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CHANGES IN THE QUALITY OF AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND AGRARIAN REFORM BETWEEN 2006 AND 2013: AN EXPLORATION OF

JOE GOABI DISTRICT

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Changes in the Quality of Extension Services in the Department of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform Between 2006 and 2013: An Exploration of Joe Gqabi District

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Abstract

The provision of agricultural extension services in the Eastern Cape Department of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform (DRDAR) has been on a downward trend in recent years. To explore the nature of this downfall, the paper focuses on the period between 2006 and 2013 to examine the changes that took place in political and administrative leadership of the department in relation to the way agricultural extension services are rendered in Joe Gqabi District.

The study found that the provision of extension services in Joe Gqabi District is affected by changes in political and administrative leadership in the DRDAR. The study shows that between 2006 and 2009, the department's leadership led in an inclusive and collaborative manner, thereby creating a favourable environment for the provision of extension services. However, in the period between 2010 and 2013, the study shows, the change in leadership coincided with governance challenges in the department, which impacted on the way extension officers worked.

Key words: Agricultural Extension Services, Department of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform, Joe Gqabi District.

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Chapter 1: Overview of the study

1.1 Introduction

Agricultural extension services (AES) in Joe Gqabi district in the Eastern Cape is provided by the provincial Department of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform (DRDAR). This department has offices in all districts in the province, and district offices allocate extension officers for all towns and villages within their areas of jurisdiction. The provincial office exercises overall authority on all operations taking place at district level, including extension services. Between 2006 and 2013 the DRDAR saw several changes at political and executive administrative level, which may have had an impact on the quality of AES rendered in Joe Gqabi district. This study seeks to investigate whether the changes at a provincial level of the department in any way affected the provision of extension services in Joe Gqabi. In other words, the study aims to examine whether changes in political and administrative levels have an impact on the provision of AES in the Joe Gqabi district.

To begin, this chapter will provide a brief background on AES and the mandate of the DRDAR. Thereafter, it will discuss political contestation within the African National Congress, the governing party, which has played out at all levels of the organisation, resulting in changes in the DRDAR. The chapter will also outline the main research questions and hypothesis, ending with an overview of the chapters to follow.

1.2 Agricultural Extension Services and the Department of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform

1.2.1 Background of Agricultural Extension Services (AES)

According to Swanson and Rajalahti (2010), in different parts of the world including Egypt, China, America, etc., extension services started thousands of years back. In the middle of the eighteen hundreds, Ireland and the United Kingdom started offering extension services through government. In England the term 'extension' began seeing use in 1867 and America later started using the term. Callou (2007 and 2008) contends that in Brazil, the extension services were born because of the capital rule which had strong North American involvement. This came as a driving force to introduce modern technologies, following a realization that very old fashioned, inefficient methods of agriculture were still used in the country. Masangano and Mthinda (2011) advance a view that, in Malawi, agricultural extension dates to 1903 during British colonialization. The focus at the time was in cotton production, in which agents were dispatched to provide education on its production.

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In addition to this brief history, it is also important to somewhat unpack the concept of agricultural extension as a service rendered to farmers, so that it can be understood in that context. Christoplos (2010) argues that, extension is used as a structureless widely used term for services provided to farmers in their development process. Some of these services may include information sharing, provision of technical advice, introduction to new sustainable systems of production, etc. Extension services is also an important vehicle used by government to provide agricultural services, to ensure that lives of the farmers are improved (DAFF, 2008). A holistic approach towards a sustainable land use strategy that covers crop and livestock production, as well as natural resource management becomes a result of an effective extension service (Shackleton, 2012). This service has become decentralised to local areas, which include farms and villages, where it gets broken down to focus on specific commodity groups, study groups, farmers' associations and cooperatives (Alcinof Resources Management, 2012).

With this background in mind, the chapter now turns to the South African context. The following section discusses AES in the South African context, focusing on the mandate of DRDAR and its approach on the provision of AES.

1.2.2 DRDAR's mandate and approach on the provision of AES

The core legislative mandate of DRDAR is derived from section 104 (1) (b) (i&ii) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which deals with the legislative authority of the provinces and any matters listed in their functional areas as provided for in schedule 4 and 5 of the Constitution. The matters listed in schedule 4 include agriculture (DRDAR, 2011). The political mandate of the DRDAR is derived from three different focal areas which are; food security for all, land reform and rural development to ensure sustainable livelihoods. The vision of the Department is "vibrant, equitable, sustainable rural communities and food security for all". The mandate and vision of the DRADR are embedded on a broad mission which seeks to "promote, support and coordinate rural development and agrarian reform interventions to reduce poverty and underdevelopment through job creation, integrated food security programme, and equitable participation in development by all rural communities" (DRDAR, 2015).

The approach used by the DRDAR to render AES in Joe Gqabi is based on several frameworks developed by the national Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). DAFF (2005) outlines Norms and Standards for Extension and Advisory Services in Agriculture as a framework setting out norms and standards for the provision of AES. The framework prefers no single extension model, as it acknowledges that models adopted should

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be context specific. The framework, however, recommends the use of a Participatory Programmed Extension Approach (PPEA) to render AES in South Africa. The outcomes of a 2007 report on profiling of government employed extension and advisory service officers further provided basis for an approach to be taken in the country, including in Joe Gqabi District to deliver AES. The report responds to challenges and inefficiencies identified by DAFF in the AES and the report recommends amongst others, that extension officers be trained on soft skills and the upgrade of qualifications to BTech degrees by those with lower qualifications, so that they can be moved from being agricultural development officers to agricultural advisors.

Finally, the adoption of the Extension Recovery Plan (ERP) by DAFF in 2008 became another milestone towards an effective approach in rendering AES in South Africa. The ERP seeks to revive AES based on five principles, which are, to ensure visibility and accountability, promoting professionalism and improving image, provision of Information Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure and other equipment, reskilling and reorientation of extension officers, and recruitment of personnel.

The background outlined above shows insight into what AES are and how they are provided in the South African context, as well as highlight the role of the DRDAR in the process. From the above, it can be concluded that politics play a role in the provision of AES in South Africa since the DRDAR has both a legislative and a political mandate. Thus, it stands to reason that political changes may affect how AES are provided. The following section provides a critical account of political contestation within the ANC as a governing party that demonstrate the context within which changes in the DRDAR occurred.

1.3 Political contestation in the African National Congress (ANC)

1.3.1 Contestation at a national level

The contestation began before the Polokwane conference of 2007 in which Jacob Zuma rose to ANC presidency, in a fiercely contested factional battle with Thabo Mbeki. Reddy (2010) argues that this elective conference was dominated by two figures, namely, Thabo Mbeki vying for a third term as ANC president and Jacob Zuma, the former deputy president implicated in corruption scandals. Chikane (2012) asserts that the action to fire Jacob Zuma in 2005 as deputy president of the country by former president Thabo Mbeki played itself out in the party. This was used by architects of his downfall to garner support for Jacob Zuma against the third term of ANC presidency sought by Thabo Mbeki. Duvenhage (2007), and Wines (2007) argue that, this gave rise to massive differences and power struggles in the ANC with some beginning to advocate for renewal. Some state agencies were also drawn into this political battle, which resulted in their weakening in the process (Booyesen, 2011).

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The ANC's political setting is a complex one because its existence is based on an arrangement called a 'tripartite alliance', which involves the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Brooks (2004) disagrees with a suggestion once made of a desirable split of this 'tripartite' arrangement after ten years of the ANC in government, basing this on the fact that both the SACP and COSATU occupy very senior positions in the ANC. Various authors use several terms such as 'patronage', 'gatekeeping', 'factionalism', 'slate politics', 'infighting', 'ill-discipline', 'purging', 'division', etc. to contextualize the contestations in the ANC during this period (Ellis, 2012, Beresford, 2015, Lodge, 2014, ANC, 2014, Booysen, 2011, Reddy, 2010, Ralo, 2012).

The Zuma era saw a dramatic rise in wayward tendencies including, nepotism, corruption, centralisation and personalisation of power and appointments, based on political allegiance against competence and merit. These appointments included those of premiers, members of executive councils as well as senior bureaucrats (Mulele, 2013, Ngcukana, 2013, and Lodge, 2014). The ANC became concerned with what it calls 'ill-discipline' that was becoming embedded in its ranks. It noted that, this has become a trend in gatherings where opposing factions use dirty tactics of booing and hackling each other with the popular faction winning the fight (ANC, 2012).

This trend continued even in the 2012 Mangaung conference, which Subramany (2012) and Makgoale (2017) describe the results of the ANC Presidency in which Zuma was re-elected in a contest against Motlhanthe, as a clear reflection of slate voting. Venter and Duvehage (2008) capture this phase as a second phase of political transition in South Africa, which saw a tremendous regression of the country from a 'competitive one-party system' to 'exclusionary authoritarianism' characterised by low levels of participation and competition.

