and development partners to deliberate on government policies.

Building synergy with civil society organisations and other partners for uptake of findings

Civil Society Organisations/Media Cluster Group
A civil society and media cluster group was formed as part of CDD's strategy to ensure thorough analysis of sectoral policies, make informed judgement about performance, and strengthen uptake of the project's findings. The Centre may have a long history of and expertise in championing a movement of this kind but building synergy with sister organisations and media partners would go a long way towards achieving the broader goals. The task of the cluster group is to leverage on the ongoing work of these organisations, and particularly, the strength of media outlets to popularise and facilitate effective uptake of the report findings. Meetings were convened amongst partners to this end, and partnerships have been strengthened.

Media partnership and publicity
One of the motivations of the project is to provide valid and reliable content to the media on governance matters. As a result, we forged a working relationship with the media around publicity and dissemination of the findings of the monitoring exercise. Since its inception, the Centre has periodically featured on television and radio to discuss reports and other national issues. Our commentaries are widely published in both local and international media and, indeed, are reference points for any scholar carrying out objective assessment of the performance of the incumbent administration.

Success stories

Population of media space for increased knowledge
How have the report's findings been reported in the media? How expansive is the reportage? In the last year of engagement we have achieved success in terms of our reports being used by news agencies, and raising knowledge in the public space. Many international and domestic media outlets have reported on the Buharimeter and this has boosted people's knowledge of the performance of the incumbent administration. In Nigeria, the project has been reported on in different print and online newspapers and international radio and television stations with offices in the country, including BBC Africa and China Central Television. It is evident in the country now that the general public is more informed about election promises. The #Our5k campaign on twitter is a good example of increased knowledge of Nigerians about the election promises.[9]

From denial to acceptance of pledges
Following the release of the 60 days' report, which

9 APC and its presidential candidate, PMB, promised during the campaign trail to pay N5,000 to unemployed youth. Following the denial of this promise a few months after PMB took office, aggrieved Nigerian youth went on social media (Twitter) with hashtag #Our5k to demand accountability.

highlighted some promises requiring no policy formulation but immediate action from the government, the government spokesperson Mallam Shehu Garba released a press statement distancing the Presidency from election promises. One of these promises was the public announcement of assets and liability of the President. This generated heated conversation and, in the end, the President, through his spokesperson, released a counter press statement detailing his assets and liabilities as well as those of the Vice-President of Federal Republic of Nigeria (Ekott, 2015). More so, the spokesperson dissociated his boss, PMB, from a campaign document, *My Covenant with Nigerians*. Since this development, government officials have increasingly used the word 'election or campaign promises' when appealing to Nigerians on the current economic realities and social challenges. Apart from this, we received responses from government on our 7 months' and one year reports. This is a clear demonstration that government's consciousness about the project has been raised.

Strengthening conversations in media space

Many a scholar, media practitioner and civil society actor have used Buharimeter reports to draw government's attention to governance challenges in the country. For example, following the response of the President's spokesperson to the 7 months' assessment of the administration, in which he labelled the Centre as partisan and mischievous, there were counter responses. In an article by Alabi Williams (2016) *Sunday Narrative: A Party's True Colours*, and published in the *Guardian* newspaper, he described the Presidency's response as a move to "plotting a quick exit for itself". In January 2016, African Independent Television organised a one-on-one talk between CDD and the Presidency on the controversy over the credibility of the election promises against which the government's performance is measured.

In similar vein, in an article titled '*Why Buhari Must Watch Buharimeter*, Emmanuel Ugwu (2016) drew the attention of President Buhari to the importance of Buharimeter as a tool for objective assessment of its administration.

> *Buhari ought to face the mirror of his campaign promises every day of his finite tenure. He should respect the Buharimeter as the reflection of his vows and accomplishments. This will furnish him with the right perspective he needs to secure a befitting legacy.*

In the *Buharimeter: A Wake Up Call*, Professor Ayo Olukotun (2016) reflected on some of the findings of the one year report to appraise the performance of the incumbent administration in the first year in office. There are other notable published articles on Buharimeter, including *Let us Work on Our Buharimeter* and *Watching the President on Buharimeter*, both by Dr Jibrin Ibrahim, amongst others.

Partnership and uptake

Synergy amongst civil society groups and development partners is continuously developed to reinforce the campaign for democratic accountability in Nigeria. Some international non-government organisations such as WaterAid, Nigeria, have reached out to us and expressed their interest in partnering on the project. Sectoral promises on Buharimeter platform (www.buharimeter.ng) have been linked to partners' project platform (Washwatch, 2015), and agreement has been reached to pool resources in fact-checking efforts made by the PMB-led administration towards the achievement of campaign promises.

Challenges

Managing the politicised space

One of the greatest challenges we confronted in the course of project implementation was consistent managing of Nigeria's politicised space. Historically, the country is bifurcated along ethnic, religious and political lines. The incumbent administration attempted to exploit the already divided space. In its reaction to the findings of the 7 months' report of Buharimeter, Mallam Shehu Garba (cited in Ehikioya, 2016), the Special Adviser to the President on Media and Publicity, described CDD as being "mischievous and partisans". CDD responded swiftly to the statement (Hassan, 2016), and our selfless commitment to be political rather than partisan in our engagement has helped to effectively manage the politicised space. The fact that we understand the political context of the country where we operate made us very conscious of her peculiarity as it affects the credibility of the intervention. At every stage, we maintain balance and a constructive position in assessing the administration's performance. We endeavor not to walk the path of partisanship. Not surprisingly, the statement issued by the Presidency received little or no accolades but rather counter-reactions from Nigerians in the media.

Working with relevant government institutions

Building effective relationships with government institutions is imperative to the success of the project. It is important that actions of the government reported in the media are authenticated through frequent engagement with government. However, despite the government commitment to participatory governance, engagement has not been robust. For example, during the writing of the one year report, CDD communicated the need for interviews with government officials to respective Ministries but less than 20% responded and granted an interview. We are currently working with the Minister of Information and Culture to strengthen the relationship with government institutions – and in another instance, considering informal means of establishing strong relationships with them.

Lack of vibrant media

Monetisation of media space in Nigeria has largely affected the effectiveness of the media uptake of findings of the initiative. Journalists will hardly use our reports, identify critical issues and develop stories around them without financial reward. As much as certain gains have been recorded in this regard, this phenomenon still presents a serious challenge hindering effective uptake of major findings of the initiative.

Taking the campaign to the grassroots

Another key challenge is how to take the campaign to people in the local/rural areas. Many have argued that the initiative is elitist given the limitation of scope of our engagement; that is, it is popular in urban and metropolitan cities which have less than 50% of the country's population. To bridge this gap, we will be working with *Reclaim Naija*, a grassroots organisation in Lagos State, Nigeria, to train community stakeholders on the use of pledge monitoring tools to hold government accountable to campaign promises. Also, we are considering the use of community radio to reach out to the population in rural areas.

Lessons learned

One of the key lessons learned is the need to ensure credibility of campaign promises documented for project execution. The source of the promises has to be verified, constantly double-checked and securely documented during collation stage and before use to assess government performance. In any case if a politician denies making such promises to discredit the intervention, it would not be difficult to defend its credibility and mobilise citizens for the cause.

The promise tracking initiative must target advocacy as an important component because without a well-developed advocacy strategy it will be difficult for the project's findings to translate into holding government accountable to election promises. Thus, advocacy allows for effective uptake of the findings.

The role of partnerships cannot be over-emphasised. An organisation can conceive of a promise tracking project but cannot implement it alone without building coherent and sustainable partnerships with development partners. Metering initiatives are often broad in scope. Even if the scope is limited to a sector, uptake of and raising public awareness about its findings require some form of partnership if it is to achieve the desired results. Thus, there is a need to partner with the media, civil society groups, amongst others.

More so, obtaining buy-in from government into this kind of initiative requires extensive diplomacy. At times, there is a need to compromise and take up some of their biases. However, this must be considered in a way that opens up an avenue for robust engagement without totally compromising what you set out to achieve with the project. Government's role in the success of the democratic accountability project is crucial and must be recognised at every stage of implementation.

Concluding remarks

For democracy in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa to make any difference for development success, it is imperative that civil society groups, citizens and development actors think about how it can be strengthened and consolidated. To effect changes in governance frameworks in most developing African countries to mirror global standards of democratic governance is never an easy task. Interventions have to be gradual, incremental and sustainable. Fundamentally, interventions with similar goals have to be built upon and conscious efforts made to ensure that credibility is unquestionable. Buharimeter is a product of several interventions which are built upon and leveraged in the current rise of citizens' movement for democratic accountability at continental, regional and national levels. The outcomes of the 2015 general elections in Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Benin, amongst others, which ushered in a new democratic regime in these countries are a clear indication of the important role that citizens can play in their country's democracy. The current reality in Africa presents an opportunity for development actors to proactively deploy citizen-driven accountability mechanisms, such as Buharimeter, to demand accountability and improve the quality of governance.

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The Citizens' Manifesto Case Study

Recounting a citizen-led advocacy agenda in Uganda

By Chris Nkwatsibwe

Introduction

The quest for sustainable democracy is a duty of a responsible and active citizenry. Uganda's political and social strata is spanned by numerous challenges, most of which have existed since independence and are widely attributed to an increasingly less responsive leadership and apathetic populace.

Based on historical and analytical perspectives, literature reviews, media reports and interviews, this case study presents a diagnosis of the challenges that gave rise to the inception of the Citizens' Manifesto Initiative in 2010; deconstructs the logic behind the idea of the Citizens' Manifesto; and examines some of the important achievements through the first five years of its implementation. It also draws out lessons to inform advocacy initiatives in similar contexts.

The Citizens' Manifesto places effective citizen organisation and a citizen-led agenda at the centre of society mutating from a crippling democracy to a flourishing one. As a process, the initiative is an organised political enterprise while as an output, it outlines the aspirations and demands of citizens to inform and change policies which perpetuate inequality, prejudice and exclusion. In large measure, the Citizens' Manifesto generated nationwide consensus on the minimum governance agenda and created sustainable platforms for 'citizen-leader' dialogue. This has framed what the country's leadership must respond to and formed a basis for leadership renewal, and has also shaped several civil society interventions over the past three years.

The descriptive and informative nature of this case study dictated adoption of both scientific and hypothetical inquiry into the context and intervention to develop an array of recommendations that would be useful in designing advocacy interventions.

It follows that, most advocacy initiatives in politically volatile countries oftentimes receive negative responses from the state which largely hampers their impact. If well designed, however, their significance and the 'small' gains won would be pivotal to the democratic trajectory and form the bedrock for the country's progress.

Uganda is at a crossroads in the quest for sustainable democratic governance. Despite the commendable gains registered since the mid-1980s and early 1990s, there are still glaring systemic challenges in the country's democratic and development trajectory. The Citizens' Manifesto Initiative was an effort to facilitate citizen-government engagements, conceived in 2008 and implemented through a five-year period between 2010 and 2015. The initiative was birthed in response to challenges in governance in Uganda, some of which are related to various iterations in the country's governance history.

This case study presents a researched synopsis of the background to the Citizens' Manifesto Initiative and its contribution to shaping Uganda's democratic path. The study traces the initiative in a complex governance context, characterised by an unresponsive leadership and apathetic populace.

At the heart of the Citizens' Manifesto are the citizens themselves, each of whom can be pivotal to shaping the future of any country if well-organised and mobilised. The initiative also underscores the important role of the media in building public momentum and mobilising citizens towards a positive and progressive governance agenda. It is expected that this momentum, besides shaping public debate, would mount reasonable pressure on the political leadership to respond to the demands of citizens and the public. The purpose of this case study is to examine the idea of the Citizens' Manifesto, its implementation process and its impact on the political and governance culture in the country. The study also draws out lessons that can inform advocacy initiatives in similar contexts.

The case study is presented in six sections; section 2 following this introduction provides a brief background to the Citizens' Manifesto Initiative and the conditions that precipitated its conception; section 3 unpacks the process of the Manifesto, its intended results, theory of change and activities. Section 4 provides a synopsis of key achievements, while section 5 highlights challenges. Section 6 provides an array of recommendations that would inform other advocacy interventions.

Background

The idea of the Citizens' Manifesto was birthed at a time following the awakening of civil society leaders to the reality of governance and politics as tenets of organising society, triggered by a series of activities monitoring the implementation of government commitments under the auspices of the Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform (UGMP).[1]

> *Sometime in 2008, the road from Kyalliwajjala to Naalya on the outskirts of Uganda's capital city, Kampala, was like many of the roads that have remained ungraded and unpaved for the last half a century of independence. The road was one of the worst nightmares for everybody who dared use it. Potholes, some of them resembling mini-crater lakes, dominated the entire stretch. The road was so narrow that pedestrians, cyclists, motor cyclists, and motorists had to compete for the tiny part of the road left un-colonised by vegetation that was growing aggressively towards its centre. Two of Uganda's leading civil society leaders driving from Kyalliwajjala in the direction of Nalya hit one of the potholes and stopped suddenly to inspect the extent of the damage to their vehicle. From this incident, the idea of the Citizens' Manifesto was born.*
> (UGMP, 2016)

The Kyaliwajjala incident spurred a comprehensive discussion on the status quo, the challenges and opportunities that existed in Uganda's governance. To develop a deeper understanding of this case study and contextualise government's response and limitations to achieving the intended results, a summary analysis of the pre-existing governance context in Uganda follows.

It is imperative to note that while there has been significant progress made in Uganda's governance as a result of the Citizens' Manifesto intervention, it is important not to overlook the problems that still exist and those that manifest in different forms. These indubitably still hold the country back in the quest for a present and future full of prosperity and opportunity.

Low levels of civic competence and citizen agency

The trend in civic competence levels among Ugandans was worrying, not only because of low literacy rates but also deficiencies in the organisational capacity of the citizenry. A wide spectrum of the citizenry was more reactive than active in responding to the challenges that affected their communities. Riots and demonstrations became the major means of engagement between citizens and the state, arguably becoming the only language that the government understood. For example, the Buganda riots which rocked the capital city, Kampala, in September 2009, brought business to a standstill for over a month while the 2011 demonstrations against a broken service delivery system and rising cost of living across the country also brought the country to near collapse. All these events paralyzed business and resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives due to the unmeasured lethal response by government.

While one would expect the government to address the challenges that precipitated the situation, the state, on the contrary, introduced more regressive laws that infringed on the people's rights to assembly and association. This resulted in a disequilibrium between the supply and demand side of good governance and service delivery; and more particularly, the inability of citizens to articulate their demands to which the political leadership needed to respond.

Poverty, vulnerability, apathy and patronage

There are ongoing challenges in service delivery in the country. These challenges are a symptom of a wider system's failure, one that can only be changed by a disciplined, selfless leadership and a proactive citizenry well equipped to hold leaders accountable. This trend was further precipitated and sustained by transition failures in the political and economic systems. With the removal of the presidential term limits[2] in 2005, the focus of the political leadership changed from delivering social services and improving livelihood to entrenching itself in power. This inadvertently nurtured a culture of political patronage and mediocrity that largely hampered service delivery.

The consequence of this patronage politics was that those who were well resourced and had the capacity to raid the public coffers acted like quasi-institutions. This translated to commercialisation of politics, a proliferation of empty political promises and the attendant transactional relations between the citizens and their leaders. The citizenry emerging from this was debased, characterised by poverty, vulnerability, desperation and apathy. Citizens had lowered their expectations of government and viewed government officials as a group of self-seeking individuals with no concern for their citizens.
Ultimately, leaders did not want limits on their leadership tenure because there was no security outside leadership, while citizens dug with a hoe, hoping against hope that one day it would change their lives and bring food security. They accepted everything that the next politician could offer; a 500-shilling coin ($0.14) was enough to buy a vote while a glass of local gin on an election night was enough to drown the sorrows of a man and guarantee an empty life every five years.

1 The UGMP was established as a collaborative platform between Ugandan and Dutch civil society actors.

2 Presidential term limits were removed from the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda by a parliamentary amendment, amid controversy.

The absent and present government and the narrowing political space

Another big challenge was the paradox of a very present and very absent government. On the one hand, the country is over governed from local councils, an over-blotted parliament, an army of ministers and a hive of presidential advisors. Currently the country has over 2 million elected leaders at different levels of government. Yet on the other hand, if one is searching for a supportive government, it is not there; avoidable diseases are killing people, maternal mortality and infant mortality are at an all-time record high with an average of 19 mothers dying every day due to pregnancy-related complications. All of these factors created a firm basis for worry and hopelessness amongst the citizens.

An increasingly narrow political space deepened this paradox; if one opted to organise a public engagement with leadership to discuss an undesirable state of affairs or an opposition political party opted to mobilise its supporters across the country, there was more than enough presence of security agencies to stop the meeting, but never enough to stop violence against women or crime.

Against this background of poverty, bad governance, patronage and apathy, the initiative underscores the importance of an active citizenry to underpin democratic governance. The question however is whether a government with repressive tendencies can positively respond to criticism and citizens organising without a negative response?

The Citizens' Manifesto Initiative

> *We realised that while citizens would want to hold their leaders accountable, there was no existing basis on which to do that and thus we embarked on the Citizens' Manifesto Process.*
> Arthur Larok[3]

The Citizens' Manifesto Initiative averred to improve the state of governance in Uganda through research, lobbying, advocacy, building civic consciousness and promoting public debate on important governance issues. The initiative had its locus on the understanding that even when leaders have tried to be accountable 'downwards' to citizens, the issues around which this accountability has been undertaken have not been agreed upon mutually between citizens and their leaders.