1.3.2 Contestation at a provincial level

The context of the Eastern Cape political setting is very complex and messy in a sense that, this province is made up of three areas which were managed distinctly under apartheid. The province is made up of the merger of two former homelands (Ciskei and Transkei) and part of an area that was under the Republic of South Africa. Leading up to the Polokwane conference, the ANC chairperson of the Eastern Cape Stone Sizani, a unionist publicly supported Thabo Mbeki's re-election for a third term. He had won a contest for this position in 2006 against Mcebisi Jonas who supported Jacob Zuma's campaign leading to the conference (Ngalwa, 2007). In a provincial elective conference held in 2006 Humprey Maxhegwana, a provincial secretary at the time in his report flagged noticeable emergence of ill-discipline from members and divisions within the party where leadership was disregarded by its own structures (MacLennan, 2006).

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Rossouw (2008) states that Sogoni, a unionist who replaced Balindlela as Premier of the Eastern Cape in 2008 was regarded as a Thabo Mbeki loyalist who lobbied for his re-election in Polokwane. His election to the position was supported by provincial leadership against that of his communist rival, Masualle who had backing from four out of seven regions of the province. According to Letsoalo and Rossouw (2008), COSATU and the SACP were completely against Sogoni's appointment. The provincial secretary of the SACP at the time lamented this appointment saying that, they were not confident in Sogoni and strongly believe that he cannot deal with the problems facing the province. Sogoni was replaced by Kiviet in 2009.

In August 2009, an article by Rossouw in the Mail & Guardian labelled a provincial elective conference which was scheduled for September that year as a 'knives out' contest. Phumulo Masualle who was the SACP treasurer in the province and a Zuma ally was up against Mcebisi Jonas who lost in his previous campaign for the position against Sizani. Jonas, another known Zuma man as far back as 2006 got compromised when he was suspected of being associated with Tokyo Sexwale, another potential candidate of the Polokwane presidential race. Rossouw (2009b) argues that leading to the conference, Masualle could count on the support from the SACP and COSATU, while Jonas only relied on a group based in provincial government. Masualle won the race later in the year against Jonas to become Chairman (IOL, 2009).

The issue of 'two centres of power' that surfaced after the Polokwane conference, reemerged in 2012 in the Eastern Cape. According to George (2012), the Young Communist League (YCL) raised the issue of removing Noxolo Kiviet as the premier of the province, for her to be replaced by Masualle (chairman) and this was adopted by the SACP. The provincial secretary, Oscar Mabuyane later confirmed that citing the deliberate actions by the executive council to undermine provincial leadership. Masualle was only appointed premier after 2014 general elections (Seale, 2014).

The political divisions discussed in this section show the various political maneuvering of different factions within the ANC governing alliance. The political contests have had real implications in the DRDAR as national politics tend to foreshadow local politics in the South African context. The next part of this section demonstrates how the political contestations played out in the DRDAR.

1.3.3 ANC political contestations playing out in the DRDAR

This section highlights the way the various political struggles at national and in particular provincial level of the ANC impact the Eastern Cape DRDAR. Table 1 illustrates the impact through chronicling political and administrative changes over time.

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Table 1. A summary political and administrative changes, and change in administrative practices

| Critical juncture | Political leadership (Member of Executive Council) | Administrative leadership (Head of Department) | Relevant changes in practice | Effects on performance |
|---------------------------------|---|---|--|--|
| 1 st specific change | Gugile Nkwinti replaces Mamase in 2005. | Amon Nyondo | Policy based implementation of programmes. Massive recruitment drive of extension officers in 2007 to align with norms and standards. | Effective and clear implementation of programmes EAS. Extension officers are motivated and clear on departmental programmes. |
| 2 nd specific change | Sogoni replaces Nkwinti 2009. | Glen Thomas replaces Nyondo in 2010. | Shake up in senior administrators facing investigations for corruption. Uncertainty on strategic direction creeps in. 'Green revolution' policy starts to disappear. | Momentum on rendering EAS gets slightly lost. Thomas scrambles trying to interpret the strategy to implement the extended mandate of the department which includes rural development. |
| 3 rd specific change | Capa replaces Sogoni in 2010. | Ngada replaces Thomas in 2013 | Power is consolidated and procurement centralized. | EAS implements programme on political instruction. |

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| | | | | |
|--|--|--|---|---|
| | | | <p>Clear tensions between Capa and Thomas.</p> <p>Tremendous pressure and attacks with a level of threats and intimidation is put on EAS when Ngada takes over.</p> <p>Harassment and intimidation of certain senior officials.</p> <p>Reshuffling of some senior officials.</p> <p>Rapid rise on strange appointments of senior officials overlooking qualifications, merit and competence.</p> <p>Sidelining and frustration of those not serving the current master.</p> <p>Vacant posts at lower extension officer level go unfilled.</p> | <p>The scope of EAS is widened to include on rural development as well with no additional funding.</p> <p>There is a developing trend of executing unplanned EAS duties which affects the moral of extension officers.</p> <p>Extension officers begin to develop a don't care attitude</p> |
|--|--|--|---|---|

Nkwinti, who was appointed in 2005, over his tenure in the DRDAR had developed a provincial strategy called 'green revolution' aimed at sustaining social and institutional mobilisation, and organisation of agriculture to ensure its sustainable and accelerated growth and development (DOA, 2007). Rossouw (2009b) states that Nkwinti (already appointed minister under Zuma) was aligned to Masualle in the run up to the 2009 provincial elective conference in which he was promised a position of deputy chairperson if Masualle wins. Rossouw (2009c) reveals that the decision by Nkwinti to support Masualle shifted the vote in Masualle's favour in the conference and he won by only 101 votes against Jonas in the race that saw Nkwinti become the deputy chairperson. The emergence of Masualle supported by Nkwinti was a clear sign of Zuma's faction consolidating its power in the province.

Mbulelo Sogoni who was a premier from 2008 to 2009 succeeded Nkwinti as MEC for DRDAR in 2009 and he occupied this position only for a year until 2010 (Maqhina, 2010a). Maqhina (2010b) further reveals that Sogoni resigned from this position a day before a cabinet reshuffle, in which he would have possibly been one of the casualties on 27 November 2010, only to be appointed director general in the office of the premier on 15 December 2010. A report by Grocott's Mail in November 2010 had reliably learnt of the reshuffle, which targeted four MECs including Sogoni. Opposition viewed this reshuffle as an act of purging and driving the agenda of factionalism prevailing within the ANC. The opposition views in this reshuffling matter, may have been true given the fact that Sogoni was a strong Mbeki supporter according to a report by Rossouw (2008). Sogoni had further made more enemies within the party when he, as premier indicated that he would oppose an application to the Grahamstown High Court by four top officials of the ANC, to clear their names against a commission report that implicated them in corruption (IOL, 2008). There are also unpublished reports that even when he was MEC of agriculture, Sogoni investigated corruption cases which saw the expulsion of the general manager for agriculture and rural development, Zukile Pityi for corruption in 2010.

Zoleka Capa was appointed MEC for agriculture after Sogoni (Maqhina, 2010), a position she occupied until 2014 when she was appointed a member of parliament that year (pa.org.za). Before her appointment as MEC, Capa was the executive mayor of the OR Tambo District Municipality. According to Ngalwa (2007), the OR Tambo district was reported as the biggest region in the province, which was divided between Mbeki and Zuma, but with Zuma having the upper hand leading the Polokwane conference. Capa was not immune to controversy when she ascended from district to provincial deployment. In 2010 a report presented by a task team led by Derek Hanekom found no wrong doing when she was accused of having bought seven farms in Kokstad using funds from OR Tambo district municipality to enrich herself (Qoboshiyana, 2010). A recent article by Fuzile (2018) reveals that Capa confessed to having given cattle to Jacob Zuma in 2008 though she says this was for Zuma to give these

to the people. This reports states that 50 of the 1 800 cattle bought by the OR Tambo district municipality where she was mayor, were transported to Nkandla. She strongly campaigned for Zuma before the Polokwane conference. This entire period shows the rise of Zuma's faction to power in the Eastern Cape post Polokwane.

1.3.4 Effects of the political contestation play out on administration of the DRDAR

This subsection discusses the changes that took place in the DRDAR, as depicted in table 2. The table below highlights the shift in power relations in the DRDAR from the former RSA (Nkwinti and Nyondo) to the former Transkei (Capa and Ngada). This shift in power brought tremendous changes in the department. To further explain the changes that took place in the DRDAR, reference will also be made to table 1 in section above.

Table 2. The area of origin of the MECs and HODs of DRDAR

| MEC | Place of origin | HOD | Place of origin |
|----------------|----------------------|---------------|----------------------|
| Gugile Nkwinti | Grahamstown (RSA) | Amon Nyondo | Port Elizabeth (RSA) |
| Mbulelo Sogoni | Mt Frere (Transkei) | Glen Thomas | Queenstown (RSA) |
| Zoleka Capa | Flagstaff (Transkei) | Lumkile Ngada | Qumbu (Transkei) |

The Nkwinti/Nyondo era saw a department run fairly well, following a clear policy as seen in table 1 to implement EAS. The Sogoni/Thomas era was met with an extension of the departmental mandate from only agriculture to include rural development. Both were new in the department and were still trying to understand and interpret the strategic direction it should take. The implementation of 'green revolution' policy started fading away. Sogoni as a supporter of Mbeki ousted in Polokwane and later in the presidency was totally misaligned politically and could not survive given the tension between the existing factions.

Then came Capa a staunch Zuma ally finding Thomas as HOD in office. Within a short space time, she publicly spoke about the differences they have in executing the mandate of the department. Their relationship grew irretrievable and Thomas left office. Ngada was then appointed HOD to the excitement of Capa in 2013. To explain this excitement Zuzile (2013) states that, Capa was hailed as being a suitable person to occupy the position of the HOD because of his over 20 years of experience in the department and had transformed a research station of the department when he acted as its head in 2004. The 20 years' experience cited above may have well meant the quickest system for consolidation of power and centralisation by someone who built a solid network within the department over time. A former district director who spoke on condition of anonymity, recalls how power got consolidated (as indicated in table 1) immediately after Ngada's appointment. They were informed that procurement will be

done centrally by the head office and district directors will perform their duties as such. Appointments also began to be done without inputs from responsible managers and these started to lean in favour of the former Transkei inhabitants (possibly influenced by the power relations shift as shown in table 2). This is bemoaned by Lodge (2014) when reporting that the Zuma reign had embedded on it very undesirable activities of corruption, nepotism, power centralisation and consolidation, as well as appointment based on political allegiance.

Purging of staff that was seen to be opposed to or not in the slate of the HOD became another developing phenomenon in the DRDAR. In August 2014, the Daily Dispatch published a front-page article titled "New EC Jobs Scandal" in which the HOD was alleged to have suspended four employees of the department for having blown the whistle on alleged nepotism. A list of all employees related to the HOD was attached in the article. A former district director who also wished to remain anonymous, recalls in agony, a spate of intimidations accompanied by charges for insubordination issued by the HOD to some senior and middle managers out of the blue. Some of these managers were in the process reshuffled from their positions and placed in less influential lateral positions within the department.

1.3.5 Noticeable direct impact on resulting from changes at DRDAR

It is worth noting that, as shown in table 1, the rendering of AES was not spared during the changes that took place over the period under investigation. The following changes were observed in the provision of AES:

- There was no clear policy followed for the rendering of AES and extension methods and approaches were not adhered to.
- The political head of the department became too involved in the actual implementation of AES and in some cases, would directly give instructions to line managers.
- There was a general decline in the level of morale of extension officers coupled with a sense of loss of direction in the service.
- Extension officers became overloaded with work in some cases as vacant positions were left unfilled for longer periods of time.
- The gains made during the Nkwinti/Nyondo era, of improving the image of extension in line with the ERP were getting lost rapidly.

All of these affected the quality of AES rendered in the province, leading to a significant regression on progress that was made in promoting professionalism in the service.

Looking at the background laid out in this chapter, it seems there is a trickledown effect from political decisions at national, provincial and local levels, that seem to play out in real ways in

how the government is run at all levels. In particular, the changes in political leadership due to factional struggles within the ANC, seems to result in changes in personnel at administrative level, thereby having an impact on the running of departments, municipalities, etc. in this case, the DRDAR and the provision of AES in Joe Gqabi district.

1.4 Problem statement and research question

A noticeable decline in the quality of AES provided in the district has been seen between 2006 and 2013. This has a negative bearing on the development of resource poor farmers in the district. Given the context and background outlined above, this study is an exploration of the Joe Gqabi District seeking to find out why the quality of AES declined between 2006 and 2013? This question seeks to understand why the decline happened, by looking at the changes that happened in the DRDAR and the provision of AES in the Joe Gqabi district.

1.5 Hypotheses

The study has got the following hypotheses:

- When governance is good in the DRDAR, AES can be rendered in a good manner.
- An effective rendering of AES will develop productive farmers.

1.6 Significance of the study

The study is significant due to the following reasons:

- Agriculture is a core sector in the economy of Joe Gqabi District, including farming by households to sustain livelihoods.
- The AES is an important vehicle in developing capacity and social well-being of resource poor farmers in the district.

1.7 Limitations

The study seeks to unearth the reasons that led to a decline in the quality of AES in Joe Gqabi, however, these reasons may not entirely be uncovered because only front-line extension officers will be interviewed. This means that only views from the low-level officials will be considered, excluding those of extension managers. Governance failures that may have contributed to the decline of the AES quality in the district as a result of these changes in leadership of the DRDAR may therefore, not fully be uncovered in this study.

1.8 Outline of the chapters

Following from this chapter, chapter two provides a brief review of literature on agricultural extension. Chapter three outlines the research methodology used in conducting this study. Chapter four discusses the findings of the study from the data that has been collected and analysed. Chapter five highlights recommendations made based on the findings. The last chapter concludes with a discussion of policy implications of the findings of this study.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Agricultural extension remains a very relevant system in providing support and knowledge to previously disadvantaged farmers to improve productivity in a sustainable manner. According to Garforth (1993) and Smith (1994) the extension service is now required at large scales beyond individual farms; therefore, this forces extension professionals to acquire more skills to properly support farmers. Beck (1992), and Funtowitz and Ravetz (1993) argue that this service is however facing difficulties of effectiveness and relevance in contributing to sustainable agriculture in the wake of environmental, economic and social risks. According to Umali and Schwartz (1994) developing countries hold over 90% of the total global extension personnel. Feder, Willet and Zijp (2001), and Anderson and Feder (2003) state that government provides 80% of the extension services through the public service, 12% is provided by institutions of higher learning, other public organisations and NGOs, and about 5% is delivered by the private sector.

Röling (1999) asserts that knowledge driven extension services has power to effectively capacitate farmers, to engage in agricultural production that is sensitive and responds to sustainable practices. Anandajayasekeram *et al.* (2007) argue that there is a growing desire to replace traditional extension with modern systems that promote participation and are pluralistic in nature. Extension is a very broad process which is intended at changing a farmer's behaviour and it serves as a pinnacle of the agricultural information network (World Bank, 1990). According to AfranaaKwapong and Nkonya (2015) a lot of countries globally have invested a lot in agricultural extension hoping to improve farmer productivity.

Agricultural extension is now an important advisory and flow of information vehicle for farmer development in modern agriculture (Roberts, 1989 and FAO, 1997). Anderson and Feder (2003) argue that sufficient and regular access to advice by farmers is a consequence of an effective extension service. Extension has a further responsibility of removing bottle necks that exist between scientist and farmers to ensure that technology gets transferred and tailor made to local contexts. Hu *et al.* (2009) and Lukuyu *et al.* (2012) contend that, the institution of extension builds farmers that can solve their problems and make informed decisions about their production and marketing leading them to sustainable farming.

It is in this light that Anderson (2007) regards investments in extension services as a means of improving farmers' capacity and productivity in a development policy context. Van den Ban

and Hawkins (1996) assert that providing appropriate advice, diffusion of agricultural information, developing professional relationships between agents and farmers, and assisting farmers in properly defining their goals in sustainable agricultural development are some of the objectives of extension.

2.2 Challenges faced by agricultural extension

The fourth industrial revolution era has presented agricultural extension with a new set of challenges. Leeuwis (2013) argues that in the 21st century, the agricultural extension challenges emanate from, amongst others, the changes within organisations that provide extension service. These challenges can be associated with management, funding, technology and development of extension theories. Considering these challenges, the agricultural extension as a practice must undergo a process of redesign that will result in its professionalisation. Kroma (2003) asserts that agricultural production forces the extension officer to go further than just providing knowledge to farmers, but to also cover issues of holistic sustainable resource management in line with global perspectives, whilst remaining responsive to social equity issues.

According to Kroma (2003) in sub-Saharan Africa, extreme poverty and food insecurity that affects vast majorities of the population, further complicates the context within which agricultural extension is supposed to improve agricultural development. Van Crowder *et al*, (1998) suggest that in the 21st century, public agricultural extension organisations should effect changes and make necessary adaptations to prepare their extension cadre for global challenges faced in agriculture, so that they become effective in addressing these challenges. Kroma (2003) argues that the modern-day challenges facing agricultural extension require a certain level of thinking and innovation from practitioners, to respond to farmer problems that were not catered for in the traditional extension.