The absence of a 'social contract' between citizens and political leaders therefore had rendered citizen action largely ineffectual, while the resulting inaction generated undesirable consequences for democracy and governance. The Citizens' Manifesto Initiative intended to bring about change in the way that the people are governed by creating a popular citizen-rooted agenda to which leaders could respond and be held accountable. This was also premised on the understanding that citizens have the power to influence government.

What did the Citizens' Manifesto Initiative set out to achieve?

The Initiative set out a broad agenda anchored on strengthening the basis on which citizens can hold their leaders accountable. This would be done by developing an agenda that reflected citizens' political, social and economic aspirations and demands, against which leadership success or failure would be gauged between 2011 and 2016.

The champions of the Initiative thus set out to achieve the following key results:

- An informed and competent citizenry that relates to leaders from a position of power and empowerment;
- Objective reasoning informing citizens' choices of leaders at different levels;
- A mechanism for sustained dialogue between citizens and leaders;
- A politically conscious and proactive citizenry that participates effectively in the democratisation process; and
- A people-centered political system and leadership that are responsive to citizens' demands and priorities.

In summary, the Citizens' Manifesto Initiative was an organised political process that aimed at strengthening the capacity of citizens and decision makers to build more accountable institutions of power.

Theory of change

The Citizens' Manifesto was presented in a four-stage process – building citizen agency from below and working upward to democratic dispensation. The activities were framed to fall in three main phases: prior to elections, during elections, and finally, post-election undertakings to sustain the ongoing nature of the process.

> In the Pre-Election Phase (2011), focus was on civic education-related interventions to build momentum and interest in citizen participation in the electoral process. Here the nature of the political process, mandates of key elective leaders, as well as the role of citizens is explained. Citizens are made to appreciate that their actions in the electoral process are crucial to build the foundations of democratic governance. At this stage (A), the focus is on creating individual and group critical political consciousness. People reflect and begin to understand their individual and wider environment; their needs, potential, opportunities and possibilities.

3 Arthur Larok was one of the two civil society leaders in the car driving to Nalya and one of the brains behind the Initiative.



The Citizens' Manifesto theory of change

This self-realization is transformed into a more collective, critical and active citizen-agenda setting stage where citizens begin to shape their demands for action in (B). Common demands begin to emerge and are prioritized at household, community, district, regional and national levels set. Citizens, through their preferred mechanisms then prepare to engage with aspiring politicians and leaders in (C). By this time, a new political culture which puts the interests of citizens at the centre of leadership aspirations begins to emerge and leaders realize the needs of their constituencies and also sign up to a 'social contract' that commits them to work towards achieving citizens' aspirations.

In the During Phase, citizens, having carefully listened to various aspiring leaders, exercise their right to vote. Successful pre-election work implies that citizens will vote on issues rather than emotions or other considerations such as tribe, ethnicity or religion. Finally, in the Post-Election Phase, citizens embark on regular tracking of the Citizens' Manifesto priorities at different levels through a process known as Citizen Surgeries. These regular meetings will ensure that leaders and their electorate and the wider citizenry keep in close interface in the election cycle. After five years, a comprehensive assessment would be done to establish whether a leader performed or not; and this will, other intervening factors held constant, be the basis for leadership renewal or otherwise (UGMP, 2010).

Who were the target audience?

The Citizens' Manifesto Initiative involved a multiplicity of actors and audiences, targeting civil society organisations, professional associations, workers' unions, farmers' federations, the student and youth movements, political parties, ordinary citizens, elected leaders and government agencies.

Firstly, because the implementation of the manifesto involved collection, analysis and advocacy on issues that emerged from the citizens' consultations, the Citizens' Manifesto's primary target was the citizens and their organisations, each of whom must take responsibility for changing the social economic and political trajectory of the country; the Citizens' Manifesto partners and collaborators were tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that the outcomes of the multiple citizens' consultations reflected the aspirations of the citizens.

Secondly, drawing inspiration from the provisions in the Ugandan Constitution that among other things underscore the right of every Ugandan to participate in peaceful activities to influence the policies of government through civic organisation, the partners and stakeholders mobilised millions of citizens from across the country to make demands of their leaders on the quality, transparency and accountability in the political system during the 2011 elections and beyond. This meant that the secondary target of the Citizens' Manifesto would be the political and technical leadership at different levels of government – needless to mention that leaders hold and exercise power derived from and delegated to them by the citizens.

The idea of the Citizens' Manifesto and key activities

The Initiative placed citizens at the centre of shaping the political future of Uganda. As earlier underscored, the main thesis behind the Citizens' Manifesto Initiative was that when the citizens are effectively organised, and their awareness and consciousness improved, they would hold their leaders accountable and their desires and aspirations would be respected by the political leadership. As such, the activities were designed to build agency among citizens and involve as many citizens and citizens' organisations as possible.

Each of these activities at the different phases of the campaign employed different organisational and mobilisation strategies. The activities also contributed differently at each level of results. For this study, and this section in particular, a brief description of the challenges and contribution of each of the activities to the intended results is presented to provide a contextualised understanding of the initiative, its results and achievements.

Methodology and stakeholder workshops

The Citizens' Manifesto engaged over 100 actors from civil society, media and academia in its preparation and execution; this is one of the most inclusive civil society initiatives engaged in influencing governance processes. These collaborators and citizens' organisations were tasked with the responsibility of organising community and citizen consultations to generate ideas on the minimum governance agenda and citizens' demands.

The methodology workshops were organised to equip facilitators with the requisite knowledge of the objectives and goals of the process, provide conceptual clarity and a skill set to facilitate the community consultations. These meetings generated clarity on the goals and objectives of the citizens' consultations and provided a uniform framework to ensure consistency across the board.

Community and interest group consultations

At the heart of the Citizens' Manifesto is an organised and unified citizenry. One of the major principles of the process was inclusivity and citizen ownership. To generate unanimity on a nationwide governance agenda and demands, community consultations were organised in 14 geographical regions of the country. The 14 regions[4] were based on the major ethnic configurations that existed at the time of Uganda's independence. Interest group consultations were also organised to generate demands that are relevant to different interest groups;[5] these five interest groups were selected due to specific demographic realities such as numerical strength, social roles, heritage, contribution to the economy and level of vulnerability.

These meetings acted as breeding grounds for the ideas, vision and aspirations of citizens. The meetings attracted politically, socially and economically diverse participants. In some cases the state would interfere with these meetings. The organisers however attempted to involve as many government agents and stakeholders as possible to mitigate the chances of state disruptions. In some cases Resident District Commissioners[6] were invited as chief guests at the meetings. This made it illogical for security agents to stop the meetings.

Drafting and synthesising of the citizens' aspirations and demands

The ideas generated from the community and interest group consultations were synthesised by drafting teams at both regional and national levels to generate the regional, interest group and national manifestos. The synthesis process also involved matching demands to different leadership positions and sieving the roles and duties of the citizens themselves to achieve the agreed vision.

Meetings were then organised at both local and national levels to validate the outcomes of the regional and interest group consultations. These validation meetings brought together local political leaders, spiritual leaders and leaders of the different social organisations at the community level.

Printing, dissemination and popularisation

After the minimum demands were validated, they were designed and printed for dissemination across the country and to different media houses, sections of the population, political parties and leadership at different levels. Popular versions of each of the manifestos with simpler messages were developed and translated into local languages so that the general population could understand the messages. This spurred debate in all social and political spheres and brought citizen issues on the political and governance agenda to the attention of political leadership and the government. Some political leaders were compelled to make public statements and commitments in response to the issues raised.

Citizen – leader interfaces

These demands and issues formed the basis and agenda for nationwide citizen–leader engagements at different levels of leadership. It is imperative to remember that specific demands were made for each level of leadership. Meetings and public fora were organised at different levels targeting key decision makers and politicians to muster their political will on the demands. Over 500 radio and television shows were also organised across the country to generate momentum through the media. These commitments would later form a basis for securing the citizen mandate through elections and on which to hold the elected leaders accountable.

4 The 14 regions include, Kigezi, Ankole, Tooro, Buganda, Bunyoro, Busoga, Bukedi, Bugisu, Sebei, Teso, Acholi, Lango, WestNile and Karamoja

5 The interest groups include teachers, youth, persons with disabilities, women, culture and farmers.

6 Resident District Commissioners are representatives of the presidents and heads of security in the different districts across the country.

Leadership audits, surveys and neighborhood assemblies

The Citizens' Manifesto process has an embedded framework for evaluation and accountability. Following the countrywide launch of the manifesto and after the 2011 general elections, annual and quarterly audits on the performance of leadership were carried out. While the evaluations involved literature reviews, the main basis for the audits was the regular interfaces between leaders and citizens at the local level throughout the four-year period. The audits focused on the evaluation of the degree of implementation of the actions in the manifesto. The most significant audits included: the 2013 evaluation of the NRM Manifesto; the 2014 mid-term assessment of the 9th Parliament; the local government scorecards; and the 2015 survey of Uganda Vision 2040.

These audits were published and discussed in diverse media platforms across the country. Regular neighborhood assemblies also brought together citizens and leaders to engage on their performance. It is widely believed that these regular audits contributed significantly to the basis for leadership renewal in the 2016 general elections.

Campaigns

The success of the Citizens' Manifesto was largely based on strengthening the demand side of good governance. Campaigns derived from the manifesto demands played a significant role in generating the requisite momentum for this demand. These campaigns included: the Term Limits Campaign; the Quality Education Campaign; the Black Monday Campaign; the Free and Fair Elections Campaign; and the School Feeding Campaign. Each of these campaigns enjoyed a life and achievements of its own including bringing together citizens and their organisations, political parties, religious leaders and the wider civil society sector in Uganda.

Media engagements

One of the major positives of the Citizens' Manifesto Initiative was the effective use of media through strong partnerships. At each stage of the initiative and each activity, media played an effective role in mobilising citizens and popularising the manifesto demands. Over 5,000 direct TV and radio appearances were made to discuss the Manifesto and the associated campaigns throughout the four-year period. This figure excludes the follow-up spiral of media discussions which indubitably shaped the governance debate across the country.

Achievements

> *Democratic governance is a task of citizens as well as governments… citizens are owners of society… the government is made by the people…and the people are you and me simply…*
> Zimbabwean activist

A unified citizenry and defiant government

The Citizens' Manifesto Initiative had as its bedrock effective citizen organising and unified citizen action. Advocacy about citizens and their central role in the democratisation process of any country was thus central throughout the lifespan of the Initiative. Like many advocacy initiatives and in most societies with selfish and unresponsive leadership that are not very receptive to civil society and NGO influence and interventions, mobilising a unified citizenry did not come easily. Thus, while the results were very comprehensive (as discussed in the preceding section), it is imperative to note that the victories would sometimes be offset by the reactionary response from the government.

In the case of the Citizen's Manifesto Initiative, the results and outcomes have been very pivotal to achieving sustained and unified citizen participation, raising citizen consciousness, improving citizen organising and stirring public debate on the form and substance of Uganda's governance. Suffice to note that the Citizens' Manifesto also formed the bedrock for most of the singular collective civil society interventions in the country.

A more organised citizenry

> *When the 2016 general elections were drawing nigh, the anxiety amongst the citizens was enormous, desire for engagement and involvement in the governance of the country was evident; and certainly the quality and level of citizen engagement was high.*
> Job Kiija[7]

The focus of all activities associated with the Citizens' Manifesto was the citizens. This ultimately informed the Initiative's bottom-up approach. The structure and economic conditions of Ugandan society create perspicuous disparities between poor and rural citizens. Their disillusionment in the quest for survival had precipitated apathy and an unwillingness to engage with governance questions of the day and the urban elite whose primary focus had been exploitation, acquisition and self-interest.

The Initiative has helped greatly to bridge this gap by drawing nationwide attention to the link between governance and existing challenges. This revelation has nurtured an understanding of the citizens' priorities, responsibility and the need for effective organising. Citizens adopted the manifesto as a major rallying point, which ultimately compelled the political leadership to at least express willingness and make positive public pronouncements in response to the demands.

7 Job Kiija is the Coordinator for Civic Space and Citizen Mobilization at the Uganda National NGO Forum which hosts the Citizens' Manifesto Initiative.

Influence on political party manifestos

As highlighted in previous sections of this paper, the Citizens' Manifesto is both a **process** and an **output.** As an output, it is a non-partisan compact that outlines the intentions, commitments and demands of ordinary citizens to inform and change policies, practices, ideas and values that perpetuate inequality. An assessment based on the benchmarks of the key issues and demands articulated in the 2011 – 2016 Citizens' Manifesto indicates that the manifestos of key political party and presidential candidates align strongly with the issues contained in the Citizens' Manifesto.

It is imperative to underscore, however, that this assessment is not seen as a broad comparative analysis of political party manifestos or their efficacy. It is rather a narrow assessment of the promises contained in these manifestos, which answered the '**what**' question quite well. To deepen the evaluation of the achievements, attention is drawn to the Citizens' Manifesto as a **process** with particular emphasis on the post-election phase of the initiative. This ultimately provides information to evaluate how the elected government implemented its manifesto.

Leadership turnover

> *Ugandans voted for change in the political leadership, their choice was just robbed from them.*
> Bishop Dr. Zac Niringiye[8]

The post-election phase of the Citizens' Manifesto process focused on ensuring that the 'elected' political leaders implement the citizens' demands. While the analysis of the political party manifestos showed positive correlation with the citizens' demands, there have been significant discrepancies between commitments by the leadership and results. Despite the irregularities in the election management system, this analysis has formed a basis for renewal of the political leadership.

The rate of turnover of leadership at the lower levels of government is telling. At parliamentary level for example, an 80% attrition rate among Members of Parliament was registered, with research indicating that this was largely due to the increased levels of citizens' consciousness and the failure by leaders to meet the expectations of citizens.

Public debate

> *What the process has done upcountry is very powerful; people now demand for accountability from their leaders and they have started becoming more accountable.*
> Kakuru Robert[9]

The need for policy change lies often times at the centre of most advocacy initiatives. There is no doubt that the Citizens' Manifesto Initiative drew significant attention from the leadership about the plight of citizens, and stirred public debate on the issues contained in the manifesto. Working creatively and innovatively with new (social) and mainstream media, the initiative has raised public awareness on salient issues affecting the country's governance. This has produced a culture of public debate and refocused media attention from majorly entertainment to information and influence. The issues in the Citizens' Manifesto remain the main points of reference in public debates. Through a spiraling effect, the initiative was able to reach close to 50% (19 million people) of the population across the country.

Policy changes

The high momentum achieved and increased public demand on specific issues in the manifesto has led to significant policy changes in different government ministries and departments plus local governments. The increase in percentage budget allocations to education, agriculture and accountability institutions can be attributed, to a certain extent, to the pressure generated through nationwide demand.

The political leadership and the president have also made public commitments and pronouncements on issues of electoral reform, fighting corruption, and repealing some of the regressive laws specifically due to public demand. It remains to be seen whether the president will follow through with his public pledges.

Amendments in the Public Finance Act, changes in the Ministry of Health, public hospitals and the Uganda National Roads Authority, can also be attributed, to a certain extent, to an increase in public vigilance and outcry. Other factors that may have contributed to these changes at a national level are the soft power of the development and diplomatic community and pressure from the opposition political parties.

Key civil society interventions and changes in the political culture

The Citizens' Manifesto has informed most joint civil society interventions undertaken in the country. These interventions include the Free and Fair Elections Campaign, the Black Monday Campaign, the Term Limits Campaign, the Quality Education Campaign, and the Account Before You Promise Campaign, which drew their inspiration from key demands in the 2011–2016 Citizens' Manifesto.

Each of these campaigns had a life, goals, strategy and achievements of their own at different levels. The Term Limits and the Free and Fair Elections campaign, jointly spearheaded by political parties and civil society organisations, led to the development of a set of proposals to guarantee a credible election management system in Uganda. These proposals have since been tabled

8 Bishop Zac Niringiye is a popular Civil Society Activist in Uganda.

9 Robert Kakuru is a Citizens' Manifesto Focal Person for the Kigezi region.

in Parliament and relevant ministries and departments of government for consideration. In the light of the recently concluded general elections, widely reported as falling short of minimum democratic benchmarks, it is tempting to question the impact of these campaigns. However, these two campaigns went a long way towards establishing a framework for any legal and constitutional reforms in the country and shaping the existing political culture of active citizen participation in electoral processes.

It is also imperative to note that due to the successes and impact of the Initiative, Uganda's polity took a different shape and the challenges that existed at the beginning of the interventions either mutated into different forms or manifested differently. The state's response to the Initiative also meant that the intervention needed to be flexible and dynamic to respond to new developments. As such, it was imperative to redesign and refocus the intervention.

Implementation challenges

In a pseudo-democracy, characterised by manipulation and intimidation – where state institutions are not independent to perform their mandates, where the presidential hand is more powerful than thou and the president's will is stronger than the peoples' will – it was highly unlikely that the initiative would be implemented without major challenges. Most of these challenges revolved around the reactionary response by the state. It is important to note that while the country has held four general elections since the advent of multiparty politics, in all cases none of the election observation missions has reported that the elections have met minimum democratic benchmarks. On several occasions the country's Supreme Court and other stakeholders have recommended electoral reforms but none hava yet been implemented.

The political atmosphere before, during and after elections is another issue of utmost significance. The atmosphere could be described as tense and characterised by latent violence and intimidation, massive deployment of security forces, and selective but symbolic violence on opposition activists. For example, Dr Kiiza Besigye[10] has been arrested and incarcerated more than 200 times since he declared his 2001 presidential election bid. On 1 March 2007, President Museveni's[11] Black Mamba squad raided[12] the Ugandan High Court in Kampala after the granting of bail to Dr Kiiza Besigye and four other suspects in a case where they were accused of treason. All of these incidents are symptoms of waning democratic credentials and a deceptive democracy at best.