Contextual challenges such as shortages of extension personnel, limited budgets, lack of experience in extension professionals, etc. have also been identified in developing countries (Antholt, 1994, Zinnah *et al*, 1998, and van Crowder *et al*, 1998). The performance of agriculture in its nature is dependent on a wide range of factors, which makes it very difficult to trace the impact of extension where it is rendered. This further subjects the service to common challenges of getting political support, access to resources (both financial and human) and the accountability of extension professionals (Anderson and Feder, 2003).

2.3 The importance of governance in agricultural extension

In modern agricultural extension institutions, changes have been made and growth has been observed leading development of bureaucratic and hierarchical structures (Swanson, Bentz and Sofranko, 1997). Anderson and Feder (2003) argue that, it is widely accepted that provision of public extension service in bureaucratic-political settings is confronted with a lot of difficulties. According to Fleischer *et al.* (2002) centralised systems of management are used in institutions with huge numbers of agents, resulting in hierarchical setups organised to oversee these large numbers of the ground level workforce. This kind of a setup tends to be dictatorial in nature and conflicts with participatory approaches to extension.

A very undesirable occurrence is described by Anderson and Feder (2003) that, competition for allocation of funds is often found between extension and research units in the public sector. This situation has negative effects for development, as it creates tension that breaks down coordination between these two important units. Axinn (1988b) asserts that extension managers must confront the difficulty of measuring extension performance and find ways of doing it properly. The current system of using indicators such as numbers of farmers' days and field days does not show the impact and quality of work done. Howell (1986) argues that a better system of extension agents' accountability would be the one controlled by farmers, because currently extension managers are unable to hold practitioners to account with a system that is unable to measure quality and impact of their work.

Furthermore, Binswanger and Deininger (1997) assert that agriculture in general always struggles to secure substantial allocation of funds and extension is worse in that regard. Umali-Deininger (1996), and Purcell and Anderson (1997) posit that, the failure of extension to attract funding is as a result of senior management that lacks commitment and will, which negatively affects implementation of extension programmes. According to Feder *et al.* (2001) the failure of senior management to lobby for adequate funding for extension, is caused by the inability to receive returns from tangible impact of extension. Decentralising management of extension services to districts allows districts to take responsibility, control budgets, make decisions and account at a district level (World Bank, 1998).

2.4 Approaches to agricultural extension

Two approaches to extension are dominant in work done by different authors of agricultural extension. Birner *et al.* (2006) contend that none of the existing approaches is better than the other. Raabe (2008) believes that each approach used should be context specific, therefore, flexibility is paramount in extension services and must take conditions of a specific locality into

consideration. Participatory rural appraisal and technology transfer are two approaches found in extension literature in which extension models are embedded (Chambers, 1993; Swanson *et al.*, 1997; Picciotto and Anderson, 1997; Anderson and Feder, 2003; Swanson and Rajalahti, 2010; and World Bank, 1990).

These are extension approaches that were introduced in the 1970s because of changes in the journey of agricultural development (Waddington *et al.*, 2010). However, Swanson and Rajalahti (2010) assert that the participatory rural appraisal approach begun in the late 1990s, with the realisation that existing extension approaches were top-down oriented in nature. This gave rise to a drive towards more inclusive and specific approaches focusing on resource-poor farmers to drive agricultural development.

2.5 Evolution agricultural extension in South Africa

According to van Vuuren (1952) cited in Liebenberg (2015), agricultural extension in South Africa dates back to the reconstruction era in 1902, when England brought their scientists to help in agricultural development in the country. Koch and Terblanchè (2013) group the South African extension service into the pre-1994 era of 69 years and the post 1994 era. Their calculation of the colonial era extension starts in 1925 (see van Vuuren, 1952 in Liebenberg, 2015) when a division dedicated to extension was established by the Department of Agriculture. Liebenberg (2015) contends that, there were systems in place that existed until late in the 1980s that benefited white farmers only. Coetzee (1987) states that, before the democratic era, black farmers had an extension service designed specifically for them in line with the Native Land Act of 1913, which reserved land for blacks. Late in the 1950s, a need was identified to approach extension in a scientific manner by a commission that was used by government to disseminate extension knowledge, called the South African Regional Commission for the Conservation and the Utilisation of the Soil (SARCCUS).

A study by Koch and Terblanchè (2013) shows that, racial segregation was prevalent even in the offering of extension, where Blacks, Whites, Indians and Coloureds used different extension platforms. Lipton (1972) states that, in the period leading to the establishment of homeland system, an assessment that was made revealed shocking statistics that, 90 000 educated white farmers had 3 000 extension practitioners at their disposal, while 600 000 black farmers – of which the majority was poor – had only 1 000 under-budgeted extension officers, who were largely stationed in irrigation schemes. This clearly demonstrated the apartheid system bias against black farmers, a legacy that is felt even after democratisation in 1994.

For instance, in 2005, several challenges facing public extension were highlighted by the Department of Agriculture. These included literacy levels of farmers receiving advice, distances travelled by extension officer between farmers, size of geographical areas covered by extension officers and the functionality of farmers' associations and organisations (DAFF, 2005).

It is shown in Vink and Kirsten (2003) that, most white farmers resorted to private extension services, citing weaknesses in the public extension service, that came up after restructuring of departments at the dawn of democracy. In line with this assertion, Düvel (2003) in a report commissioned by the Department of Agriculture in 2003 found inefficiencies in public extension using farmer perceptions. The report further found that, the regular restructuring at senior management level of the department also negatively impacted on the delivery of extension.

A Participatory Programmed Extension Approach (PPEA) focusing in areas of planning and projects, coordination and linkages, education and training, monitoring and evaluation, and knowledge and backing in extension, was recommended for South Africa's public extension (Ibid).

2.6 PPEA as an approach recommended for agricultural extension in South Africa

There is a growing move globally towards a participatory and farmer inclusive extension approach to support agricultural development (Swanson and Rajalahti, 2010). According to Düvel (2000) the effectiveness of traditional extension approaches has been questioned due to this paradigm shift towards more participatory approaches – this is the case in South Africa as well. The reasons behind this shift vary widely from the developed to the developing world. In the developed world, it has been necessitated by decreasing profits while production is rising, environmental degradation, rising competition, negative effects of climate change, etc. In the developing world - including Africa, it has been as a result of agricultural extension struggling to make significant impact over a long term, stimulating interest towards new approaches.

Arising from this shift in the developing world, particularly South Africa Düvel (2000) recommends a purposeful or programmed approach for South African agricultural extension. This approach is embedded on the principles of participation, institutional linkage structures, problem focused or enterprise specific approach, professionalism in intervention, purposeful evaluative approach and effective institutional management. In developing this approach, Düvel drew from decentralised bottom-up global approaches advancing participation and

problem solving from scholars such as Chambers, Pacey and Thrupp (1989), Farrington and Martin (1993), Reintjies, Haverkort and Waters-Bayer (1992) and Röling (1994). Bergdall (1993), Dusseldorp and Zijdeveld (1991), and Korten (1991) developed the following guiding principles for these models:

- A process of development is long-term and needs commitment and collective responsibility.
- Emphasis on participation of local role players.
- Thorough needs identification and project preparation, with intended beneficiaries' active participation.
- Incremental growth of programmes to gain close linkage to felt needs and the local environment.
- Programme personnel playing a role of facilitation and partnering against that of experts.
- The programme striving to capacitate local actors to independently plan and implement their own modifications as a primary objective.

The PPEA was adopted by the national Department of Agriculture in 2003 as seen in Düvel, (2003). As indicated in chapter 1, the PPEA was then incorporated to Norms and Standards for Extension and Advisory Services in Agriculture, serving as a framework setting out norms and standards for provision of AES (DAFF, 2005). This was followed by the adoption of the Extension Recovery Plan (ERP) by DAFF in 2008 as a step towards an effective approach in rendering AES in South Africa. The ERP was meant to revive AES based on five key principles of ensuring visibility and accountability, promoting professionalism and improving image, provision of Information Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure and other equipment, reskilling and reorientation of extension officers, and recruitment of personnel.

2.7 Summary

The literature from various extension scholars giving introductory remarks, challenges, approaches, global practices and the agricultural extension approach adopted by South Africa have been detailed in this chapter.

The next chapter discusses the research methodology used to carry out this study.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter lays out the research methodology approach employed in conducting this study.

3.2 Research design


The study uses a qualitative research approach, utilising various techniques in the identification of sources and collection of data, focusing on a single case. Ritchie and Lewis (2003) contend that qualitative research has a primary objective of explaining ideas, unpacking meanings and getting to understand the nature of specific questionable situations that have occurred. A generative approach is used in which individual interviews with lightly structured questions have been conducted as a primary source of information (see Moore, 2018).

3.3 Sampling

Burgess (1984) argues that the designing and selection of samples is a general feature of social inquiry in which qualitative research falls under, regardless of how small the research population is. According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003) a sample is selected to represent specific features of a group within a sampled population, to enable a researcher to explore and understand themes they wish to study.