More demand, limited supply

The structure of the Citizens' Manifesto process concentrated on building demand for good governance. This model surmises that governments and leaders are willing to supply as long as there is demand for good leadership. This rather wrong assumption formed one of the major limitations of the initiative. While there was sufficient demand on specific governance issues, the political leadership was not necessarily responsive. There needed to be a robust framework to make non-responsiveness risky to politicians beyond reduction in public support.

Negative response from the state and the problem of regressive legislation

Advocacy initiatives that focus on changing a status quo in governance often receive negative reactions from people benefiting from the flawed systems. In Uganda, state apologists often referred to the Citizens' Manifesto activities and campaigns as donor driven and selfish, with the intention of delegitimising the Initiative based on its funding source. This accusation was however neutralised by the substantial credibility the Initiative derived from its inclusive methodology and perspicuously vital vision and goals. The organic demand created by the bottom-up approach of the Citizens' Manifesto process also contributed to developing a strong sense of ownership and accountability among citizens.

The success in creating demand also precipitated a reactionary response from the state through its coercive arm. The state introduced regressive public order management laws, such as the Public Order and Management Act, 2013 (POMA),[13] to restrict public meetings and campaigns. This diverted focus from the goals of the initiative to engaging with the state and challenging its actions. To mitigate this challenge, the organisers involved state agencies at all stages of planning and organisation to ensure more transparency and where possible, co-option.

Deficiency in quantitative evaluation

While the Initiative had an embedded audit and assessment process involving citizens, many aspects of the manifesto demands were traditionally hard to measure. This is largely due to the fact that most of the evaluation involved subjectivity and reliance on public opinion. Secondly, the auditing process was also based on outputs rather than outcomes of a better governance agenda and improved livelihoods. The demands at the different

10 Dr. Kizza Besigye is a four-time challenger of President Museveni in Uganda's general elections. Each time he has been arrested, courts have dismissed the cases against him as deficient of evidence and ruled his arrests unconstitutional and a violation of his rights and freedoms.

11 President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni has been the president of Uganda since 1986 after he, alongside other Ugandans, launched a successful 5-year guerrilla war against the then Obote II government.

12 The Human Rights Network in Uganda reported that Black Mamba unleashed brutal violence against the suspects and their lawyers leaving one lawyer bleeding after he attempted to intervene in the unlawful arrest. This raid was widely condemned by all sections of political actors in the country as a direct affront to the independence of the Courts of Law.

13 POMA 2013 was introduced in 2011 in the wake of the 2011 general elections. It granted the Uganda Police Force sweeping powers to restrict public meetings.

levels therefore needed to be designed in a quantifiable manner so that they were feasible to measure progress. For an effective evaluation of success of an intervention of this nature, it was imperative that the audits focused on measuring impact rather outputs.

Conclusion and recommendations

In societies with deeply entrenched patronage and dictatorship, the results of advocacy may not be visible. However, if well packaged, the gains may be pivotal in shaping the future democratic trajectories of societies.

Duty based advocacy vs demand based advocacy

> *Things cannot simply change because demands have been made; they change because those who seek change are part of the change.*
> Godber Tumushabe[14]

The assumption of a demand-supply function in advocacy is usually ineffective. Politicians and state institutions oftentimes do not respond to citizen demands and civil society recommendations. Thus attention has to be drawn to citizens and their duty in addressing particular issues. This paradigm can be reinforced by the question 'What can **we** do?' rather than 'What should **they** do?' This facilitates adoption of responsibility and places citizens at the centre of action to achieve their goals.

Effective collaboration and use of media

Conventional advocacy targets particular institutions and leaders with a direct mandate to act. However, change is often influenced by invisible forces. Building collaborations with invisible powers in government – including political party financiers, security and the diplomatic corps – can go a long way in marshalling good will from the political leadership and ultimately triggering positive responses. The media plays a fundamental role in generating public momentum towards achieving particular political goals. Media not only helps bring advocacy issues to the attention of the political leadership but also augments public pressure and demand on political leadership to respond. This can facilitate a spiral of public debate which by transitive effect informs changes in policies.

Solution-focused approach

As advocacy interventions respond to problems in society, it is often the case that the focus is on lamenting and complaining about what is going wrong. This often leads to confrontation with government, creating friction as a result of the usual 'defensive-offensive' relationships, and often facilitating negative and reactionary responses from state agencies. Adopting a solution-focused approach where change is affected by constructing solutions to existing problems and sharing a vision and aspirations can deliver more positive alternatives. This will effect change through empowering people and relevant state institutions to take appropriate responsibility and action.

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Leading from the Middle

A case study of the birth of a social justice movement 'Sauti ya Umma'

By Nancy Muigei

Each generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfill it, or betray it.
Frantz Fanon (1959: 206)

Introduction

Can social movements offer alternative leadership in Kenya? What role can they play in the face of closing civic space? What will social change look like? This paper explores these questions using the case study of 'Sauti ya Umma' (Sauti), a social justice movement meaning "the people's voice" in Swahili. The birth of Sauti was triggered by discontent and frustrations experienced by its founders about the situation in Kenya in 2015, in particular around impunity, corruption, shrinking civic space and the lack of progress in dealing with these challenges.

This paper examines how the nascent movement was formed, the struggles it experienced and how collectively this young movement has built its identity and continues to pursue its objectives. It argues that, whilst closing civic space, impunity, corruption and rising unemployment seem like isolated issues, they are interconnected and signify an underlying crisis of leadership and governance. Social movements have the potential to provide alternative leadership and realise transformation only if they are able to connect with the struggles of people in their ordinary daily lives – what Sauti frames as connecting struggles, issues and actors. Kenya's 2010 Constitution provides a blueprint through which change can be achieved.

Introduction

In July 2016, I attended a farewell party hosted by the human rights movement for the outgoing President of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Dr Willy Mutunga. In his remarks, Dr Mutunga reminded the audience that: "Kenya was ripe for a fourth liberation, the [full] implementation of the 2010 Constitution". He stated that the Constitution had provided an impetus for grassroots activism to demand greater accountability and transparency in the delivery of devolution. The full implementation of the Constitution was therefore paramount if Kenya did not want to implode or explode (Dolan, 2016). Dr Mutunga continued that "alternative leadership and the youth voice [were] going to be spaces for change in the country" and hoped for the "possibility of building a permanent bridge between the civil society and grassroots movements" to realise transformation.

The Constitution of Kenya is a progressive document that Ghai and Cottrell (2013:19) argue has the ability to "open a dynamic new chapter in Kenya's national development". Devolution in the Constitution promises to take government closer to the people. It protects and promotes the rights of the marginalised and minorities through providing spaces for them to participate publicly in this new form of governance (Cheeseman et al, 2014: 15).

While the Constitution of Kenya has been lauded as progressive, it can be sabotaged and shrinking civic space is evidence to this. This case study argues that having a critical mass of people with agency is crucial to protecting constitutional guarantees and demanding full implementation. It posits that there is a need for social movements to provide alternative leadership through connecting struggles, issues and multiple actors.

Dr Mutunga's profound speech speaks to the question posed by this paper: Can social movements offer alternative leadership in Kenya? To address this, the paper begins with a theoretical discussion about social movements then proceeds to analyse critically the Kenyan context. It examines empirical data emerging from Kenya and elsewhere while reflecting on the case of 'Sauti ya Umma'. The paper then explores the emerging trend of closing civic space and attempts to understand this through the prism of social movements and questions about whether social change can be achieved. It concludes by revisiting the experience of the writer, a keen observer of the founding of Sauti and reflections about the future.

Three junctures in history stand out in our analysis of social movements in Kenya: the independence wave, the democratisation wave and the constitutional reform wave. This paper will focus on the democratic and constitutional waves in order to draw lessons that are useful to our understanding of social movements in Kenya.

Understanding social movements

Batliwala (cited in Horn, 2013) defines social movements as "forms of collective action that emerge in response to situations of inequality, oppression and/or unmet social, political, economic or cultural demands". She states that social movements are a set of constituents pursuing a common political agenda of change through collective action. Power (2004: 296) characterises social movements as collectives in response to the constraints of development. Their ability to mobilise is credited to "the formation of identities and solidarities" based on class, gender, age or kinship. Tilly (1998: 454) describes social movements as "a series of contentious performance…. and a vehicle for ordinary people's participation in public politics". It is clear that social movements are not homogenous, but rather they are very broad and complex organisations overlapping in their character and exhibiting external and internal inconsistencies (Power, 2004: 294). This invites further examination and analysis of social movements.

> *Democracy is not some fixed set of procedures that once achieved, remains in place unaltered. As long as social movements and governments make democratic claims democracy will continue to be recreated.*
> Markoff (2015: xvi)

What drives the formation of social movements? Is there something inherent in the actors that contribute to mobilisation? Is identity sufficient to bind people to a common goal? How best can we understand movements and how they have evolved over time? The definitions by Tilly, Power and Batliwala foreground four issues: mobilisation, identity, collective action, grievances and the limitations of development, and how this has produced discontented voices.

Theories of social movements

The genealogy of social movements and collective action is traced to the emergence of modernity and the enlightenment period in Europe. Social movements emerged to challenge constraints brought about by modernity; that is, capitalism, state building and urbanisation (Neidhardt and Ratch, cited in Buechler, 2016: 1). Understandably these challenges provided the "networks, resources identities and grievance for social movement formations". They premised their ideology on the understanding that society was a construct and a product of human creation "subject to intervention and transformation" (Buechler, 2016: 3), and as such, they mobilised to challenge the status quo. This type of movement was known as classical or old movements. They mobilised around shared grievances emanating from what they characterised as "relative deprivation" (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2009: 17). This model was largely shaped by experiences of labour movements (Tilly, 1998: 454).

As political contexts changed post-modernity, social movements adopted new ways of political participation and dealing with the new environment. The paradigm of the old movements became inadequate to explain the rise of the civil rights movement and student protests in the 1960s (Tilly, 1998: 454). This new paradigm became known as "new movements". Critics examining the new movements question the extent to which these movements are new, owing to their lack of distinct features from the old movements. Tilly (1998) explains, producers of knowledge about these new movements were sympathisers of the movement and to some extent involved in the process. Knowledge produced revealed incoherent perspectives that led to three "overlapping perspectives: political process, rational action and resource mobilisation" (Tilly, 1998). Whereas the new social movements foregrounded the question of identities and sought to understand why social movements arose, the overlapping perspectives, political process, rational action and resource mobilisation were interested in "how social movements mobilise rather than why" (Foweraker, 1999: 2). These new socio-constructivist paradigms focused on "identity, framing and emotions" (Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009: 17).

While these paradigms agreed on the underlying reasons for collective action, they remained inadequate to explain discontent around globalisation and liberalisation (ibid). Voss and Williams (2011: 352) criticise their failure to explain the emergence of locally based and grassroots movements such as the landless workers of Brazil and living wage movements in the United States of America. Further scrutiny of the resource mobilisation theory also revealed that:

> *Resource mobilization theory assumed rational actors weigh costs and benefits of participation vis-a vis non-participation, and pursued goal-oriented action constrained and enabled by the availability of resources at their disposal. Political process models…focused on relations between movements and the state, and generally lack any explicit social psychological model, but tacitly assume rational action and a direct relationship between material conditions and subjective interests.*
> (Oliver et al, 2003: 232-233)

While the rational-action paradigm enriched the understanding of social movements through the lens of emotions (Goodwin and Jasper, 2006: 397), the dichotomisation of 'reason and emotion' became problematic to feminist scholars. In particular, they urged the separation of passion and reason "[dichotomized] thought and feeling" thus foregrounding "abstract

masculinity". They challenged Western thinking that privileged rational independent thinking over emotion undertaken collectively as such, movements seen to be driven by emotions were not considered "respectable", and they had to justify their actions through rational thought. Feminist theories raised critical questions that exposed the weaknesses of the theories highlighted so far. They challenged us to think about how epistemology and methodology shaped "new standards of evidence that [recognized]" the gendered experiences of social movements' theory and practice (Taylor, 1998: 357). This approach brought to the fore experiences of women and men; it challenged gender inequality within movements, and through reflexivity shed light on otherwise invisible issues not captured by mainstream theories. Feminist approaches are therefore critical in providing a lens that helps identify internal and external inconsistencies of social movements that otherwise would remain unnoticed within normative frameworks.

Literature on social movement theory and even definitions have drawn heavily on empirical evidence from Northern America, Latin America and Europe (Tilly, cited in Brandels and Engels, 2011: 2). Little attention has been paid to empirical evidence from Africa as such, and these social movements remain under-researched and under-theorised. Important to note, the conditions that shaped the emergence of social movements in Western Europe, America and Africa differ. While social movements in Western Europe and America "co-evolved" within "relatively stable" democracies, in Africa the conditions were mixed (Oliver et al., 2003). Empirical evidence about social movements in Africa reveals hybridity and duality of the Western influence and African local contexts which are not necessarily homogenous (Larmer, 2010: 257 and De Waal & Ibreck, 2013: 304). This is demonstrated by how globalisation and information technology have shaped the evolution and mobilisation of social movements, connecting movements beyond national borders and between them and civil society (Ellis and Van Kessel, 2009: 3). The fluidity of these movements in their relation to civil society is worth noting, in particular in the Kenyan case (wa Githinji and Holmquist, 2011: 15). While both have co-existed, there is a thin line that differentiates between them, especially in terms of who does what, where, and how? The glue that holds them together is the shared interest, goals and aspirations for social change and like social movements, civil society is not homogenous. McIlwaine (1998: 417) agrees with this view when she says:

> *Social movements which have been subject to varied interpretations are also said to be part of civil society, although not equated with, they are constitutive elements of civil society but not coterminous.*

McIlwaine is concerned about the overgeneralisation of civil society without regard to its heterogeneity and the issues that manifest in a social movement framework. This recognition of social movements in Africa being hybrid in nature is critical to how we analyse and consider the case of Sauti ya Umma.

> *Fighting against oppression is the duty and responsibility of every patriotic Kenyan" Dedan Kimathi.*
> (cited in Durrani, 1989: 32)

Contextualizing social movements in Kenya

Contextualizing social movements within their socio-political and economic setting is critical to understanding why and how they emerged and why it has been difficult to sustain social change. This section will explore the history of social movements in Kenya, how they mobilise, how they manifest, who participates, how they frame their messages and whether they still exist and if not, why?

The purpose is to provide an understanding of why Sauti was formed. The paper draws our attention to the opportunities Sauti envisaged and builds on earlier premises about the need to connect struggles, issues and multiple actors in order to realise social and transformative change. This paper makes the following observations about social movements in Kenya;

- The nature of politics in Kenya and how it is organised makes it difficult for social movements to sustain social change;
- Civic spaces have simultaneously contracted and expanded since independence and this makes it difficult to have sustainable vibrant social movements;
- Internal contradictions within movements have led to co-option, fragmentation and have exposed fault lines within the movements and wider political context.

Social movements in Kenya have been at the centre of liberation struggles and are synonymous with the fight for freedom, democratisation, and constitutional reform (Thigo, 2013: 255 and Mati, 2013: 235). These movements emerged from below in response to adverse impacts of economic liberalisation and the oppressive regime of former Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi of the KANU party (Mati, 2013: 236). They played an important role in the realisation of multi-party democracy, the widening of democratic and civic space and worked closely with civil society to realise these gains. Whilst they are not homogenous, their contribution cannot be underestimated. Equally, social movements have had their fair share of challenges, such as co-option, multiple false dawns, missed opportunities and a myriad of other issues. Mati (2013: 235) observes bitter and deep political tensions along religious and ethnic identities were some of the reasons for the delay in realising the new Constitution.

Two distinct types of movement emerged during the multi-party era and struggle for the Constitution

– protest movements and social movements. Protest movements were ad hoc whilst social movements were more structured with ideologies and theories of change. Some of the protest movements transitioned into social movements, whilst others folded after they achieved their goals. Some social movements chose to remain underground such as the December 12 Movement replaced by Mwakenya. Its membership was drawn from students, progressive intellectuals, workers and peasants. Others like the Release Political Prisoners, Green Belt Movement, February 18 and Forum for Restoration Democracy became synonymous with the fight for multi-party democracy (Gacheke, 2010 and Kinyatti, 2008: 233). The constitutional struggle movement included the likes of the National Executive Council and the Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (Mutunga, 1999: 4). A distinct feature of these movements was how they evolved over time and never got to blossom fully. This was partly due to the constricted space in which they operated during the pre-multiparty era (Mutunga, 1999: 5).

The year 2002 marked the end of Moi's authoritarian rule of 24 years and the entry of Kibaki's rule under the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) (Berman et al, 2011: 462). The NARC government brought in renewed hope as a leader of opposition had taken power. Kenyans were very optimistic and confident about Kibaki's leadership (Murunga and Nasong'o, 2006). This period marked a turning point for social movements in Kenya, in particular, the co-option of leaders from the movement into Parliament or government jobs. The hope that the entry of civil society luminaries into government would alter things was short-lived as Kibaki's government manifested old KANU traits typical of the Moi era, thus shattering the hopes of many Kenyans.

This left a visible and growing leadership gap within civil society and social movements. This gave way to the re-emergence of social movements like Bunge La Mwananchi, an urban movement that sought to provide alternative leadership through challenging some of the excesses of the government (Gacheke, 2013). Whilst Bunge emerged from the urban centre, and has chapters countrywide, a major criticism it faced was that it focused on mobilising for the urban population, perhaps as this was reflective of its lived reality and access. While Kibaki's regime had helped widened democratic space, the fire and hope that embodied the movement in the 1980s and 1990s was no longer fiery (ibid).