3.4 Study area

The study area is in the Joe Gqabi District which is in the Eastern Cape Province. The district has three local municipalities; Elundini, Senqu and Walter Sisulu. It lies north of the province bordering with three other districts (Alfred Nzo, Chris Hani and OR Tambo) and the country of Lesotho. The figure below shows the map of the district.



3.5 Study population

Ritchie and Lewis (2003) assert that in any research, it is very important to define the ‘parent population’, which is the population from which the sample gets drawn. In this study, the population are the extension officers (EOs) employed by the DRDAR in Joe Gqabi District. The representation of the population comes from all three local municipalities of the district.

3.6 Sampling method

A purposive non-probability sampling with both homogeneous and heterogeneous elements has been used as method of sampling in this study. Ritchie and Lewis (2003), Amer (2011) and Latham (2007) state that non-probability samples can only be used to conduct qualitative research and to generalise over the study population and not beyond. Babbie (1990) and Frey *et al.* (2000) argue that selecting a purposive sample is based on your own knowledge of the population studied and the objectives of your research. Based on these, the selection of this sample then becomes non-random.

3.7 Sampling frame

Out of all the EOs employed by the DRDAR, only those employed before 2006 have been interviewed as that is the period from which the study focuses. According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003) qualitative research samples are not meant to be statistically representative but it is much better when a sample frame is structured in that way. This ensures that it is in line with requirements of not being too bias, diverse and comprehensive.

3.8 Sample size

A non-randomly selected sample of ten EOs out of twenty-five employed before 2006 was drawn and used to conduct interviews. Trochim (2002), and Ritchie and Lewis (2003) state that purposive sample sizes for qualitative research are often very small, with less than 50 respondents that are chosen for a good reason linked to the research. Due to its richness in nature, the data collection and analysis becomes quite difficult to manage when they are too big. The subjects who are likely to give the researcher the best information are selected in purposive non-probability samples (Kumar, 2011).

3.9 Data Collection

3.9.1 Informed consent

In seeking permission to interview participants, each participant was thoroughly informed of what the study entails and the process to be followed in conducting the interviews was clearly explained. It was also explained that participation is voluntary, confidentiality is guaranteed and participants have a right to withdraw at any stage of the interview when they feel uncomfortable. Once the participants understood and agreed to be interviewed, they were then asked to sign a consent form (see attached consent form in annexure A).

3.9.2 Demographic questionnaire

All participants were asked to complete a demographic questionnaire to capture their gender, race, age, number of years working for DRDAR and their qualifications to show that indeed they meet the requirements set in the previous chapter. Detailed demographic information is shown in table 3 in the next chapter and the demographic questionnaire is attached as annexure C.

3.9.3 Lightly structured interview questions

A set of lightly structured questions asked to each participant during the interview was prepared beforehand and all participants were asked the same questions in one on one

interviews. Permission was sought to each participant to voice record the interview so that the recordings can be used during transcribing of the interviews and all participants granted the researcher permission to record the interviews. Lightly structured interview questions attached as annexure C.

3.10 Data analysis

3.10.1 Primary data analysis

The Dynamic Inquiry (DI) will be used as a tool to analyse the primary data collected from the participants. The DI was developed by Mckee and McMillan in 1992 as a process to undertake thorough involvement and analysis for individuals and organisations. It is also critical as a process in organisations for establishing universal organisational language concerning its goals and current reality. Haricharan (2015) states that process used to discover these organisational goals and realities is subjective in nature, falling short of unearthing objective truth.

3.11 Summary

This chapter has laid a foundation for embedding the presentation of findings based on a specific methodology that has been used in collecting data. A variety of mechanisms available has been used to collect and analyse data to ensure that the probability of findings of this study is close to reality. Findings of this study are presented in the following chapter.

Chapter 4: Presentation of findings

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the findings of this study based on the data collected.

4.2 Demographics

The table below shows the demographics of participants who took part in this study. These are ten non-randomly selected EOs across the Joe Gqabi District whose data was captured using a questionnaire attached as annexure C.

Table 3. Demographics of participants

| Gender | Sex | Number (No.) | Percentage (%) |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| | Male | 8 | 80 |
| | Female | 2 | 20 |
| TOTAL | | 10 | 100 |
| Race group | Race | No. | % |
| | African | 10 | 100 |
| TOTAL | | 10 | 100 |
| Age of participants | Years | No. | % |
| | 40 – 50 | 7 | 70 |
| | Above 50 | 3 | 30 |
| TOTAL | | 10 | 100 |
| Duration of employment | Years | No. | % |
| | 12 | 4 | 40 |
| | 13 – 20 | 3 | 30 |
| | 21 – 30 | 1 | 10 |
| | 31+ | 2 | 20 |
| TOTAL | | 10 | 100 |
| Level of education | Qualification | No. | % |
| | Diploma | 6 | 60 |
| | Undergraduate degree | 3 | 30 |
| | Honours | 1 | 10 |
| TOTAL | | 10 | 100 |

4.3 Questions asked to participants

The following is a set of lightly-structured questions asked to each participant individually in an interview conducted between 23 October 2018 and 26 November 2018:

- i. Looking at the period under review, can you recall who the Member(s) of Executive Council (MECs) were in the department?
- ii. Can you recall how many times were the Head(s) of Department (HODs) changed?
- iii. In your understanding, how would you describe an extension service that is rendered properly?
- iv. Which period between 2006 and 2013 would you say the extension service was properly rendered and why?
- v. Which period would you say was the worst in as far as rendering extension services?
- vi. Are there any good or bad leadership driven practices that developed around this period in the DRDAR that affected the rendering of AES.
- vii. Yes/No. Did you at any stage feel like as an Extension Officer (EO) you were not getting the necessary support from the leadership to properly deliver the AES?
- viii. If yes, please explain.
- ix. Are there any specific successes you can flag as being EO led during this period?
- x. If yes, please elaborate.
- xi. What proposal if any, would you make to the leadership of the DRDAR that can be made to improve the rendering of the AES

4.4 Findings from interviews conducted as a primary data source

For purposes of ensuring anonymity of participants who are all EOs, their identification has been coded as follows and will be used as such for referring to their responses: EOA, EOB, EOC, EOD, EOE, EOF, EOG, EOH, EOI and EOJ. The presentation of findings will be divided into two eras, the period of 2006 to 2009 and the second era starting from 2010 to 2013. This is because these are two significant periods in the DRDAR as they were led by different political and administrative heads who effected different changes in the department, which this study is seeking to unearth.

4.4.1.1 Presentation of Key themes per era

Wilber (2000) developed and recommends four domains or quadrants called the Integral Theory (IT) to frame key themes coming out of the interviews. These domains are then broken down into subjective (deals with individual awareness), inter-subjective (focusing on

organisational culture), objective (behavioural) and inter-objective (looking at organisational structures and systems). According to Thomas (2011) these domains can be used for organisational scanning as well as reflecting on its internal and external, and individual and collective prospects necessary to move the organisation forward. In this instance, the four quadrants of the IT will be used to interpret the thematic analysis of the changes that took place in the DRDAR and their effects in AES in the Joe Gqabi district between 2006 and 2013 in the context of organisational culture.

4.4.1.2 Key themes for the first era (2006 to 2009)

The subjective expressions in the individual consciousness domain included statements such as, “I recall very well”, “I think”, “I have already alluded”, “I would say”, “we have one of the best”, “successes realised”, “found bottlenecks”, “I decided”, “removed the middlemen”, “willingness to engage”, “as I am saying”, “closeness to farmers”, “importance of visionary leadership”, “termination of programmes”, “not well rendered”, “not being consulted”, “supposed to mobilize”, “make needs assessment”, “go an extra mile”, “professional extension service”, “principle based extension”, “motivation”, “confidence”.

In the behavioural domain, participants had objective expressions relating to a variety of needs which included phrases like, “needs aligned”, “effective programmes”, “increased number of capacitated farmers”, “reasonable budget allocation for programmes”, “provision of vehicles”, “protective gear and ICT gadgets (cell phones, connectivity modems, laptops)”.

Inter-subjective domain expressions dealing with the organisational culture were captured and they included, “good leadership practices”, “quality focused service provision”, “proper planning, implementation”, “provision of sound extension advice”, “consultative approach”, “visible and accountable leadership”, “collaborated organisational workforce”, “regular staff engagements by leadership”.

Some of the statements made in the inter-objective domain which focuses on organisational systems and structures were, “set up a needs based system”, “allowing for planning”, “effective implementation”, “clear policy and programmes”, “inclusive systems”, “clear tasks”, “cascaded vision”, “functional ground level farmer structures”, “ensured capacitated workforce”, “possessed a technically sound team”.