The struggle for constitutional reform took close to two decades. Arguably "pressures from below" caused by fragmentations among the elite (Mati, 2013: 235) saw alliances being formed which led to growing demand for a new constitution. Mutunga (1999: 5) describes it as leading from the middle because of the elite and middle class alliances. So why did it take long to realise the Constitution? According to Mati (2013: 235), it was the "collective fears and threats" following the 2007/08 post-election violence that "forced an elite consensus" to work towards the realisation of the Constitution, which came into force on 27 August 2010 (Mati, 2013: 235 and Lodge, 2013: 151).

The new Constitution has inspired change and restored hope because of its progressive provisions. It has opened up opportunities for previously marginalised groups to access basic services and demand greater accountability. In the 2015 words of the former Chief Justice, Dr Mutunga, the Constitution:

> *...is a major leap forward in [Kenya's]national journey to independence, democracy, development, ….equitable distribution of political power and resources, societal leadership that is incorruptible and accountable, great diversity and unity in nationhood….a progressive bill of rights that will anchor equitable distribution of resources, a vibrant civil society and other fundamental and radical pillars that if implemented will transform [Kenya] into a great African economy, a secure and dominant nation in Africa.*

The caveat in Dr Mutunga's speech was the statement "if the constitution was implemented". It is this reality that informed the birth of Sauti ya Umma, in recognition of the fact that while we have a good constitution on paper, its promises can be sabotaged through the introduction of restrictive laws that curtail its guarantees. Attempts to shrink civic space in Kenya pay credence to this concern. The recent introduction of the Miscellaneous Amendment Bill on Public Benefits Organization Act brought into Parliament in 2014 and 2015 is a good example. The original Act was passed in 2013, yet three years on has yet to be implemented (Wood, 2016: 534). The law restricts civil society space through introduction of extra regulatory measures that curtail freedom of association, assembly and even access to resource and funding. Other laws that have been challenged in court include the Security Amendment laws, which were overruled by the High Court as being inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. Sauti was inspired by the change that the Constitution offered and the opportunities it presented. This is what stirred funders to consider forming a movement as young women and men from the middle.

> *Globalization is a reality and not a choice, but why should it only benefit multinational corporations and the superrich whose platinum cards provide the ultimate premier passports with no flag? Why should internationalism just be for money and markets and not for ordinary human beings and their human rights values and protections too?* (Chakrabati, 2015: xiv)

The birth of the movement

Sauti ya Umma was born out of frustrations and discontent experienced by its founders, in particular:

- Dysfunctionality of politics in Kenya – the elite acquiring

power for their own benefit and manipulating the rest of the population through tribalism, sexism, religion and ethnic chauvinism, still for their own benefit;

- The plight of the common man and woman struggling to make a living and survive because of poor policy decisions;
- The lack of interest by the elite in providing services for the poor – evident in the state of health care, education, conditions for hawkers or market vendors, and justice for the poor;
- The fact that, even with a new Constitution that brought devolution and was supposed to bring services closer to the people, it had instead devolved into elitism with MCAs and governors becoming local kingpins of corruption and self-interested leadership;
- A culture of impunity and zero accountability that continues to prevail among the old elite and the new elite.

So why is the Constitution of Kenya so important for Sauti? As the founders discussed their concerns, it was evident that something needed to be done to address persisting challenges. They decided to face the challenge and form the movement. They acknowledged that although the Constitution had administrative and legal measures in place, the Jubilee government intended to roll back the gains and weaken constitutional safeguards. Analysis of public views and perceptions revealed that the public felt that their duty ended with voting for a new Constitution and it is was the duty of the government to make the Constitution a reality. Citizens were losing hope in the Constitution as a tool for change, and began to see it as a legal tool to protect the interests of privileged elites rather than ordinary citizens. However, there is still a lot of hope about devolution among citizens, despite numerous challenges with its implementation. Civic education on the Constitution remains low, and attempts to educate citizens are barely existent. This picture is what provided an impetus for the formation of the movement.

Founders started to meet after the Garissa terrorist attacks because it became more obvious that when tragedy strikes it is the common person who is affected. The Garissa University attack saw the killing of over 147 students, allegedy by Al Shabaab militants. Since then, members have been meeting regularly because of their common desire for change. They wish to see a shift from personality-driven politics to politics that addresses bread and butter issues that affect the common Kenyan person, man, woman, boy or girl, and political leadership that consistently upholds the rule of law, specifically around the Constitution.

Sauti's dream is of a free, fair and just society, driven by value for human life, freedom from need and accountable governance. Sauti believes in the idea of a movement that connects struggles and multiple actors as a means to realise change in Kenya and challenge the status quo. The movement seeks to achieve positive change through promoting a free, fair and just society. It believes in the sensitisation of Kenyans to appreciate good governance, rule of law, and actively advocate for the same. The movement recognises the centrality of Kenya's progressive constitution and seeks to enhance unity among Kenyans and, working with specific change champions, protect constitutional values and governance institutions. The movement defines its values as integrity, accountability, transparency, fairness, equality and non-discrimination.

Sauti aims to achieve its dream through representation at all levels, national, county and diaspora, and sharing the dream and vision of the movement, inviting membership to form active county chapters. It would like to connect different struggles and build a strong coalition across different parts of the country. It believes in knowledge building, discussing issues affecting people and taking action to realise solutions. Action in this case includes protests and the use of the media. Given that mainstream media has a tendency to misrepresent issues, it was agreed that it was important for Sauti to also develop its own media and communication platform.

Sauti members are drawn mainly from existing groups including the feminist movement, youth movement, and other movements like Bunge La Mwananchi and Wa mama (People's Parliament). Sauti is not a coalition but rather a movement that seeks to recruit and consolidate change agents and champions from different sites of struggle in Kenya. They believe a consolidated voice will be crucial for providing alternative leadership that deviates from the common norm.

Reflections on challenges, tensions and the future

The movement experienced internal and external challenges from the very onset. There were members who felt the movement needed to begin recruitment immediately whilst others were more cautious and wanted to develop a solid theory of change before beginning recruitment. These challenges revealed how different members viewed change and how they wanted to achieve it. In particular, this helped us to think about who we wanted in the movement. Important to note, while social movements seem like spaces where all good things thrive, when not checked, they can also be spaces of marginalisation and the stifling of voices. The case of the constitutional movements in Kenya is testimony to this. Bunge La Mwananchi, a longstanding movement, has suffered the same kind of challenges linked to leadership crises and fragmentation (Gacheke, 2010).

The movement has also faced challenges with formalising its registration status. The Registrar of Companies rejected the name 'Sauti ya Umma' and asked for a more appropriate name. Members will be seeking the services of a pro bono lawyer to write to the Registrar to

seek for reasons why the name was rejected. They feel this is important because their identity as a movement is 'the people's voice'. This is not so strange in Kenya. The National Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission has had court battles in its attempt to get registered. Even with a High Court ruling that it needed to be registered, the Commission continues to fight on (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

Conclusion

This paper argues that while shrinking civic space, impunity, corruption and rising unemployment seem like isolated issues, they are interconnected and signify a crisis of leadership and governance. Social movements have the potential to provide alternative leadership and, if able, to connect the grassroots to the middle and connect the struggles, issues and actors. The movement believes that change and transformation is no quick fix and that change has to be progressively realised as a collective.

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Case Studies on Social Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (SPEFA)

The case of Nsawam-Adoagyiri Municipality

By Emmanuel Ametepey

Introduction

Citizens' involvement in governance and development is an important pillar for nation building. Since the 1990s, the quality of governance has been recognised as one of the central factors affecting development prospects in poor countries (Menocal and Sharma, 2008). Governance goes beyond the formal institutional framework of the state to encompass the interaction between formal and informal institutions, rules, processes and relationships. It is a process of bargaining between those who hold power and those who seek to influence it (Oslo Governance Centre, n.d.).

Following the adoption of constitutional rule in 1993, the approach to decentralisation and local government was set out in Chapter 20 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. This was further elaborated with relevant legislation, including the Local Government Act 462 of 1993, the National Development Planning (System) Act 480 of 1994, the Civil Service Law of 1993, PNDCL 327, the District Assemblies' Common Fund Act 455 of 1993 and the Local Government Service Act 656 of 2003. There are also subsidiary legislations including individual Establishment Instruments of the respective District Assemblies, and the Local Government (Urban, Town, Zonal Councils and Unit Committees) (Establishment) Instrument of 1994 (L.I 1589).

Ghana's decentralisation concept was initiated in 1993 to promote popular grassroots participation in the management and administration of local governance institutions for improved conditions of life. This is believed to be an important means to improving the effectiveness of service delivery and empowering the local people to participate in the development processes that affect their lives. Despite this important role of local communities and stakeholders in the local governance processes, their involvement in decision making on planning, budgeting and financial management of local government agencies is only marginal.[1] This low level of participation is one of the most structural challenges confronting the decentralisation process and local government financial management in Ghana.

'Voice' and 'accountability' are important dimensions of governance: it is widely acknowledged that citizens as well as state institutions have a role to play in delivering governance that works for the poor and enhances democracy. In particular, the capacity of citizens to express and exercise their views has the potential to influence government priorities or governance processes, including a stronger demand for transparency and accountability. However, citizens need effective 'voice' in order to convey their views; and governments or states that can be held accountable for their actions are more likely to respond to the needs and demands thus articulated by their population.

> *The government of Ghana has recently undertaken a series of important steps to reinvigorate its planned decentralisation of functions to local governments. Some of these reforms include the development of the new Decentralization Policy Framework in 2010 and the National Urban Policy in 2012. The intention of these reforms is to accelerate the decentralisation process by directly addressing bottlenecks and gaps, challenges resulting from high rates of urban growth and recognition of the increasingly urban nature of both poverty and economic development in a coordinated and holistic manner.*

Background

The Social Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Project is a Local Government Capacity Support (LGCSP) project initiated by the Government of Ghana

1 Analysis of the Sefwi Wiawso Municipal Assembly: Ahenkan, A; Bawole, JN; Domfeh, KA.

in collaboration with the World Bank. The project is to be implemented in all 46 Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies (MMAs) in Ghana, including in the Nsawam-Adoagyiri Municipality, over a three-year period commencing in 2013. In year 1, 11 MMAs were supported under the project; in year 2, 25 additional MMAs joined; and in year 3, the remaining 10 of the 46 MMAs were added.

The implementation of the LGCSP involves three key Municipal and District Assemblies (MDAs): the Ministry for Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD), Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) and the Local Government Service Secretariat (LGSS). The project will support MMAs for a three-year period to enable them to mainstream social accountability activities. After the project ends, MMAs will have to undertake social accountability activities from their own resources.

Broadly, the project goal is to improve citizens' engagement with urban assemblies and their perception of urban management by providing capacity and support to improve the accountability and effectiveness of basic service delivery. In 2014, the Centre for Democratic Governance (CDD) reported low participation of citizens in the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assembly's (MMDA) planning process in Ghana (CDD, 2014). CDD-Ghana conducted the monitoring in collaboration with the Support for Decentralization Reforms of the German Agency for International Corporation. The report revealed that nearly 70% of MMDAs did not hold any public hearings with citizens on the Assembly's planning process:

> *Majority of MMAs held performance review sessions but with very low representation by women…participants were largely limited to secondary stakeholders contrary to primary beneficiaries such as the poor, marginalized and ordinary citizens.*

The general objective of Ghana's decentralisation policy is to fundamentally transform society by empowering citizens to take charge of their development agenda and improve their livelihoods. This is primarily geared towards poverty reduction through the promotion of production and related activities to raise people's income and material well-being.

The actualisation of this objective, on the supply side, rests on the extent to which the Assemblies can mobilise sufficient resources to meet the needs and aspirations of citizens. On the demand side, it depends on the extent to which citizens fulfil their tax obligations. Unfortunately, the majority of Assemblies are not mobilising enough revenues and many citizens do not fulfil their tax obligations thus limiting the potential of the MMAs to improve on the provision of services to citizens.

In addition, MMAs need to demonstrate fiscal accountability and transparency in all revenue mobilisation and expenditure decisions. Citizens should be able to hold Assemblies to account for the services they provide. To do this, people need information about what decisions Assemblies are taking and how public money is being spent. As representatives of citizens, law requires that Assembly Members share information from the Assembly with their electorates. However, studies have shown that the MMDAs do not disclose quarterly receipts even to the citizens' representatives let alone to the citizens themselves (Send Ghana). Without knowledge of Internally Generated Fund (IGF) receipts, citizens are unable to monitor the utilisation of public funds (SEND Ghana, n.d.). One cardinal principle of transparency is that usable information should be made available in sufficient time to permit analysis, evaluation and engagement by relevant stakeholders.

The SPEFA project provides opportunities for media, citizens and MMAs to engage specifically on public financial management (PFM) issues that affect the development of the district. Specifically, the project will:

- generate civil society demand for financial information from MMAs (e.g. on budgets and audits)
- promote more effective engagement of civil society with MMAs on PFM issues
- strengthen the capacity and engagement of citizens' representatives on the budget and service delivery issues.

The objectives of the project for Nsawam-Adoagyiri Municipality are to:

- improve the capacity of stakeholders and other citizen groups to demand accountability from public service officials in the Nsawam-Adoagyiri municipality
- engage with the Nsawam-Adoagyiri municipal Assembly on Public Financial Management (PFM) issues
- strengthen the capacity and engagement of citizens' representatives on the budget and service delivery issues in the Nsawam-Adoagyiri Municipality
- improve citizens' perception of urban management and increase their participation in decision-making with the Assembly.

The case study

The purpose of this case study is to document the work undertaken in the SPEFA project with particular focus on Nsawam-Adoagyiri Municipality (NAMA). The SPEFA has been implemented for almost two years. We seek to document the lessons learnt, the successes and challenges encountered over the past years.

The approach

Three main approaches were used: a community mobilisation exercise where the team identified and surveyed key communities and groups to be included in the project; the SPEFA forum, a learning platform bringing

together representatives of various citizens groups to learn about the processes of the assembly such as planning, budgeting, procurement, performance monitoring etc; the town hall meeting, a platform bringing together public officials and ordinary citizens to ensure accountability by the duty bearers (public officials).

Community mobilisation exercise
In order to get a fair representation of citizens' groups in the municipality, citizens' groups from all five sub-districts of the municipality were identified. The groups included representatives from the Ghana Police Service, Ghana National Fire Service, Ghana Education Service, Ghana Health Service, Ghana Prisons, Department of Social Welfare, Civil Society Organisations, Traditional Authorities, Youth Groups, Students, Farmers' Associations, Traders' Associations and media houses. The interaction of representatives with officials of the Assembly are detailed below in the outcomes of the Town Hall meetings.

SPEFA Forum – this is a learning platform held every quarter to educate representatives of citizens groups on the District Assembly concept and processes involved. The representatives are expected to carry out a step-down training for their members to inform them about the processes of the Municipal Assembly and assist them to ask relevant questions at the engagement sessions (town hall meeting). As a learning phase, local government experts build the capacity of identified groups, community leaders, opinion makers, market women, youth groups and traditional leaders. The training focuses on financial reporting and financial management, how the assembly manages its resources and how it reports on the utilization of resources. This covers various legal frameworks such as the 1992 Constitution, supported by Acts of Parliament, Financial Administration Act 654 of 2003, Financial Administration Regulation of 2004 (L.I. 1802) and Financial Memorandum for MMDAs of 2004. To date, 12 forums have been held with over 120 participants from all the citizens' groups identified in the municipality.

Town hall meeting – the purpose of this meeting was to allow the Municipal Assembly to present their Income and Expenditure for the year under review and their Composite Budget for the new year to citizens. Key personalities present at the meeting included the Municipal Chief Executive, the Municipal Coordinating Director, the Planning Officer, the Budget Officer, the Presiding Member, the Municipal Crime Analyst, Chiefs and traditional rulers, trade unions and youth groups.

At the meeting, the Budget Officer and the Planning Officer presented the status of the Assembly Income and Expenditure as well as the 2016 Composite Budget to the participants. During question and answer time, the Municipal Chief Executive, the Coordinating Director and other Heads of Departments responded to questions asked by participants. Critical issues raised included, but were not limited to, the following thematic areas:

The collection and use of internally generated funds (IGF) – During the presentation, the Budget Officer mentioned that the Assembly could not meet their projected revenue collection target for 2015, stressing that revenue performance over the last two years was not encouraging and attributing the situation to tax evaders and the non-enforcement of by-laws to prosecute defaulters. Almost 80% of IGF revenue is from market tolls, property rates, taxes, fines and business registration fees. The report of the Assembly`s failure to meet their revenue target was met with disappointment by the citizens, especially the market women. Participants wanted to know what accounted for this shortfall despite the rapid growth of the market. The market women refuted this report and challenged them to show evidence of their claim of tax evasion. The Market Queen had this to say:

> *The whole market is not connected to electricity, we have informed the officials for many times but no response…Secondly, we pay our market tolls, and it is not true that we don't pay it. Our tolls and taxes help the assembly a lot but they don't care about our welfare.*

Elizabeth, a market woman asked the following question**:**

> *The official mentioned that the Assembly could not meet their revenue target because they could not collect the tolls and taxes. I want to ask if the revenue collectors are paid or not. If they are unable to work but are paid we need to know.*

In response, the Planning Officer acknowledged difficulties in revenue collection as some traders do not adhere to the fees and do not pay. He stressed that this is in fact the situation, and that the Assembly will start prosecuting such tax offenders to build the capacity of the revenue unit to increase mobilisation efforts.

Revenue leakage is one of the major challenges to collection of revenue by the Assembly. A proposal was made to introduce point of sales machines alongside counterfoil receipts to address revenue leakages. The Municipal Chief Executive (Hon. Mark Annoh Dompreh) said strategic measures have been developed to improve revenue collection. He welcomed the POS proposal and assured the citizens of further discussion to procure the machines and to introduce it.

Access to public and private facilities by people with disability – Mrs Sefakor Komabu Pormeyie of EEPD Africa for People with Disability questioned the Municipal Planning Officer about the involvement of people with disability in the planning process. She wanted to know why the Assembly continues to put up structures such as school buildings without taking into account the plight of physically challenged persons. In response, the Planning Officer dismissed the issue raised by Mrs Pormeyie, citing an example of where the Assembly had ordered the breakdown and reconstruction of a public school (Municipal Assembly Junior High School) where the contractor had failed to adhere to disability requirements.

The school was not commissioned until it was made disability friendly. While we commend the Assembly for this effort, one must not lose sight of the fact that several newly constructed private and public buildings are not disability friendly, which the Assembly failed to monitor to ensure that the buildings met disability requirements.

Zonal council participation in decision making at the Assembly – Honorable Mallam Jibril, the Assembly member for Adoagyiri-Zongo, asked the Planning Officer about the participation of zonal councils in decision making, and pointed out that the people of Adoagyiri-Zongo had no zonal council and were thus not participating in decision making at the Assembly. In his presentation, he claimed that they involved zonal councils in the planning processes. In response, the Planning Officer apologized on behalf of the Assembly and assured participants of the readiness to establish a zonal council at Adoagyiri-Zone.

Citizens consultation on physical infrastructure – An interesting issue raised was the construction of a new abattoir for Nsawam without any consultation with the butchers' association and its leadership. The chief butcher, who happened to be at the meeting, was not happy about this and strongly opposed the use of the new facility as it did not meet safety requirements for an abattoir, saying:

> *When you started your planning, you did not consult anybody, no one is aware of this building. I am a stakeholder; you finished constructing the building before informing me. When you bring in the cows where you will keep them before killing? Tell me planning officer!*

The Municipal Chief Executive rendered an unqualified apology to the chief butcher and promised to involve him in redesigning the abattoir.

The issues raised at the town hall meeting underlined the fact that on many occasions the Assembly took major developmental decisions without the involvement and views of citizens and beneficiaries. This is in sharp contrast to the fundamental pillars of the Local Government Acts which envisage popular local participation in all aspects of local governance so that equitable development is achieved. While governance watchers were of the view that this is a deliberate act, the Planning Officers were of the view that it is due to budget and logistic constraints.

Nana Amoako Ampong, the Adontehene (Chief) of Adoagyiri, took his turn to advise the Municipal Chief Executive and his team on the need to ensure active and holistic involvement of the community members in the planning of the Assembly. He further urged the participants to let their voices be heard in demanding accountability from duty bearers.

To date, four town hall meetings have been organised. In the most recent town hall meeting, 187 participants attended, 52 women and 135 men.

Target groups

Through stakeholder consultations, participants were selected to attend the SPEFA town hall meetings, taking into consideration sub-zonal councils and identifiable groups. Participants were drawn from the following target groups:

- Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies
- Zonal/Urban/Town Councils
- Unit Committees
- Traditional Authorities (Chiefs and Queen Mothers)
- Neighbourhood Committees
- Identifiable community leaders
- Parent–Teacher Associations
- Farmers' Associations
- Youth Groups
- Women's Groups
- Local media (community and private FM radio stations)
- Transport Associations
- Trade Associations
- Representatives of identifiable political parties
- Other identified local CSOs/CBOs/NGOs
- Others.

Achievements

Influence systemic and leadership changes

- Stop the Municipal Assembly from commissioning a public school which has no disability friendly access – this access was later constructed before the school was commissioned.
- The Municipal Butchers Association rejected a slaughter house built without prior and proper consultation.
- The Municipal Chief Executive was subsequently dismissed following public outcry about non-performance; the SPEFA project is a contributing factor to this decision by the President.
- Construction of the main road linking Aburi and Nsawam has started, awaiting completion and commissioning by December 2016.
- Re-construction of the Nsawam lorry station (bus terminal) has started.

Increased transparency and accountability

- Local Assemblies display their mid-term budget on their public notice boards.
- Citizens are well informed about the MMAs PFM process.
- A watchdog function of observing and reporting social accountability issues and processes has been implemented.

Increased government responsiveness

- Channels provided for local government actors to communicate and interact with citizens on PFM and other social accountability activities under the project.

Greater youth participation in mainstream processes

- Youth participation in the SPEFA project was high through working with identifiable youth groups.
- A SPEFA Advocacy Group for advocacy and media engagements was formed.

Multi-stakeholder collaboration

- The project led to extensive multi-stakeholder discussion and collaboration between – Traditional Authorities (Chiefs and Queen Mothers), Neighborhood Committees, Identifiable Community Leaders, Parent–Teacher Associations, Farmers Associations, Youth Groups, Women's Groups, Local media (community and private FM radio stations), Transport Associations, Trade Associations, representatives of identifiable political parties, Other identified local CSOs/CBOs/NGOs, MPs and Ministers of State, PWDs, others.

Lessons

- Social accountability needs to be encouraged and maintained for transparency and accountability and good governance in public administration by MMAs;[2]
- Citizens should be made more aware of their responsibilities;
- Social accountability is best achieved with a bottom–up approach;
- Communication is key to sustainable development;
- Citizens in MMAs have similar development challenges which SPEFA can help address;
- Citizens' interest in developmental issues has been ignited through SPEFA;
- SPEFA has strengthened social accountability in the MMAs thus fostering collaboration among MMAs & citizen group;
- Citizens are willing to participate in developmental processes and local decision making;
- Citizens are willing to pay their tolls if they are adequately informed or engaged in how the tolls collected are used;
- The use of local languages to facilitate SPEFA events was very effective in allowing citizens to freely express their views.

Challenges

- Dwindling spirit of volunteerism among SPEFA group;
- Continuous demand for funds by some stakeholder groupings such as citizen groups, and MMA personnel and media as a way of motivating them to participate in SPEFA activities;
- Ensuring consistency in personnel who attend SPEFA group meetings;
- Low participation of women and elderly at SPEFA events;
- Low MMA personnel attendance at SPEFA events.

Conclusion

The introduction and implementation of SPEFA in the Nsawam-Adoagyiri Municipality has led to a dramatic awareness of citizens' roles and responsibilities in service delivery and financial accountability of the Nsawam-Adoagyiri Municipal Assembly. Nevertheless, there are still governance issues that require consideration and attention: low participation of citizens and accountability on the part of Assemblies; poor relationships between revenue collectors and taxpayers and unsatisfactory services by the Assemblies to taxpayers. There is a need to develop mutual understanding between the MMAs and society. Building trust in state institutions is critical for MMAs to increase revenue mobilisation and undertake development initiatives. Conversely, the use of IGF in fulfilment of citizens' rights and satisfaction about service delivery will further boost the revenue of the MMAs as citizens will have no justification to withhold tax. Effective engagement of local communities and other stakeholders will enhance transparency and improve upon service delivery within the local government systems. A conscious effort to build capacity and create space for local engagement will enhance efforts towards decentralisation and fast-track poverty reduction and national development in Ghana.

2 SPEFA evaluation after year 1.

***Acknowledgements**

This case study is the first fruit of Social Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (SPEFA): The Case of Nsawam-Adoagyiri Municipality. We are very excited about it and would like to express our profound appreciation to all those who have contributed through various means to make it possible for us to present this case study. Firstly, to the Almighty God for granting us His grace to see the light of today. Then to Bright Owusu, the Programme Manager of Ampa Resource Organization whose insightful direction helped steer the thinking process behind the SPEFA project and this first case study, we are most grateful. We would also like to express our appreciation to Diana Koranteng, the Project Officer of Youth Advocates Ghana (YAG), for her invaluable advice and support at various stages of the preparation of this document, and Ransford Boateng of Ampa Resource Organization, who made available reports and other materials to put together this case study that will be useful for generations to come.

Finally, to Dr Marianne Camerer and Mabel Sithole of Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice of the University of Cape Town, South Africa, for their comments and review of the final draft. For their painstaking work, we say "thank you". We appreciate the fact that you have the foresight to invest in African youth and the hope of building strategic leadership for the African public sector. We trust that this partnership will continue to enhance governance, transparency and accountability not only in Ghana but Africa as a whole. It is a worthy cause.

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Strengthening Legislative Accountability and Local Governance

A case study of the #YLAPNG project in Nigeria

by Samson Itodo

Introduction

Nigeria practices a constitutional democracy anchored on the principle of separation of powers. This presupposes that governmental powers are shared between the executive, legislature and the judiciary. The legislative arm of government is vested with the constitutional competence of lawmaking, oversight and representation. At the national level, Nigeria operates a bicameral legislature (the Senate and House of Representatives), unicameral at the state and local government level. The Senate comprises 109 senators elected on the basis of equality of states while the House of Representatives is composed of 360 members representing federal constituencies and constituted on the basis of population. Elections to the legislature are conducted every four years, which is the statutory life of an Assembly (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Only five out of 30 registered political parties have representation in the National Assembly, and the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC) and the People's Democratic Party (PDP) are in the majority. Proposed legislations or bills go through five stages; first reading, second reading, committee stage, third reading, joint conference committee state and assent. Public hearings are conducted sometimes to harness citizens' inputs to bills. The National Assembly passes motions and resolutions to regulate the conduct of the executive and protect public interests. The legislature conducts its oversight functions through standing and ad hoc committees constituted on a sectoral basis like finance, public accounts, education, power, health etc. The upper house has 65 standing committees and the lower house has 96. The National Assembly (NASS) is required to sit for 181 days in a legislative year with official recess days (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).

Since the return to democracy, the legislature has been a subject of debate and controversy. A cross section of Nigerian society believe that the bicameral nature of the legislature is not sustainable and that Nigeria should operate a unicameral legislature at the national level. Another school of thought advocates a reversion to parliamentarism, largely attributed to her inability to purge itself of institutional corruption, impunity and poor constituent representation. Contextually, physical access and access to information in the National Assembly is problematic. The lack of openness and transparency of the institution is exemplified by its refusal to make public the annual budget breakdown and lawmaker's allowances, despite pressure from citizens and other stakeholders. With an annual budget of N150 billion, the National Assembly is reported to have passed only 106 of the 1,063 bills sponsored over the last four years (Adebayo, 2016). The 1-year scorecard of the present 8th Assembly shows that between June 2015 – June 2016, the Senate passed 11 of 299 bills sponsored and the House passed 85 of 685 bills (Adebayo, 2016).

In 2013, the *Economist* published a report ascribing Nigerian lawmakers as the highest paid in the world compared to their counterparts in the United States, Germany and South Africa (The Economist, 2013). To date, the National Assembly has not disclosed the salaries and emoluments of its members despite disclosure assurances from its leadership. This non-disclosure has been the subject of several litigations and protests by citizen groups involved in promoting democratic accountability (Premium Times, n.d.). The preponderance of opinion suggests that the reluctance of the National Assembly to publish its budget is informed by the fact that yearly legislative output does not justify the NASS statutory budgetary allocation of N150 million and the salaries and earnings of lawmakers. Although this statutory allocation was reduced to N120 billion in 2013 and N115 billion in the 2016 Appropriation Act, the NASS has declined any request for full disclosure despite assurances from the leadership of both chambers that the budget would be made public. This is symptomatic of a culture of unaccountability deeply entrenched in Nigeria's political system. The lack of openness heightens distrust and suspicion between citizens and the legislators, and undermines the integrity and image of the legislature.

In addition to the lack of openness and transparency, the conduct of legislative business is not matched with competence, intellectual depth and diligence. This is manifest in the quality of bills passed by the legislature and the poor conduct of oversight functions; often times legislation contains contradictory provisions which signal a lack of proper bill scrutiny. Whilst some legislators ensure diligence in holding the executive to account via oversight, others regard oversight as an avenue for political witch-hunts or self-enrichment as ministries, departments and parastatals are fond of lobbying legislators with employment opportunities, cash rewards and government contracts. This compromises the ability of parliamentary committees to conduct objective and credible checks and balances on the executive. To a very large extent, this is responsible for the clamour for membership and chairmanship of 'juicy' parliamentary committees by legislators.

In line with the principle of representative democracy, the legislature is expected to avail citizens with the opportunity to participate in law-making through public hearings, submission of memoranda, committee meetings etc. Unfortunately, citizens' participation in law-making processes has been poor, and in some instances, non-existent. This is occasioned both by the inability of citizens to play their role of engaging their representatives and the reluctance of elected representatives to consult their constituents during consideration of bills through constituency outreaches, meetings, social media and media engagement like radio programmes. It is worth underscoring that few legislators consult their constituents during law-making and motion sponsorship. Although public hearings provide an opportunity for the legislature to harness citizens' inputs into bills, the conduct of public hearings has been characterised by a lack of consistency, poor planning, poor public communication and restricted physical access to the NASS complex. There are some exceptions where the bill under consideration enjoys high public interest; remarkably, the 7th House of Representatives conducted the people's forum on constitution review in all the 360 federal constituencies across Nigeria.[1] This was a radical shift from the norm. Subsequent houses have not adopted this model.

The performance of key legislative functions like law-making, representation and oversight requires some level of capacity. This is very critical for democratic consolidation. Over the years, the Nigerian legislature has been fraught with different degrees of capacity deficits (National Institute for Legislative Studies, 2015). One factor responsible for this is the turnover of lawmakers after every general election (Channels Television, 2015). Rather than close the capacity gap, the 2015 elections saw an increase in the number of experienced lawmakers that failed to secure a seat in the 8th Assembly. According to the National Institute of Legislative Studies (NILS),[2] Nigeria ranks highest in the turnover of legislators (Odemwingie, 2014). This poses a great threat to legislative performance and outputs in the National Assembly as experience cannot be overlooked in legislative practice. The challenge therefore lies in the ability of citizens to manage their expectations on the performance of their representatives. This calls for an intervention that will potentially bridge the communication gap between elected representatives and their constituents such that both parties can understand and appreciate their realities and needs.

A recent study by Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement (YIAGA, 2015) reveals poor understanding of the core mandate of the legislature on the part of citizens, which affects the nature of engagement between constituents and legislators. Legislators are overwhelmed with demands for individual assistance from constituents. This assistance is mostly in the form of financial assistance for family events e.g. burials, marriages, children christening, school fees, house rents etc. Constituents believe that legislators directly receive funds to implement constituency projects hence their increased demands for financial handout and community projects. This situation is attributed to poor political education and poor information sharing and communication between the legislature and citizens.

The study further revealed that legislators make promises not attainable within their constitutional mandate in a bid to secure electoral votes. Most campaign promises are framed in line with the dominant socio-economic challenges of a community without consideration of the constitutional powers of the legislature. This heightens the expectations constituents have of their legislators. When their hopes are dashed and campaign promises are not met they become disillusioned with the political process. This situation has impacted negatively on the relationship between legislators and constituents. Often times, citizens are complicit when they fail to demand accountability from their elected representatives. It makes a mockery of the social contract between the government and the governed.

The 7th Assembly recorded very low passage of legislations or motions addressing the socio-economic and political needs of young citizens. To make matters worse, the few young legislators in the National Assembly could not seize the political space available to advance the youth agenda. This was exemplified in the non-inclusion of youth issues in the botched constitution review process, despite robust advocacy by youth civil society organisations (CSOs). In addition, in 2013, the Senate rejected a social welfare bill proposing monthly pay of N20,000 to unemployed graduates, but passed a constitutional amendment placing its principal officers on life pension. Other indications that lawmakers lack an understanding of youth issues or do not care about the plight of young citizens were the

1 The People's Forum was a citizen's outreach programme by the House of Representative Committee on Constitution Review. Legislators were requested to conduct town hall meetings where their constituents could vote on proposed amendments.

2 NILS is an agency of the National Assembly statutorily established to provide capacity and research to the National Assembly.

approach adopted by the National Assembly in handling the botched immigration recruitment exercise, the N4000 additional fee imposed by NYSC for call up letters and the investigation on reports of job racketeering and an employment scam in the public sector.

The Young Legislators Accountability Project was conceptualised as a civic education project to address several misconceptions on the statutory mandate of the legislature whilst raising awareness among citizens about avenues for holding elected legislators accountable. The project is a direct response to the need to create platforms for dialogue between citizens and government to assess the performance of social contracts and advance participatory democracy.

The project was designed to enhance legislative accountability through effective citizens' participation whilst building a cohesive young legislators' hub for political mentorship, peer learning and capacity development. The project is a strategy to sustain citizens' participation in governance in the aftermath of the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. The overall goal of #YLAPNG is to deepen legislative accountability through the creation of platforms that bring legislators and constituents together. #YLAPNG is driven by a strong commitment to build a new social contract and forging effective relationships between legislators and constituents.

#YLAPNG was designed to close the following gaps:

- Low citizens' engagement in legislative process
- A closed legislature
- Poor legislator – constituent relationship
- Poor legislative performance
- Limited citizens' understanding of the functions of the legislature.