The key themes captured from the interviews in relation to the first era are summarized in the table below.

Table 4. Summary of key themes for the first era

| INTENTIONAL | BEHAVIOURAL |
|--|---|
| Individual consciousness (subjective awareness) | Team needs (objective) |
| <p>Image portrayed Positive image, willingness to go beyond the call of duty</p> <p>Staff posture Highly motivated, confident</p> <p>Service delivery necessary programmes, sound technical advice, principle based</p> | <p>Tangible Protective gear, vehicles, ICT gadgets,</p> <p>Observed Farmers needs based, capacity for farmers, reasonable budgets,</p> |
| CULTURAL | SOCIAL |
| Organizational culture (inter-subjective) | Organizational systems and structures (inter-objective) |
| <p>Core Effective leadership, collaboration, quality focused, visibility, accountability</p> <p>Motivation sustaining Consultative, democratic, regular engagements</p> | <p>Delivery oriented Functional structures, capacitated workforce, technically sound team, proper planning, effective implementation</p> <p>Institutional open opportunities, simple organogram, inclusivity, cascaded vision</p> |

4.4.1.3 Dominant themes for the first era

The analysis drilled down to identify the dominant themes from the interviews in relation to the four domains of the IT. These themes are summarised in the table below.

Table 5. A summary of dominant themes for the first era

| INTENTIONAL | BEHAVIOURAL |
|---|--|
| <p>Individual perceptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Motivation • Confidence | <p>Performance improving</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sufficient budget allocation • Provision of necessary equipment |

| CULTURAL | SOCIAL |
|--|---|
| Leadership practices <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Visibility • Consultation | Structure and systems' status <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Functional structures • Needs responsive system |

4.4.1.4 Support for each dominant theme for the first era

In this section, support for choices made in dominant themes will be detailed for each chosen theme.

a) Individual perceptions

Motivation and confidence

In relation to motivation, participants mentioned issues like, “regular engagements with EOs”, “visible leadership”, “regular interactions”, “recognition of EOs”, “closeness to ground level” as subjective elements that were taking place between 2006 and 2009 which motivated EOs a great deal. Participant AEJ can still recall the positive effect caused by the MEC’s ability to interact with EOs in which he states that:

During this period, the MEC would arrange a provincial gathering of EOs in which work related issues would be discussed, reflect on performance and agree on implementation targets going forward.

Participant EOA supports this view by noting that:

The MEC had very good relations with EOs and that gave him a lot of respect from them. EOs were highly motivated and committed to their work.

Participant EOD also hails this period as having been instilling confidence and motivation to EOs by stating that:

The MEC went out of his way to recognise EOs and made them feel appreciated and worth having in the department. He tried his level best to keep EOs motivated by even introducing programmes that were pro EOs such as extension summits, extension forums, etc.

b) Performance improving

Reasonable budget allocation

The allocation of sufficient budget came as another important factor which ensured that needs of farmers are fulfilled. Under this part, aspects such as, “infrastructure development”, “different farmer support programmes”, “provision of farm implements”, were used to emphasize the critical role sufficient allocation of funds plays in farmer development.

According to participant EOF:

Funds were sufficient to some extent to invest in farming infrastructure, purchase implements and machinery for farmers and to provide further support through different programmes. The budget was really good in terms of meeting the needs of farmers.

EOE reiterates the fact that funds allocated were able to significantly support farmers in the district, contending that:

There were very necessary farmer support programmes during this era and they were easily aligned to farmers’ needs. For example, the National Wool Growers Association (NWGA) ram exchange programme was able to improve the quality of wool in areas of previously disadvantaged farmers and the Nguni programme also assisted in upgrading the genes of livestock in these areas.

Provision of necessary equipment

Significant ground was covered by the DRDAR to provide the necessary equipment needed by EOs to effectively carry out their duties. In this area, a unanimous view was registered by all participants that, it is during this era that extension officers witnessed an incremental roll out of cellphones, laptops, protective gear and subsidised vehicles for EOs, which made it very easy for them to carry out their duties. Statements such as, “image of extension improved”, “easy communication with farmers”, “easier access to farmers” were used to describe the way the provision of working tools transformed extension.

c) Leadership practices

Visibility and Consultation

The leadership of the time was lauded for being visible on the ground not only to EOs, but to farmers as well. To describe this phenomenon, participants used statements such as, “visit farmers”, “reachable”, “interact with farmers”, “engage and discuss extension issues with EOs”, “good governance”, “visible executive leadership” with participant EOB indicating that:

The MEC was very close to the farmers and provided much needed guidance and this made farmers very comfortable with him.

In the same wavelength, EOC highlighted that:

This period saw tremendous improvement in the rendering of extension services because the MEC was able to engage with stakeholders. Moreover, he was close to EOs and farmers and this made him have a clear understanding of their needs. The visionary leadership of the HOD also played a significant role in ensuring that consultation processes are improved with EOs and farmers.

Concurring with the participants above, EOE pointed out that:

The MECs approach was consultative in nature. He clearly articulated tasks to avoid duplication and contradiction by top management in relation to what duties must be executed by EOs on the ground.

EOF also asserted that:

The decision-making processes during this period were democratic because the top management would sit down with EOs and farmers as well, listen to their inputs and grievances before a decision was taken.

EOG went on further to state that:

This period was the best because there was consultation, which is very necessary to ensure that EOs and farmers get to voice out their opinions and views in relation to how extension services should be rendered.

Another view by EOH was aligned to the rest above stating that:

Things were much better during this era because there was consultation where EOs and farmers were given an opportunity to air their views on how the extension programmes should go.

d) Structure and systems' status

Functional structures

The functionality of structures was characterised using phrases such as, "different support programmes", "a lot of assistance for farmers", "collaborated very well".

Participant EOA depicts a picture of functionality of internal structures, stating:

I recall very well that the period between 2006 to 2009 brought a lot of positive changes in the provision of AES because the MEC collaborated very well with the HOD.

This view is also held by participant EOB, suggesting that:

The MEC was able to pay visits to farmers on the ground to ensure that indeed programmes are implemented in line with departmental policy and would provide the much-needed guidance by exchanging views with farmers.

EOE agrees with this notion, positing that:

During this period, there was effective collaboration between the department and various stakeholders which include farmers.

EOH contends that:

Things were much better during this era because EOs and farmers were given opportunities to engage with the leadership of the department to contribute in setting the direction to which the department should go. Extension services was much better, and this was attributed to a variety of funded farmer support programmes at farmers' disposal.

Needs responsive system

To depict the responsiveness of the system to the needs of EOs and farmers, participants used expressions such as, "participatory leadership during planning", "necessary programmes", "aligned to farmers' needs", "closeness to structures", "varying needs", "importance of consultation", "proper facilitation".

In relation to this matter, EOA pointed out that:

Planning was also participatory, which made the leadership understand the challenges as well as the needs of EOs and farmers.

EOD alludes to the fact that:

Based on their needs, EOs were given opportunities to attend various capacity building programme for them to improve their skills and become more effective in their jobs.

4.4.1.4 Discussion of dominant themes for the first era

a) Individual perceptions

Motivation and confidence

EOs need motivation from their superiors for them to optimally perform their duties and when this happens, their confidence levels are bound to be high. Benabou and Tirole (2002) argue that having and improving self-confidence is a necessary driver of a person's desires and various experts have emphasised the important role self-image plays in motivation. Confidence helps individuals take on ambitious goals and gives an ability to confront difficult moments and situations. According to Karimi and Saadatmand (2014) self-confidence goes hand in hand with motivation and normally people with high self-confidence attain positive results and yield success.

b) Performance improving

Reasonable budget allocation

The allocation of funds for the provision of working tools for EOs and farmers support programme was able to cover the priority needs of both the EOs and farmers. Anderson (2007) argues that it is through sufficient investment in extension services that EOs and farmers are capacitated, contributing later to productivity. Limited budget has been flagged as one of the contextual challenges facing extension especially in developing countries (Antholt, 1994; Zinnah *et al*, 1998; and van Crowder *et al*, 1998).

Provision of necessary equipment

Farmers regard the public sector extension as inefficient and ineffective largely because of the lack of resources needed to support farmers. Provision of the necessary working tools for extension personnel is one of the ways this negative notion can be reversed. These tools are inclusive of the ICT gadgets and vehicles for EOS to create a conducive environment for them to carry out their duties (DAFF, 2011). The investment in technological change and knowledge system in which a systematically and effectively rendered agricultural extension is centred, are important elements in improving agricultural and economic productivity (World Bank, 2003).

c) Leadership practices

Visibility

Different factors such as availability of transport, feeling motivated, having confidence in what you do etc., contribute towards visibility of EOs in their farming communities. According to

Anderson and Feder (2003) a visible extension workforce ensures sufficient and frequent access to advice by farmers resulting in effective extension services.

e) Structure and systems' status

Functional structures

A good extension service may be delivered when it is embedded in functional structures within the organisations responsible for delivering this service. DAFF (2011) states that extension services have for a long time been seen as only focusing on improving lives of farmers. However, recently, it has become critical for this service to broaden its scope of support given an increase in the number of government programmes e.g. rural development, land reform, etc. to portray a good image of extension.