Proposed interventions and theory of change

For any institution to make a lasting impact the activities must be derived from an underlying theory of change (ToC). For the legislature, this should explain the fundamental elements linking its work and the various dimensions of social change it sets out to effect in constituencies. These may include changes in value orientations, social conditions and development of the constituents. Here, a good measure of the potential impact of the legislature lies in the extent to which constituents and their legislators understand and fully internalise this theory of change. A theory of change in this context suggests that improvements in the social conditions of the constituencies with young legislators are only possible if legislative activities (including campaign promises) are targeted at actualising constituents' needs (and also realistic expectations) and not legislators' needs or selfish desires.

In enhancing accountability and citizen participation in legislative activities, the project strengthens the linkages between the youth electorate and young legislators through accountability and town hall meetings. This is preceded by periodic needs assessments of constituents and the production of citizens' charters. The project also establishes support systems that address challenges likely to undermine the performance of young legislators. Whilst serving as a political framework for grooming future political leaders and legislators, the project also hones youth skills on policy-making, advocacy, negotiation and critical thinking.

The project aims to sustain youth participation in governance in the aftermath of the 2015 elections through issues-based engagement with young legislators. Through the establishment of the Young Legislators Forum, the project enhances legislative accountability using young legislators as models of good governance and effective representation. The Forum serves as a power bloc or youth caucus within the legislature, tasked with the responsibility of exploiting the political space in the legislature for the passage of youth-friendly legislation and policy. Remarkably, for the first time ever there are 29 young legislators (28 males, 1 female) in the 8th National Assembly. This increase in young people in the legislature is an indicator of democratic development in a country like Nigeria with a long history of political marginalisation of young people.

Through the conduct of mid-term performance audits, the project generates empirical evidence on the performance of elected representatives, particularly young legislators. The performance audit serves as a citizen-driven scorecard showcasing the performance of elected representatives. This enhances accountability as it offers citizens the opportunity to give feedback to their legislators as well as to contribute to policy making. The regular interface with the technical youth working group and young legislators creates avenues for peer learning, formation of alliances, political mentoring and leadership development. The project guarantees the availability of regular information on the contribution of young legislators to legislative activities. This information is useful for constituencies they represent.

Three drivers propelled the project – the Young Parliamentarians Forum (YPF), the Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Advisory Panel (AP). The TWG comprises experienced youth experts drawn from youth CSOs in line with thematic areas of expertise. It provides technical assistance to young legislators through voluntary research and production of policy briefs. Furthermore, the YPF and TWG obtain resources from the experience and intellect of members of the AP, comprising experienced academics, policy experts, legal practitioners and so on. The AP and TWG provide a platform for intergenerational dialogue and knowledge transfer.

The project leveraged on partnerships and collaboration with other organisations to enhance its impact and success. Five institutions are involved in the project: Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) provided funding support; the National Institute for Legislative Studies and Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre provided technical support and access to the National Assembly; the United States Embassy provided opportunities for peer learning and sharing of experiences between young legislators in the United States and Nigeria; and, the #BuhariMeter initiative of the Centre for Democracy and Development supported the project with data on the performance of the executive to aid legislative oversight by young legislators.

The following factors informed the conception and design of the project:

- Increased citizens' enthusiasm for civic participation and legislative engagement;
- Increasing number of young legislators in the National Assembly and state assemblies;
- Paradigm shift within the political class that there are consequence for non-performance or poor representation; and
- The peaceful democratic transition from a ruling party to an opposition party that prides itself as a party committed democratic accountability;

The case study interventions

Agenda setting and Citizens Charter

In a bid to sustain issues-based citizens' engagement with elected representatives, a Constituents Needs Assessment (CNA) was conducted to collect specific information on constituents' expectations of their young legislators, priority issues and the level of citizens' knowledge on the roles and responsibilities of their representatives. The assessment aimed to generate empirical data on the priority needs of constituents, promises made by legislators, and ways to facilitate information sharing between legislators and constituents. The methodology adopted for the study is associated with survey research design. The study population covers 17 states and 28 federal constituencies across the states. In each of the constituencies, a representative sample of women, men, people with disabilities and youth were randomly selected. Data was obtained from both primary and secondary sources. The former was collected through key informant interviews with selected leaders and members of key interest groups, supplemented by the administration of questionnaires. The latter was gathered through a desk review of relevant and related literature drawn from journals, official publications, CNA project documents, and periodicals, among others.

A group of volunteers was recruited from selected communities in the constituencies with young legislators. The volunteers established community networks that handled the constituents' needs assessment at the local government level. The young volunteers administered questionnaires in 10 wards in each local government. Interviews were also conducted with members of interest groups that were purposefully selected.

The assessment evolved with a charter of demand highlighting constituents' priority needs and strategies for improving legislator–constituent relationships. The Charter of Demand served as a social contract document between the legislators and their constituents. The outcome document serves as a baseline/scorecard for holding legislators accountable for their campaign promises. Legislators used the Charter as a reference for determining constituency projects; for instance, Hon. Tony Nwulu sank boreholes in Oshodi/Isolo Federal Constituency of Lagos State based on the priority issues in the CNA document; Hon. David Ombugadu from Akwanga/Nassarawa Eggon/ Wamba constituency renovated his campaign office and converted it to his constituency office to facilitate robust engagement with his constituents.

Constituency Accountability Dialogues

The engagement of constituents in legislative activities is central to the #YLAPNG project. The project provides a platform where constituents can negotiate a new social contract with their elected representatives. To this end, the concept of Constituency Accountability Dialogue (CAD) was initiated to provide a platform where constituents can engage their legislators on their priorities and needs. CAD also avails legislators the opportunity to give account of their stewardship and representation in the parliament. YIAGA works with legislators to host accountability town hall meetings in local constituencies.

Several CADs were conducted during the commemoration of one year of representation in the National Assembly. During the CAD, legislators harness feedback from constituents and make commitments to address their needs. Legislators who had not previously visited their constituents organized six CADs in the last six months; for example, Hon. David Ombugadu representing Akwanga/Nassarawa-Eggon/ Wamba LGA of Nassarawa State and Hon. Adedapo Lam Adeshina representing Ibadan North East/ Ibadan South East of Oyo State. The accountability town hall meeting was described as the first accountability dialogue in the history of the constituencies where they were conducted. In Ibadan North/Ibadan South constituency, the constituents were excited about the CAD model as it gave them an opportunity to ask key questions. Their lawmaker used the platform to share information about his projects and activities. The constituents demanded that an advisory implementation committee and a monitoring team be constituted for effective implementation of campaign promises.

These committees have been constituted with the support of YIAGA. In Nassarawa State, Hon. Ombugadu has been consistent in hosting separate consultative meetings with his constituents in Wamba and Nassarawa Eggon local government. Each CAD showed a record attendance of over 500 constituents.

Performance audits and scorecard

In a bid to deepen accountability, a citizen-led performance audit was conducted. This is the first form of performance scorecard to be conducted with Nigerian legislators. The primary aim of the performance evaluation was to provide lawmakers and citizens with information on the performance and accomplishments of young legislators in the 8th National Assembly. This is an important tool to improve the quality of representation in the legislature. It also allows the legislators to assess themselves, gauge their performance and improve various aspects of their work. The scorecard adopts a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to present objective and transparent results targeting performance in the following areas: plenary sessions, parliamentary committees and constituencies.

On the quantitative front, the efficacy of young legislators was gauged fairly on the basis of attendance at plenaries, number of bills sponsored, number of motions moved and number of amendments proposed. Furthermore, the influence of the legislator was assessed by evaluating the weight of his/her contributions and reactions elicited by their interventions. Additionally, attendance at committee meetings was measured as well as participation in committee activities. On the qualitative front, the effectiveness of a young legislator centred on the quality of representation he/she provides and the perception of his/her constituents.

On the basis of the above factors, a scorecard was generated for each young legislator. The scorecard provides information to the legislator on his/her legislative activities in the last one year as a means of consolidating his/her performance. Secondly, the scorecard empowered constituents to make informed decisions on the performance of the young legislator by providing accurate and objective information about every legislator's performance. The first performance assessment was conducted after the 1st year of the 8th National Assembly (June 2015 – June 2016).

The report has been shared and constituents are holding town hall meetings to engage their legislators on their performance. This has deepened citizens' engagement with elected representatives. It has resulted in a shift in the paradigm of legislators, many of whom had hitherto taken constituents for granted. As a result, most legislators in this project have undertaken several initiatives to reach out to their constituents and address their needs. Some legislators made efforts to contribute to debates on the floor of the House and sponsor motions in the interest of their constituents. For example, Hon Gaza Jonathan Gwefwi, representing Garaku/Keffi federal constituency of Nassarawa State, sponsored a motion on the need to direct the Federal Road Maintenance Agency to repair the Keffi/Abuja highway to reduce road accidents. This was a direct request by constituents through the 'Letter to my Rep' campaign.

Bridging the knowledge gap through training and peer learning

One of the gaps that the project seeks to address is the knowledge gap on the part of legislators, legislative aides and citizens with respect to legislative process, leadership and engagement with constituents. In furtherance of this objective, training programmes were designed for legislators and their legislative aides. YIAGA, in partnership with the United States embassy, facilitates peer learning and exchange between young legislators in both countries.

In November 2014, a roundtable was hosted at the US embassy to expose young legislators to practical strategies for enhancing legislator-constituent relationship. Participants at the roundtable included 15 young legislators, the Minister of Youth and Sports Development, officials from the US embassy and OSIWA staff. The event featured a video conference between two young legislators in the US (Crisanta Duran and Jose Diaz, state legislators from Colorado and Florida respectively) and their Nigerian counterparts. The legislators were exposed to best strategies of engaging constituents using toll free lines for complaints and social media tools for educating and engaging with constituents. The legislators were urged to employ the services of young people to better manage and handle their social media platforms for engagement with constituents.

Following the roundtable, the legislators requested training in social media for their legislative aides. Thirty-eight legislative aides were subsequently trained in the use of social media, in partnership with the US Embassy, Abuja. More than 10 legislators have since created social media accounts to engage with constituents and share information on their activities. YIAGA conducts periodic assessment of these social media platforms and provides technical advice to foster effective use by young legislators.

Legislative aides are central to the performance of a legislator. Studies have shown that legislative aides are the engine room that determine the success or otherwise of a legislator. Legislative aides are often the nexus that links legislators with their constituents. Considering the critical role aides play in the legislature, YIAGA strategically initiated the convening of a roundtable meeting to secure the partnership of legislative aides on the #YLAPNG project. Our decision to engage legislative aides was based on feedback from our CNA as well as previous interactions with young legislators.

Bills analysis and production of policy briefs

As part of the strategic support and engagement with legislators, analyses were conducted of specific bills presented in the National Assembly in the following thematic areas: education and youth development, unemployment and entrepreneurship, technology, the economy, gender and persons with disabilities, elections and constitutional reforms, governance and accountability, and health. The TWG constituted for the project conducted the analyses and produced the policy briefs. The TWG comprises young professionals and researchers drawn from youth CSOs, the private sector and the media, selected based on their areas of expertise and limited to young legislators in the National Assembly and selected state assemblies. The TWG was constituted to perform the following voluntary functions:

- Provide technical assistance in policy research and analysis for young legislators;
- Review proposed bills using a youth lens to highlight the implications for youth;
- Produce policy briefs or briefing documents on specific youth issues for young legislators;
- Facilitate and monitor the conduct of constituency outreaches and consultations;
- Popularise the good work of young legislators using new and traditional media.

Under this area of work, briefing documents and motions have been produced to aid the work of the legislators. Notable amongst these are the two anti-corruption bills forwarded to the National Assembly by President Buhari, the Mutual Legal Assistance Bill of 2016 and the Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Bill of 2016. The briefs were produced to enhance the contributions of young legislators to the debate on general principles. YIAGA has received commendation from the legislators for the quality of the policy briefs, which enhanced their contributions on the floor of the House.

Another landmark outcome from this initiative is the #NotTooYoungToRun bill, drafted by the YIAGA team and sponsored by Hon. Tony Nwulu, one of the beneficiaries of the project. The bill has passed its first and second reading and is presently before the committee on constitution review. The #NotTooYoungToRun bill gave birth to a national campaign comprising over 88 civil society organisations campaigning for a reduction of the eligible age for contesting elections in Nigeria[3].

Establishment of the Young Legislators Forum

In a bid to establish a cohesive advocacy group of change champions in the National Assembly, YIAGA facilitated the process of establishing a Young Legislators Forum. The platform is designed to serve as an entry point for young people to galvanize legislative support for pro-people legislation. The Senate President officially inaugurated the forum on October 7, 2015, after a series of retreats hosted by YIAGA to design the framework for the forum and the following key components:

- Vision, mission and guiding principles
- Mandate and functions
- Membership and composition
- Governance structure
- Institutionalizing YPF within National Assembly structure
- Engagement with critical stakeholders e.g. youth CSOs
- Funding and resource mobilization
- Strategic plan development
- Communications.

Through the Forum issues relating to youth, budget implementation and accountability have been raised from the floor of the House. For example, the Forum ensured adequate appropriation for youth in the 2016 Appropriation Act. The Forum also submitted several petitions on students' rights and the rights of young women to the House. In February 2016, the House passed a resolution directing the security agencies to arrest, investigate and prosecute those involved in the death of Rivers State University students.

After eight months of implementing the #YLAPNG project, YIAGA was inundated with requests to replicate the project in other national parliaments across Africa. One such request was received from young legislators in the Parliament of Sierra Leone. Against this background, #YLAPNG TWG member Ms. Nana Nwachukwu visited the Parliament of Sierra Leone on March 2, 2016, where she met with the Speaker Hon. Sheku Badara Bashiru Dumbuya, Deputy Speaker Hon. Chennor Maju Bah and the Majority Leader Hon. Ibrahim Rassin Bundu (APC). The principal officers of the Parliament expressed strong commitment to implementing the project to bridge the gap between constituents and legislators and enhance the capacity of young legislators in the Parliament of Sierra Leone. In March 2016, the Parliament of Sierra Leone inaugurated its Young Legislators Forum. YIAGA is currently providing technical assistance to the forum.

3 See www.yiaga.org/nottooyoungtorun for more information on the campaign.

Media engagement

Print media

Since commencement of the project, #YLAPNG has featured on numerous national and international print and electronic media platforms including *Premium Times*, *Daily Trust*, *Leadership* Newspapers, *Guardian* Newspapers, Naij.com, *The Order*, African Independent Television, TVC, Oak TV, Channels TV, NTA and CCTV. The news stories reported on activities and enlightened the public about the objectives of the project. Most importantly, the news reports publicised the impact and success stories of the project to a wide audience.

#YLAPNG Weekly Radio program and tweet meet

The #YLAPNG hashtag was created to raise online awareness about the project, and the activities of young legislators in the 8th National Assembly. Every week, Amplified Online Radio (www.amplifiedradio.net) hosts a one-hour programme to discuss the goals and achievements of the project.

Website

The importance of a strong online presence for an organisation today cannot be overemphasised. The website www.ylap.org was launched to share compelling stories about the activities of young legislators in the 8th National Assembly with our audience through its content (words, images and videos), which is also shared directly through all other #YLAPNG communication channels.

Project outcomes

The project resulted in a series of positive outcomes:

- Greater citizens' engagement with elected representatives was evident from the CADs and town hall meeting, contributing to building a culture of accountable governance and citizens' participation in the democratic process beyond elections;
- Renewed commitment on the part of young legislators to consult and engage with their constituents, evidenced in the frequency of requests for partnerships and support for CADs;
- Improved quality of debate and engagement on bills, measured by the wide usage of policy briefs produced under the project by the young legislators and the increasing demand for more publications by some committees in the National Assembly;
- Platforms for peer learning and capacity building were developed – the quarterly engagement between young legislators in the US and Nigeria is providing young Nigerian legislators with a platform to share experiences and best practices that enhance legislative accountability and civic engagement;
- Capacity building and training of legislative aides;
- The TWG model offers youth organisations a platform for policy engagement at the highest level, and provides a learning opportunity for youth organisations interested in policy advocacy and community organising;
- Increased availability of up-to-date information on legislative activities online through the use of the #YLAPNG website, Twitter, Facebook and Youtube;
- Improved legislative capacity of young legislators and enhanced engagement with constituencies;
- Improved partnerships between legislators and civil society groups to promote participation;
- Increased legislative accountability, evident in legislators' engagement at the CADs and online through social media.

Challenges and successes

Challenges

- YIAGA experienced difficulty in convincing young legislators to embrace the project at the initial stage. Confidence and trust were established over months during the various intervention programmes and partnership with other stakeholders like the US embassy, OSIWA, PLAC etc;
- Access to information in the National Assembly, including on the activities of young legislators, posed a challenge (the engagement with the National Institute of Legislative Studies addressed this to a certain extent);
- Poor understanding by citizens about the functions of the legislators;
- A leadership crisis that rocked the National Assembly (and a long recess to address the crisis) delayed commencement of the project;
- Under-budgeting for some items on the project budget;
- A communal dispute in the Oshodi/Isolo constituency led to an impromptu postponement of a CAD scheduled for 22 February, 2016.

Successes

- The CNA assembled data and information on constituents' needs, which were codified into a document to serve as a checklist or Charter of Demands for the young legislators.
- The paradigm shift on the part of young legislators

to engage with constituents through the CADs is a remarkable success, exemplified by two young legislators who hosted their CAD without any funding support from YIAGA.

- The creation of a platform for citizens to reach their legislators is another success, and the #LetterToMyRep campaign was well received. The reconstruction and activation of the Nassarawa Eggon constituency office and youth empowerment centre is a direct outcome of #YLAP engagement.
- Beyond securing the buy-in of the young legislators for the project, YIAGA enjoys greater credibility and confidence among constituents who can now reach out to their lawmakers.
- Securing the partnership of the US Embassy to provide opportunities for peer learning and sharing experiences with young legislators in the US is a remarkable success. The US Embassy also committed to making funds available to build a resource library during one of YLAP's engagements with legislative aides of the young legislators. There is a possibility of hosting an exchange program for young legislators in Nigeria and US.
- The #YLAPNG project facilitated the creation of the Young Parliamentarian Forums in Nigeria, the first in the entire West African sub region. The Forum now serves as a gateway for youth engagement with the National Assembly.
- YIAGA was able to secure partnerships and commitments from other organisations on the project: OSIWA provided funding support; NILS and PLAC provided technical support and access to the National Assembly; the United States Embassy provided opportunities for peer learning and sharing experiences between young legislators; lastly, the #BuhariMeter initiative of Centre for Democracy & Development supported the project with data on the performance of the executive to aid legislative oversight by young legislators.

Conclusion

Democracy is under scrutiny across the globe and Africa is no exception. Citizens are expressing discontent at the inability of democracy to deliver meaningful development. The experience of Burkina Faso, Mali, Gambia and the recent Brexit vote are instructive in this regard. What is the essence of democracy without development? As long as democracy fails to deliver sustainable development, the gap between the government and the governed will grow wider and this could potentially degenerate to political instability. It is therefore important to prioritise the expansion of civic space to promote dialogue between citizens and elected representatives. Sustainable development can be guaranteed if state and non-state actors build strong partnerships based on the principles of openness, mutual respect and responsibility.

This project is a test case to show that citizens can enhance the quality of governance and representation if given the resources and opportunity to engage. It also gives credence to the view that political society and civil society are not mutually exclusive but interdependent. Whilst civil society should play its role of promoting participatory democracy and accountability, citizens must not abdicate their civic duty to hold government accountable. Citizens should be more assertive in promoting social accountability and transparency in public governance, as therein lies the silver lining to sustainable development.

Since the commencement of this project, politicians (especially legislators) are beginning to value more the mandate given to them by their constituents. This is evolving into a new paradigm in the psyche of politicians where they realise that there are consequence for poor representation in the legislature. Citizens are also taking initiatives to negotiate new social contracts at the local level using new tools of measuring performance and legislative accountability.

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Building and Enhancing Participation, Transparency and Accountability in South Africa through Social Audits

By Axolile Notywala

Introduction

The Social Justice Coalition (SJC) is a grassroots member-based social movement based in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. The SJC was founded in 2008 and currently has branches across 15 communities in Khayelitsha, with the majority in informal settlements. Khayelitsha, the biggest township in Cape Town and one of the biggest in South Africa, is located about 30 kilometers away from Cape Town's central business district.

The SJC has campaigned for clean, safe and dignified sanitation services and an effective and efficient criminal justice system in Khayelitsha with a particular focus in informal settlements since 2009. This is work that is now divided into two programmes, the Local Government Programme and the Safety and Justice Programme.

In 2013, the SJC conducted its first social audit into the provision and servicing of chemical toilets in four informal settlements in Khayelitsha. Various other organisations such as Equal Education (EE), Ndifuna Ukwazi (NU) and Planact have since followed suit.

Many people in informal settlements still do not have access to basic services such as sanitation. Access to clean, safe and dignified sanitation services is a daily struggle for many living in informal settlements. Cape Town has 204 informal settlements and the majority of these informal settlements are unplanned for. While many have existed for decades, government still treats them as temporary. The treatment of informal settlements in this way contributes a lot to the lack of and in many cases inadequate provision of many services.

The majority of sanitation services for example in Cape Town are outsourced. Based on information received through a PAIA request for a list of all toilet types in the City of Cape Town's informal settlements, over 65% of toilets provided to informal settlements are outsourced. These include toilet types such as chemical, container, bucket and portable flush toilets. The failure of the City of Cape Town to properly monitor private companies providing these services means that they often pocket millions of Rands while providing substandard services and are not being held accountable. I detail more about the failures of these service providers later on in the case study when I talk about examples of the SJC's social audits in Khayelitsha.

When these failures happen, many are left without clean, safe or dignified sanitation services and are forced to use bushes or open fields to relieve themselves. This poses not only a health risk but also a safety risk for informal settlements residents. Residents are attacked, robbed, assaulted, raped and murdered on their way to or from these places. Women and children are more vulnerable. Their dignity is compromised. This is a violation of the constitutional rights to safety, health, dignity, privacy and access to sanitation.

The work of the SJC is focused on the advancement and protection of the constitutional rights for all. Many voices from poor and working class communities are neglected in existing political and participation spaces and this leads to the many service delivery protests we see in South Africa today. There is a great need for community participation spaces to be strengthened and utilised effectively. In order for this to happen, communities need to be empowered and encouraged to stand up and claim their rights. This is a lot of what the SJC's work has focused on. Over the past seven years, the SJC has put a lot of focus on encouraging and promoting community participation, transparency and accountability especially in local government. The social audit process is one of the tools we use to achieve the above and improve service delivery.

What is a social audit?

The following definition of a social audit can be found in the *Guide for Conducting Social Audits in South Africa* that I was involved in developing (SJC, NU, IBP and EE, 2015).

The social audit guide is an important document in the work of promoting and expanding social audits in South Africa.

> *A Social Audit is a community-led process that facilitates public participation in the monitoring of government service delivery and expenditure in order to hold government accountable. During a social audit, members of the community collectively participate in a process of verifying government (or private company) documents by comparing them with the realities on the ground and the experiences of the community. Evidence collected during the audit is then reported to the responsible authorities at a public hearing. Community testimony, knowledge, and experience are a legitimate and central part of this evidence. Government documents may include "budgets and reported expenditure, tenders or contracts, invoices and receipts, as well as supporting laws, reports, policies, plans, or norms and standards.* (SJC et al. 2015: 15)

Where do social audits come from?

Social audits have been used in India for many years. The social audit process originates from there and was pioneered by Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS)[1] in the 1990s. MKSS led a campaign to demand the passing of a right to information law in India. This campaign developed after many workers in poor areas had struggles with getting work and struggles getting paid minimum wages they were entitled to.

Through the campaign for the Right to Information Act (RTA), MKSS developed a process that involved analysing documents they had received through the law, verifying those documents against realities on the ground and with affected communities and organising public hearings where they shared evidence with government officials and to demand responses and accountability.

The RTA was enacted by the Indian Parliament in 2005, and in the same year the Mahatma Ghandi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)[2] was also passed. The MGNREGA guarantees rural households at least 100 days of work and a minimum wage. It also mandates that there be monitoring of projects under MGNREGA through social audits. Social audits have since been conducted in many states across India. In 2009 the state of Andhra Pradesh institutionalised the process by setting up the Society for Social Audits, Accountability and Transparency (SSAAT), an independent body that was set up under the Rural Development Department that has been mandated to conduct social audits within the government of Andhra Pradesh. Thousands of social audits have since been conducted in India and have also been used in other countries such as Kenya and the Philippines.

1 Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) http://www.mkssindia.org/about-us/about-mkss/

2 Mahatma Ghandi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) http://nrega.nic.in/amendments_2005_2016.pdf

The disjuncture between constitutional values and participatory democracy in South Africa

The South African Constitution, under the basic values and principles governing public administration, requires that people's needs be responded to, and the public be encouraged to participate in policy-making, public administration and that it must be accountable. It requires that transparency be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information.

The Municipal Structures Act (MSA) sets out ward committees to encourage community participation as way to inform decisions in local government. However, these ward committees in many places across South Africa are dysfunctional; they are often dominated by party politics and fail to serve the purposes for which they were established. Besides ward committees, there are no organised forums in place that encourage and support real participation in government matters in South Africa

One of the important objects of local government under Section 152 of the Constitution is *"to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government."*

Lack of access to information is one of the major challenges faced by residents in efforts to participate. The right of access to information is a fundamental right in the South African constitution that is enjoyed by very few. The fact that these rights are enjoyed by some and not everyone as guaranteed by the Constitution contributes a lot to the political inequalities that exist, where certain voices matter and are listened to more than others in the South African democratic political system.

Residents in many poor communities have tried many different ways of engaging and getting the attention of government but often fall on deaf ears. Democratic participation is not and must not be limited to electoral politics as is the case currently in South Africa. Government at all levels needs to be open, accessible, transparent and accountable to constituencies they serve all the time and this must be done through meaningful participation. The challenges of poor service delivery faced

by many poor and working class communities cannot be resolved by government alone without taking into consideration meaningful participation and listening to the views of the local beneficial community. Service delivery protests, which in some cases turn violent, are not only happening due to the fact that there is a lack of or poor service delivery. Decisions made on behalf of residents by elected officials without meaningful engagement and participation also contribute to many of the service delivery protests that we continue to see in South Africa today.

The Citizen Based Monitoring (CBM) Framework of the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) adopted in 2013 best describes part of the disjuncture in the following way:

> *The experiences of citizens – the intended beneficiaries of government services – are a critical component of measuring the performance of government and for the delivery of appropriate and quality services. Currently the emphasis of government's monitoring is on internal government processes and the voice of the citizen is largely absent. This is a risk as the picture is not complete.* (DPME, 2013: vi)

Social audits in South Africa have been developed to complete this picture, to overcome some of the challenges I mentioned above and to help build meaningful engagement and participation between government and residents to improve service delivery and accountability.

The SJC's social audit experience

I have been involved in four social audits conducted by the SJC and Khayelitsha residents since 2013. In all four social audits my involvement has been to mainly lead the organising and implementation throughout all the steps of the process. This case study will focus more on the very first social audit conducted in April 2013, the 'Mshengu' toilet social audit.

Due to the many challenges faced by informal settlement residents in Khayelitsha in accessing basic services such as sanitation, the SJC in 2012 piloted a trial social audit exercise planned together with the International Budget Partnership (IBP) and Ndifuna Ukwazi (NU). The idea of the pilot came after the SJC and NU had attended a Monitoring Budget Implementation workshop conducted by the IBP in Washington early in 2012. Part of the workshop was training in conducting social audits.

Participants in the trail audit exercise, mainly SJC members living in Khayelitsha, evaluated the provision, placement and servicing of chemical toilets in two informal settlements, RR and DT section in Khayelitsha. Through this exercise, participants found that residents were not aware of service delivery specifications for the provision and servicing of chemical toilets in their areas and they did not know that they were legally entitled to accessing the Service Delivery Agreements (SDAs) for this service. Many did not know what a service delivery agreement is.

After reviewing findings and reflecting on the process of the trial social audit exercise, the SJC started to work on plans in conducting at least two social audits in 2013. Part of the planning included getting access to SDAs. This was a major challenge, despite access to these documents being required by legislation through the Municipal Systems Act (MSA) and Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA).

Section 84 of the MSA requires that SDAs, including annexures, must be available for public inspection at the municipality's offices during office hours. Section 75 of the MFMA further requires all SDAs to be made available on the municipality's website. This does not happen in the City of Cape Town and in many other municipalities across South Africa.

It took the SJC over three months, after several emails, letters and phone calls to get access to the SDA for the provision and servicing of chemical toilets in informal settlements in Cape Town. Eventually, after being able to get access to the SDA the SJC conducted its first social audit in Khayelitsha in April 2013. This we did with support from the IBP and NU and with two pioneers of social audits in India, Vivek Ramkumar and Sowmya Kidambi.

The social audit was conducted in four informal settlements in Khayelitsha, namely Green Point, Emsindweni, RR and CT Section and took place from 22 – 27 April 2013, with the public hearing held on 27 of April 2013. Participating in the social audit were over 60 residents from the four informal settlements and other parts of Khayelitsha.

The first step of the social audit process included analysis of the acquired information with all the participants. This we did so that everyone had an understanding of what the service provider was required to do. Documents we analysed included the SDA for "rental, delivering, placement and servicing of portable chemical toilet units for informal settlements and public transport interchange sites within Cape Town". A company known as Mshengu Services provided this service. A second document we analysed detailed the servicing schedule of the company and the number of toilet units provided and serviced in all the informal settlements in Cape Town.

Many of the participants had seen or heard of the SDA for the first time ever, this despite having used the 'Mshengu' toilets (this is what the toilets are called in Khayelitsha) for many years. This is information that all residents should have had access to in order to be able to assist government monitoring and making sure that there is value for the millions of Rands paid to the company. The Mshengu contract was worth over R165 million for a period of three years at the time.

In the process of analsying the documents we had invited officials responsible for this service from the City of Cape Town to do a presentation and tell us more about what is required of the company in providing this service. Questions were posed to the officials by participants to make sure that we were all clear on these requirements because this was information we had seen for the first time and we were going to use it throughout the process of the social audit. We commended the attendance and participation of the officials from the City of Cape Town on the first day of our social audit and invited them to come back to the public hearing where we would be presenting the findings and evidence.

The next step of the process was the development of questionnaires based on the information from the documents and from what was presented by City of Cape Town officials. Three types of questionnaires were developed; a questionnaire for residents who use the toilets, workers (Cleaners and Community Liaison Officers) and a physical verification questionnaire. The next step was going to the four communities and speaking to residents to get their views on how they see and feel about the standard of the service being provided by the company, to speak to workers regarding their working conditions and the environment they were working in, and to physically check the number of toilets and their condition on the ground in all four areas. A total of 270 residents were interviewed and 256 toilets inspected across the four informal settlements.

The steps above happened in three days from Monday to Wednesday. The following two days we spent analysing the evidence, preparing a summary of findings to be presented at the public hearing and making sure that we found a venue big enough to accommodate hundreds of other Khayelitsha residents that we had mobilised throughout the whole week.

At the public hearing, the participants presented the findings, including:

- The City of Cape Town had provided us with a list showing that there were 346 toilets in total in the four informal settlements. On inspection, only 256 toilets were found, 90 toilets missing.
- Of the 256 toilets inspected, only 68% had been serviced in the last week, even though this was supposed to happen three times a week according to the SDA.
- No daily cleaning was taking place even though this was a contractual obligation.
- 54% of toilets were in an unusable state and a further 66% of toilets were damaged.
- None of the toilets inspected were secured to the ground and this posed a challenge to residents because the toilets could easily fall while being used. The contract required that all toilets be safely secured to the ground, including those in sandy areas.

There was a clear breach of contractual obligations by the company Mshengu Services, based not only on the evidence provided by participants of the social audit, but also on testimonies from other residents who were not part of the weekly activities of the social audit but took part in the public hearing.

The public hearing is designed to be a space where government, service providers and residents have a chance to discuss the findings and evidence being provided. It is a space to discuss what is working and what is not, what challenges the community faces and what challenges government or service providers face when providing services.

Social audits are evidence-based and highlight lived experiences of beneficiaries. Community members who were not part of the week-long process of the social audit are invited to testify and can either agree or disagree with the findings based on their own experience. The social audit is a fact-finding exercise rather than a fault-finding exercise, although it might not seem like that to government officials who are invited to respond because the space becomes very heated when communities raise issues and demand answers. This is to be expected in many communities because residents rarely get a chance to engage about service delivery issues with those they elect except during election periods. It also becomes a challenge for those who have organised the public hearing because residents raise many issues, even issues not covered through the social audit because they know they might not get the ‘luxury’ of seeing those they elected ever again. This therefore needs a strong facilitator that knows and understanding the community and the issues.

The public hearing also had a panel of independent observers, including members of the media, religious leaders and other civil society organisations and their role was to provide an independent view of the public hearing proceedings, comment on the findings and observe and document commitments made by all parties.

The City of Cape Town had a chance to respond and they disputed many of the findings presented in the public hearing even though they were provided with the evidence and testimony by many residents about their own experiences in using the toilets. Some of the ways in which they tried to evade responsibility and accountability was by questioning the legitimacy of the social audit process and the sample size we had chosen in terms of the four areas we selected in Khayelitsha. These are arguments the City continued to use in the social audits that followed. The fact that the City managed to be part of the public hearing and listened to the findings was the more important point for us because the hearing started to initiate a dialogue and residents had a chance to raise their grievances.

None of the issues raised were resolved at the public hearing and there were no commitments made by the City. After discussions of these issues with residents at the

public hearing, resolutions on the provision of chemical toilets were taken (SJC, 2014: 24).

We then followed up on what was agreed between the SJC and the City at the public hearing. The City had requested us to write a full report of the social audit and send it to them so that they could have more time to go through it and respond. This we agreed to. Gisela Kaiser, the City's Executive Director of Utilities, acknowledged that the city did not have sufficient capacity to monitor all contracts.

A few days later before we had even submitted a full report, I was on Radio Zibonele, a local radio station in Khayelitsha, discussing the social audit and the City's response at the public hearing. On the show I mentioned that the the City had disputed some of our findings and wanted more time to respond. I was surprised when a caller on the show called to say that more chemical toilets had been delivered in Green Point a few days after the public hearing. This was clearly a response to our social audit findings on the missing toilets, even though the City had disputed the finding. The social audit had yielded some positive results. Many other issues that had been raised were still not resolved but it was a start, and this was all through a constructive participatory process that started to give voice to those who are often ignored by those in power when demanding accountability.

The Mayor of Cape Town, Patricia de Lille (2013), in a statement responding to the social audit, wrote the following:

> *The City acknowledges that we need to improve the monitoring of service providers for toilets to ensure that residents access the highest level possible of basic services at all times.We have taken remedial action to address this. To this end, we have appointed 266 staff members to improve our efforts to monitor the provision and maintenance of toilets services across the City. In addition to this, I will later this month visit different communities, including informal settlements, to engage them about the contents of our Service Level Agreements (SLAs) with different contractors.*
>
> *I will use these engagements to further appeal to the community to be our eyes and ears of the City to ensure that all our contractors deliver on their contractual obligations. The SLAs will also be published on the City's website and further be displayed at all City facilities, including libraries.*

The statement from the Mayor had a different tone to that of the officials that were at the public hearing.