Needs responsive system

A desirable system is the one which can respond to the needs of farmers as beneficiaries of the service. According to Howell (1986) a system of accountability for extension will be one controlled by farmers, as the existing system controlled by managers is unable measure the responsiveness of the work done by EOs to the needs of farmers. Earl *et al.* (2001) argue that governments globally are under duress to change and reprioritise agricultural productivity through agricultural extension institutions in areas supported by public sector extension, to respond to sustainable agriculture and food security.

4.4.2.1 Key themes for the second era (2010 to 2013)

The key themes that arose from the intentional quadrant included, "terminated a programme", "no recognition", "compromised extension service", "dented image of extension".

In the behavioural domain, participants voiced out statements such as, "ignored real needs of farmers", "misaligned delivery", "poor engagement", "poor planning", "insufficient budget allocations", "random budget allocation", "drastic decline in provision of vehicles, protective gear and ICT gadgets".

The views that were brought up in the inter-subjective domain included, "giving instructions", "no consultation", "not based on farmer needs", "top-down approach", "top-down multiple instructions", "political interference and dominance", "increased authoritarianism", "disregarding scientific principles", "quantity focused service provision",

Under the inter-objective domain, participants raised issues like, “not well rendered”, “politicised extension service”, “full of inconsistencies”, “anti-participatory systems”,

The key themes captured from the interviews in relation to the second era are summarised in the table below.

Table 6. Summary of key themes for the second era

| INTENTIONAL | BEHAVIOURAL |
|--|---|
| Individual consciousness (subjective awareness) | Team needs (objective) |
| Image portrayed Imaged dented Staff posture low confidence, demotivation, low esteem Service delivery Compromised | Tangible Drastic decline in vehicle, clothing and ICT gadgets’ provision Observed Ignored farmers’ needs, mismatching needs and actual delivery, insufficient budgets |
| CULTURAL | SOCIAL |
| Organizational culture (inter-subjective) | Organisational systems and structures (inter-objective) |
| Core Dominance, authoritarian, science disregard, quantity focused Motivation diminishing Political interference, multiple conflicting instructions | Delivery oriented Lack of consultation, poor planning, Institutional Nonexistent engagements, bloated top organogram, extension politicisation, inconsistent, anti-participation |

4.4.2.2 Dominant themes for the second era

Dominant themes for the second era are summarised in the table below.

Table 7. A summary of dominant themes for the second era

| INTENTIONAL | BEHAVIOURAL |
|--|--|
| Individual perceptions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dented image • Compromised service delivery | Relegated priorities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drastic decline in equipment provision • Insufficient budget allocation |

| CULTURAL | SOCIAL |
|--|---|
| Embedded tendencies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bossiness • Authoritarianism | System and structural deficiencies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bloated-top organogram • Politicised extension service |

4.4.2.3 Support for each dominant theme for the second era

The basis for supporting each dominant theme for the second era will be discussed below.

a) Individual perceptions

Dented image

The image of the department was dented to some extent between 2009 and 2013 as a result of the approach taken by the MEC at the time. This was highlighted by interviewees using expressions like, “image negatively affected”, “confidence lost”, “unfulfilled promises”, “neglected farmers”.

EOF supported the fact that the image of the department was compromised in a sense that:

The neglect of the district by the MEC negatively affected the image of the department in farmers. Farmers excluded from the province and this is the time when things changed for the worst with farmers losing their confidence in the department.

Concurring with this assertion, EOI stated that:

The fact that the MEC did not allocate tractors for the district and failed to deliver promises in relation to areas that were to be prioritised for cropping, not only dented her image, but that of the department as well.

Compromised service delivery

This era was regarded by some participants as having somewhat compromised service delivery and this came out through the use of expressions such as, “district not benefiting”, “compromised practical work”, “false pronouncements”, “discontinued farmer support programmes”.

Participant EOH presents a case in point regarding compromised service delivery, stating that;

There was a time when tractors were distributed to district by the department but the district [Joe Gqabi] never benefited from those tractors and this affected the delivery of services to farmers.

b) Relegated priorities

Drastic decline in equipment provision

The sudden drop in the rate of providing equipment necessary for EOs to fulfill their duties was described by using statements like, “provision of subsidised vehicles dropped”, “reduction in provision of necessary ICT gadgets”.

A group of participants such as EOA, EOB, EOD, EOG, EOI and EOJ highlighted the fact that:

The provision of subsidised vehicles drastically dropped and this makes it very difficult for us (EOs) to travel to farmers. EOs now must share very few pool vehicles to go to their respective areas of work.

Insufficient budget allocation

Programme funding saw a reduction in allocation of funds with some critical programmes getting scrapped altogether. Statements such as, “extension of mandate”, “limited budget”, “shortage of equipment and working tools”, “reduction in bursaries awarded” were used to depict conditions underpinning extension services.

EOF was moved when describing reduction in budget allocation, which became a major hindrance in the rendering of extension services, stating:

The extension of the departmental mandate to include rural development during this period negatively affected budget allocation because it now had to make provision for other rural development programmes that are outside agriculture. This was also risky because EOs were not trained in the additional fields they now had to service.

Still under this subject, EOJ recalls that:

This is the period in which the provision of working tools such as the subsidised vehicles, ICT gadgets, etc. declined. The funds for capacity building programmes were also reduced. The number of EOs awarded bursaries to further their studies also declined.

c) Embedded tendencies

Bossiness

A culture of being dominance of managers rouse rapidly in this period and was described by using statements such as, “urgent information”, “fake deadlines”, “multiple instructions from different people”.

A description of this situation was given by EOC and EOE stating that:

EOs got exposed to multiple conflicting or sometimes duplicated instructions from different senior officials based in the provincial office, asking to be furnished with urgent information. Sometimes these people made use of fake deadlines putting a lot of pressure on EOs who were forced to chase these deadlines.

Authoritarianism

This is a period which saw an extraordinary rise in disrespect of the wishes of EOs and farmers on the ground. Expressions like, “no consultation”, “things changed for the worst”, “programmes initiated from the top”, “no inputs required from EOs”, “top-down approach” were used to describe this situation.

To reflect on the extent to which those occupying the top echelons of leadership disrespected the views of EOs, EOG said:

Consultation was abandoned with directives coming from the top management on what must be done, and this did not work well for extension services. Instructions now and again came flying from the top on a regular basis with execution being all what was expected from the EOs.

EOJ added that:

Programmes were initiated from the top with no inputs from the EO level being the ones gathering needs from farmers and very often referred to as the face of the department.

d) System and structural deficiencies

Bloated-top organogram

The structure of the department saw a rapid growth especially at the top. “Complex organogram”, “Multiple and conflicting instructions”, “bloated top structure” are some of the expressions used to depict this phenomenon.

Giving a personal account of the bloated-top organogram, EOD insisted:

The department suddenly had a lot of branches in the organogram whose staffing was only at the head office level starting from directors upwards.

This created a situation where these directors had to prove legitimacy of their branches by demanding to be furnished with information by EOs resulting in EOs spending their time compiling documents against their core responsibility, which is the rendering of extension services.

EOE reflecting on the same issue, said that:

It became a concern to see the organogram rapidly growing complex at the top and this created confusion as we started seeing a rising situation of getting multiple instructions from different people based in the head office. A top-down approach with no protocol became a frequent occurrence.

Politicised extension service

An extension service fraught with politics is said to have been the order of the day during this era. Statements such as, “political interference”, “politically driven”, “politically motivated”, “disregard of scientific principles”.

EOD describes this situation by indicating that:

A lot of political interference was seen in the extension services during this time and some leadership motives and decisions were politically motivated.

Another perspective was brought by EOE indicating that:

The delivery of extension quickly became flooded with political interference, where now instructions were given disregarding scientific principles of extension...