A full report was sent to the City a few weeks after the social audit. The report included the resolution that was taken at the public hearing with demands and recommendations on how to improve sanitation services provided by private companies.

We also sent the report to other government departments including the Western Cape Provincial Government, the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs and National Treasury because of their oversight responsibilities over municipalities.

We also sent the report to Chapter Nine institutions, the Auditor General, the Public Protector and the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) for them to investigate different aspects of the Mshengu contract. The SAHRC subsequently opened an investigation looking into human rights violations on the provision of chemical toilets by the City of Cape Town through Mshengu Services. The SAHRC report was released about a year later, and found that the City's long-term use of temporary sanitation facilities and lack of a plan for sanitation delivery in informal settlements in the city, violated rights of residents in Cape Town's poor and working class communities. The report also found that the City, in providing these chemical toilets, had unfairly racially discriminated against black African people in Cape Town and instructed the City to develop a comprehensive plan for sanitation within six months.

This was a major victory, not only for those who had conducted the social audit in Khayelitsha but for informal settlement residents in the whole of Cape Town. Unfortunately and regrettably, the City of Cape Town challenged the SAHRC's report in an appeal. The appeal was upheld based on procedure and the report sent back to the SAHRC's Western Cape office for re-investigation. The re-investigation process is still underway.

The social audit received a lot of media attention and the issue of sanitation continues to be in the news in Cape Town. The SJC was invited by the Department of Planning and Monitoring (DPME) to present on our social audit process that year. We were also invited by National Treasury to do a presentation and discuss the monitoring of contractors and outsourced services in local government. This showed us that social audits and other citizen-based monitoring processes in South Africa are crucial for the promotion and respect of the values in our Constitution.

Following the positive responses we received from DPME and National Treasury, and the interest from civil society organisations across the country in the process, we started to talk about how to strengthen, replicate and expand the social audit process in South Africa.

Later in 2013, we conducted a second social audit on refuse collection and area cleaning in informal settlements in Khayelitsha. Refuse collection and area cleaning in informal settlements is also outsourced to private companies. The social audit was aimed at highlighting similar challenges with the lack of monitoring of outsourced services and the effects of this to residents and government. In this social audit we invited some of the civil society organisations that had indicated interest in the process to participate and learn, including Planact from Gauteng province, Afesis-Corplan in the Eastern Cape and Equal Education.

The third SJC social audit looked into the janitorial service for communal flush toilets in four informal settlements in Khayelitsha. The janitorial service is a project that was established by the City of Cape Town in 2012, following sustained advocacy from the SJC for implementation of such a service, responsible for the cleaning of communal flush toilets in informal settlements and for minor plumbing repairs.

In this social audit we again invited representatives from civil society organisations in other parts of the country. These included the Bench Marks Foundation in Mpumalanga and North West, Gold & Uranium Belt Impact Censoring Organisation (GUBICO) in the Free State and Mining Affected Communities United in Action (MACUA) in Mpumalanga. Representatives from Planact, Afesis-Corplan and Equal Education participated once again.

This was a different social audit in the sense that the service is not outsourced and therefore we did not rely on SDAs. Getting access to information was again a major challenge in both the refuse collection and janitorial service social audits, and we continue to face this challenge when planning social audits.

The participation of government in all three social audits is very important and it is something we continue to commend and encourage, even though we might not agree with some of their responses and conduct in all public hearings.

Ndifuna Ukwazi and the IBP continued providing research and technical support in all three social audits. Through this work we started having conversations with all partner organisations about the potential for replication and expansion of the social audit process in South Africa. The Social Audit Network (SAN) is a product of these conversations. The SAN is a network of organisations that support the use and development of social audits, hosted at the SJC and aimed at building substantive social audit practice across South Africa. Currently the SJC, Ndifuna Ukwazi, Equal Education, Afesis-Corplan and Planact are members of the SAN.

In November 2014, The Heinrich Boell Foundation (HBF), in partnership with the SJC, NU and the IBP, organised a learning exchange on social audits in India for civil society organisations that had shown interest in social audits in South Africa. The India Learning Exchange was an opportunity for South African CSOs to learn and observe the good practices, challenges and lessons learned by CSO counterparts in India where social audits were pioneered and tested. This provided an opportunity for South African CSOs to reflect on the added value, potential challenges and practices that they could adopt in their own projects or social justice campaigns. Representatives from SJC, HBF, NU, IBP, Planact, Equal Education, Afesis-Corplan, Bench Marks and the Open Society Foundation South Africa (OSFSA) participated in this learning exchange.

Early in 2015, following the India learning exchange, we did a review of SJC's social audit work and reflected on what we had learnt from India. The idea of a formalised Social Audit Network gained traction and NU volunteered to formally house the network with the appointment of a coordinator. Although the formal hosting of the network was at NU, the SJC and IBP assisted in undertaking some tasks of the network, including training and development of materials. The idea of the development of a South African social audit guide also materialised and work on this project commenced shortly thereafter.

In March 2015, Equal Education Gauteng conducted a social audit looking into school sanitation in 218 schools across the Gauteng province. In August 2015, we conducted our first in a series of localised social audits, in Green Point. The localised audits were a result of the review of our social audit work undertaken in early 2015. After many collaborative months of work between SJC, NU and the IBP, the social audit guide was launched in November 2015. In the same month, with the support of SJC, NU assisted the community of Wolwerivier[3] to conduct a social audit.

The guide for social audits lists the following principles:

- They are led by the community.
- They help to realise constitutional rights and build community power.
- They should be used as part of a broader advocacy campaign.
- They gather evidence and legitimise community experience.
- They examine and verify government documents.
- They hold government accountable through public hearings and follow up.
- They are non-partisan (Social Justice Coalition, n.d.: 18).

The guide expands and elaborates further on these principles, and outlines three phases of organising a social audit and 10 steps for conducting an audit. These are in no way prescriptive but act as a guide. They can and should be adopted for different political contexts and environments in South Africa.

What we have learnt so far and the next steps on the social audit work

The work has not been without its challenges. Reflecting on what has or has not worked is something that needs to

3 Wolwerivier relocation camp was built by the City of Cape Town on an isolated farm 30km from the CBD. Today, as when the site was identified and developed, it remains far away from the amenities and economic opportunities needed for a sustainable, integrated and well serviced community.

happen continuously as this work develops and expands. As we continue doing this work, we continue to learn and adapt as we go.

The first three social audits of the SJC were aimed at addressing systemic issues as part of the broader campaign for clean and safe sanitation. A lot of what came out of these social audits, with and sometimes without engagements with the City, helped deepen the SJC's understanding of how the City works when it comes to informal settlements and sanitation provision. It also led to asking more questions and getting an even deeper understanding around the City of Cape Town's plans or lack thereof for informal settlements.

An important gap that we identified in reflecting on the first three social audits we had conducted was that not much changed locally. In India we saw some sense of justice for the community even at a particular public hearing. This was not the case for our social audits. Toilets that had been broken or blocked were never individually followed up on to make sure that they were repaired. The City fixed some and some were left as they were. The follow-up step is one of the most important steps in the social audit because without real change on the ground the social audit is close to being meaningless in terms of service delivery improvements. Certain expectations can be created in communities when conducting social audits and these always need to be managed and dealt with at the outset.

A social audit is one process in a field of many citizen-based monitoring processes. It can achieve a lot or it can achieve very little. Consistent follow up is important. Social audits will achieve nothing if they are used as once-off events. There is a lot that we still need to do to improve on this and make sure that real change is seen in communities. Follow-up strategies need to be developed based on the particular social audit and the particular context and political environment in which the community and organisation is working.

That being said, one of the positive results most people have overlooked in the social audits conducted so far is the community empowerment aspect. The focus is always on whether there has been change in the specific service or not. This is a fair assessment considering that social audits are designed around specific services, such as the provision and servicing of chemical toilets in the case of the Mshengu social audit. But communities being empowered to be able to ask for service delivery information from government, monitor services and demand accountability on their own is an important outcome that contributes to sustainability of this work and improvement of service delivery. Social audits are a great organising and mobilising tool for communities. Community organisations such as the SJC might come and go and if communities are not empowered through the social audit process then, in my view, the work is worthless.

Politics are a daily reality in the work in which organisations such as the SJC are involved. This is something we can never run away from. In participation spaces, there's going to be contestation and there are going to be disagreements. This is what we all have to get used to, both civil society organisations and government. But if we are serious enough, the engagements need not always be adversarial.

This work is fairly new – for both civil society and for government. So far there has been quite a lot done in getting civil society organisations familiar with the process in many trainings, workshops and roundtables. A lot of the challenges and lessons have been discussed and ideas put forward in different gatherings with civil society organisations. Government, with the exception of DPME, has not been involved in these discussions. The challenges we face in this work can only be overcome if government and civil society see eye-to-eye and therefore there is a great need for government to be involved in these discussions.

The SAN, in continuing these discussions and involving more levels of government, is organising a Colloquium on Social Audits in October 2016. This is to be a space where civil society, government (local, provincial and national representatives) and academia will discuss the social audit process, its value and its challenges and come up with ideas on how best to advance this work.

The conversations in this space will aim at dealing with questions around access to information challenges, government buy in, support and involvement in social audits and other citizen-based monitoring processes in order to enhance participation, clean governance, transparency, accountability and improve service delivery.

Conclusion

The social audit process is one of many tools that can be used to encourage participation and transparency and enhance accountability. It is still a fairly new concept in South Africa with many challenges and as we continue to learn, reflect and adapt its implementation across South Africa, more needs to be done.

In order for social audits to succeed, a conducive environment needs to be enabled and the role and buy-in of government is crucial to achieve this. The interests and engagements with DPME in the office of the Presidency and National Treasury so far have been very encouraging. But, a lot still needs to be done to counter the challenges around access to information and the participation of government (civil servants and elected officials) and all those responsible for the delivery of services to the relevant communities where a social audit is to be conducted.

Can social audits foster inclusive development and improve poor service delivery without spilling over into violence and contributing to disengagement of democratic processes? Do they have the potential to enhance participation, transparency and accountability?

Albert van Zyl, in reflecting on his participation in a meeting with some of the people who have been involved in leading social audits in South Africa, noted the following:

> *Social audits are a powerful tool. But knowing how and when to use them, and understanding their underlying principles, are key to their effectiveness. While they may not always be the quickest way to prompt the government to respond, the kind of changes they stand to deliver could well be revolutionary.*
> (Van Zyl, 2016)

I cannot agree more. But again, I cannot stress enough the need for a supportive government for all this to be achieved. The hope now is that the Social Audit Colloquium will pave the way for constructive engagements between civil society organisations and government in advancing the social audit work and for the basic values and principles in the South African Constitution to be truly realised.

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Biographies of GSDPP staff and experts (in alphabetical order):

Alan Hirsch has been director of the Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice at UCT since 2013. He was born in Cape Town and educated in Economics, Economic History and History at UCT, Wits and Columbia. After economic research and teaching at the University of Cape Town, he joined the South African Department of Trade and Industry in 1995, managing industry and technology policy. He moved to the Presidency in 2002. He managed economic policy in the South African Presidency, represented the Presidency at the G20, and was co-chair of the G20 Development Working Group. He has served or serves on several boards, and is associated with a range of policy research initiatives including the International Growth Centre for which he is the Zambia Country Director and the European Centre for Development Policy Management where he is a board member. He was a visiting scholar at the Harvard Business School, was a regular visiting professor at the Graduate School of Governance at Maastricht University and a member of the OECD secretary-general's Inclusive Growth Advisory Group. He writes about economic development issues, including Season of Hope – Economic Reform under Mandela and Mbeki and recently co-edited The Oxford Companion to South African Economics.

Albert Van Zyl is the International Budget Partnership's (IBP) Director of Strategy and Learning. Albert van Zyl joined IBP in 2005 from South Africa where he established and managed the macroeconomic analysis and budget offices in the Western Cape Treasury. Before that he directed the Budget Information Service (BIS) at the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa). Most recently he founded and managed the IBP's South Africa country office. Van Zyl holds MA degrees in Politics, Philosophy, and Economy from the Universities of Stellenbosch and Bordeaux, France. He has been published on a range of public finance issues including CSO oversight of budgets, fiscal policy, social service finance, budget transparency, and subnational finance.

Colm Allan is a Research Associate at Rhodes University in South Africa and a governance consultant with SAME Indicators and Diagnostics. His areas of specialisation include benchmarking socially accountable governance and building effective civil society capacity to monitor and advocate for social accountability. He founded the Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM) in 1999 and the Centre for Social Accountability (CSA) in 2006, both at Rhodes University. The process-based approach he developed for strengthening social accountability, whilst directing the CSA, has been adopted by a number of civil society organisations in Southern Africa. Since 2013 he has created a set of indicators for assessing the capacity of both state and non-state actors for socially accountable governance. These were piloted in Mozambique and recently informed a review of social accountability impact in Tanzania. They are currently being refined for use in East and Southern Africa, supported by SDC.

Fabio Andres Diaz is a Colombian researcher on peace and conflict. He is currently a Research Associate at the Department of Political and International Studies and at Rhodes University, and a Researcher at the Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam. He has conducted research on Colombia, Sri Lanka, Mozambique and South Africa, and at the Center for Conflict analysis and Management at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Public Service Accountability Monitor of the School of Journalism and Media Studies – Rhodes University. Fabio is currently researching the continuum between protests and civil wars and is also editing a book on Transitional Justice in Colombia for Routledge.

Hannah Diaz is the Programme Manager: Executive Short Courses for the Graduate School for Development Policy and Practice. Hannah holds a BA Hons. in Anthropology from Rhodes University and a MA in Development Studies, specialised in Poverty Studies and Social Policy, from the Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Prior to joining the GSDPP, Hannah worked as a Senior Social Consultant at EOH Coastal & Environmental Services where she undertook and oversaw research relating to the socio-economic impacts of planned change resulting from large development initiatives. Before that Hannah worked at the Public Service Accountability Monitor as a Programme Officer in the Regional Learning Programme; this involved working extensively with a range of civil society organisations (CSOs), identifying their capacity needs and building their capacity through designing and delivering a range of training courses focusing on rights-based monitoring and advocacy across South and Southern Africa. Her research interests relate to social policy, and poverty and inequality.

Mabel D. Sithole is the daughter of diplomats who have worked with governments in Africa, the United Nations and the African Union for over 40 years. Her firsthand experience of their work ignited a passion to work with leaders in Africa in pursuit of a better continent for all people that call this beautiful place, home. She obtained her first degree in Politics and Administration from the University of Zimbabwe in 2007 where she also served as president of the Model United Nations Club. Following an internship with the International Committee

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Marianne Camerer is the Programme Director of Building Bridges, the new policy-focused research and outreach programme at the GSDPP. Prior to joining UCT, Marianne co-founded the international anti-corruption NGO Global Integrity and serves as a trustee of The Global Integrity Trust. She previously headed anti-corruption research at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), was a founding director of the Open Democracy Advice Center (ODAC) and lectured in applied ethics at the University of Stellenbosch. Marianne has consulted for international organizations such as the World Bank and United Nations. She holds masters' degrees in public policy and political philosophy from Oxford and the University of Stellenbosch and has published in the governance field. Her Ph.D. in Political Studies, from the University of Witwatersrand, was on "Corruption and Reform in Democratic South Africa" with a particular focus on the arms deal. Marianne is a Yale World Fellow and spent a semester in New Haven as a Fellow of the Yale Council on African Studies. She is passionate about leadership development and trained as an integral coach through UCT's Centre for Coaching at the Graduate School of Business. Marianne is an Advisory Board member of CAPI, the Centre for the Advancement of Public Integrity, at Columbia Law School.

Nkosikhulule Xhawulengweni Nyembezi is a policy analyst, a researcher, and a human rights activist. He is a respected political and economic commentator who also serves as a studio resident analyst for Ukhozi FM, Umhlobo Wenene FM, and TruFM. He is a columnist for I'solezwe lesiXhosa newspaper, has written a number newspaper opinion articles and has been interviewed on radio and television on a wide range of issues. He has published peer-reviewed work in academic journals such as The Orbiter on issues such as food security and class action against price-fixing by bread companies in South Africa. He has served on various programme committees for the International AIDS Conferences, and is the current civil society Convenor at the National Anti-Corruption Forum. As a senior researcher at Dance4Life, the youth face of the World AIDS Campaign, he worked with young people from schools in South Africa. As a leader of the Election Monitoring Network, he has been involved in the coordination of civil society election-monitoring programmes in the national, provincial and local government elections since 1994, and serves as the Co-Chairperson of the National Co-ordinating Forum – a platform that brings together civil society formations and the Independent Electoral Commission. His research interests focus on parliamentary systems, election campaigns and voter trends, and has contributed articles into the Compendium of the Electoral Advancement Institute of South Africa. He enjoys spending time with young children that he serves by organising educational toys, graduation and Christmas parties, and nutrition programmes through several agricultural projects. He also enjoys spending time with family, friends, participating in annual cultural events and outdoor sport events such as The Big Walk.

Building Bridges is a leadership development platform of the Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice at the University of Cape Town. The programme seeks to grow and support a network of capable, ethical leaders that contribute to inclusive and engaged governance, to address the 'big challenges' for development in Africa. Through leveraging the unique convening power of the university environment, the programme brings together influential Africans to deepen understanding of key challenges affecting the continent and to explore research- and policy-based solutions.

The research roundtable was funded by grants from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Ford Foundation.

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FORD FOUNDATION