4.4.2.4 Discussion of dominant themes for second era

Each dominant theme for the second era will be discussed in the section below.

a) Individual perceptions

Dented image and Compromised service delivery

The approach used in rendering extension service was misdirected, in many instances following no clear policy or strategy. An assertion made by DAFF (2012) is that, it is widely

accepted that the role of public sector extension nationally has not had the impact that was hoped for by the government. It has increasingly become that of brokering and facilitating access for farmers to other services other extension services. The service has been badly overstretched by focusing on commercialisation, even of small-scale farmers with limited budget and personnel. This has in the process negatively affected the image of extension services and placed delivery of their core service at risk. What is required or preferred in rendering extension services, is setting up clearly defined and simple departmental strategic objectives to help build a coherent and comprehensive system of public integrity that effectively responds to issues of service delivery (OECD, 2017).

b) Relegated priorities

Drastic decline in equipment provision and insufficient budget allocation

Insufficient allocation of funds for the delivery of extension services is a critical challenge that affects the extent to which the usefulness of the service is recognised. Leeuwis (2013) posits that the challenges confronting extension arise from organisations providing such a service, especially in the 21st century. Inadequate funding is but one of these challenges. Binswanger and Deininger (1997) assert that agriculture battles to secure enough allocation of funds and extension struggles even more in this regard. There is generally widespread competition for the allocation of funds between extension and other units in agricultural organisations, which causes tensions that negatively affect agricultural development. Investment in agricultural extension is an imperative component towards improving productivity in agriculture (Anderson and Feder, 2003).

There is overwhelming evidence of gross under-funding for agricultural extension particularly in developing countries, resulting in the inability to undertake functions that are meant to improve food security and contribution in economic growth (Gallagher, 2002). Failure of extension services to secure adequate funding rests with lack of the senior management's will and commitment to lobby for such funding which is caused by their inability to tangibly prove the work done by extension (Purcell and Anderson, 1997).

c) Embedded tendencies

Dominance and authoritarianism

The EOs interviewed in this study firmly believe that the leadership or management in their department tended to exercise excessive authority over them, completely disregarding their views and inputs. Referring to situations like this, Fleischer *et al.* (2002) argue that extension institutions with large numbers tend to organise themselves in a centralised managerial setup

which has a tendency of being dictatorial, ignoring the participation of EOs. Extension should form part of a decentralised system that largely involves regional and local authorities and organisations (Rivera and Qamar, 2003).

d) System and structural deficiencies

Bloated top organogram and politicised extension service

The creation and approval of new directorates resulted in increase in the number of managers believed to be allies to the MEC and/or HOD in the DRDAR and this in turn brought about politicisation of the extension services. It is reported in EC-DoA (2006) that the department had 23 approved and funded senior management service (SMS) positions in total, whilst in DRDAR (2013) the approved and funded SMS positions were 60 in total. In percentage terms, this translated to 161% increase in SMS positions between 2006 and 2013 in the department. Anderson and Feder (2003) are of the assertion that the rendering of public sector extension services becomes very difficult in bureaucratic-political settings. Swanson, Bentz and Sofrako (1997) argue that structures in modern agricultural extension organisations have become hierarchical and bureaucratic as a result of changes and growth that have been realised. As numbers of personnel grow and organisations becoming more hierarchical, the management systems become more centralised and this tends to ignore participatory approaches to extension (Fleischer et al, 2002).

4.5 Flagging of the critical juncture between 2006 and 2013 in the DRDAR

The figures below show the critical juncture in terms of changes in political (MEC) and administrative (HOD) leadership that affected the rendering of AES by the DRDAR in Joe Gqabi district between 2006 and 2013. The period in which significant change took place in the department between these two eras is flagged by means of the critical juncture.

Figure 2. Changes in MECs in the DRDAR between 2006 and 2013





Figure 3. Changes in HODs in the DRDAR between 2006 and 2013




It is the participants' view that the critical juncture in which the department began showing signs of being mismanaged at the MEC level in the DRDAR was in 2010 when MEC Capa took over office from MEC Sogoni. At the HOD level it is linked with HOD Ngada taking over office in 2013, having acted in this position for some time before officially being appointed. The study participants believe Ngada's appointment sealed a similar leadership approach they shared with the MEC. In flagging this critical juncture, it must be noted that during the process of conducting the interviews, only one out of the ten participants remembered the Sogoni era (from 2009 to 2010) as the MEC and the Thomas era (from 2010 to 2012) as the HOD. It may well be because their periods in office were very brief, as a result they did not make any significant changes in the department, hence the focal periods of this study are between Nkwinti and Capa as MECs, as well as Nyondo and Ngada as HODs.

4.6 Organisational structure of DRDAR in Joe Gqabi district

It is important at this stage to show the organisational structure of the DRDAR in Joe Gqabi district that existed during the period under review. This is done to show the reporting lines that were followed by the EOs and to explain the setup of the management structure in relation to AES, which is shown in the figure below. This section by and large does not address the issues of whether positions were filled or vacant at the EO level but seeks to explain the multiple instructions system EOs were subjected to as described by research participants. This structure is shown in the figure below (Figure 4. organisational structure for DRDAR - JGD Adapted from: EC-DoA, 2006).

CHANGES IN THE QUALITY OF AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND AGRARIAN REFORM BETWEEN 2006 AND 2013: AN EXPLORATION OF JOE GQABI DISTRICT



The District Director at the helm of the DRDAR in Joe Gqabi district between 2006 and 2013

The organisational structure above shows the hierarchical structure of the DRDAR at a district level, which is headed by a District Director. In a telephonic conversation Lukas Swart, (on 04 February 2019) the District Director in Joe Gqabi district between 2006 and 2013, reflected on both eras under investigation.

Regarding the first era, he indicated that the MEC of the first era was a good listener. "He always listened to technical advice given to him by bureaucrats". As District Directors, we relayed some of our views to the MEC via the Chief Director (CD) we were reporting to, and the MEC would always consider those. Swart recalls a trip he took to Mount Fletcher (a rural town in the Joe Gqabi district) with the MEC showing him agricultural infrastructure such as shearing sheds the department had built in the town. The MEC said to me whilst we were driving around, "you are like a fish, you lay your eggs and hide them", implying that he had all this good work done by the department in the most remote areas of the district.

Reflecting on the second era, Swart recalls a couple of incidents that took place, influenced by the MEC who was in office during this period. In the first incident, he was instructed by the MEC to facilitate the planting of maize out of season in February of that year, which he refused and was supported by farmers as well, who also emphasised that planting that time of the year was just a waste of public funds. "The MEC then accused us [officials] of influencing farmers against her".

In a second incident, the MEC wanted wheat in February (again out of season) planted in Pelandaba, a village in Sterkspruit, following a request made to her by a traditional leader of the area. Swart recalls receiving phone calls from a CD to whom he reported and the acting HOD (who was also a CD) at a time, pressurising him to execute this instruction. He recalls the acting HOD even saying to him that "the politicians want you to plant". He says, "again I flatly refused to do that explaining my scientific reasoning to them behind that". He recalls that machinery was trucked from Dohnë (DRDAR's research station based in Stutterheim) to Pelandaba to plant the wheat which became a failed crop. Upon visiting later that year, the MEC went to the wheat site and saw the failed crop to which she conceded that, "Swart was right by refusing planting wheat that time of the year."

Swart admits that although he stood his ground where he could and absorbed the political pressure he received; he just could not divulge to his subordinates the undue political pressure exerted to him by the MEC using senior bureaucrats. He asserts that, "the department was

now focused on measuring the number of hectares planted instead of the yield/tons harvested”.

In relation to Swart's comparison of other districts relative to Joe Gqabi regarding undue political interference they were exposed to in the second era, he says:

I did not have the same experiences as my colleagues in other districts. For instance, the MEC never had my phone number or never called me directly, whereas my colleagues from O.R. Tambo and Alfred Nzo Districts were receiving phone calls directly from the MEC, putting pressure on them to carry out certain instructions. Due to this, my colleague from O.R. Tambo ended up leaving the department and the other one from Alfred Nzo was later removed from her position.

From the above, it is evident that Swart experienced first-hand the undue political pressure put from above but found ways to absorb it, instead of passing it down to his subordinates. However, from the empirical evidence given by participants in this study, it is clear that means were found from above to directly exert political pressure on EOs on the ground. In a nutshell, the information shared by Swart corroborated the evidence provided by participants as presented in the findings of this study, in both eras. It must however be noted that, given the challenges encountered during the period of conducting this research project, it was not possible to explore the independent role of the district office of DRDAR in any depth than what has been provided above.

Complex multiple instruction network for EOs

According to figure 4 above, the line manager in position of Deputy Director: AES is responsible for AES in the district and reports directly to the District Director. Below the AES manager are Control EOs at a local level to which EOs report. Important to note in the figure above are the two red arrows (one from District Director to Control EO and from Deputy Director: Coordination to Control EO) and the Deputy Director: AES in relation to the reporting lines of EOs. The expectation is that all matters relating to AES should go via their line function manager, but it does not always happen like that. The red arrow linking the District Director and the Control EO (supervising EOs at a local level) shows that instructions sometimes are issued directly by the District Director to the Control EO for execution by the EOs. The red arrow linking Deputy Directors: Coordination (who do not have personnel directly allocated to them) to Control EOs indicates that, as managers based at a local level, Deputy Directors: Coordination also interact directly with Control EOs and expect compliance when they require certain duties to be performed by EOs.

Furthermore, the multiple orange arrows linking various other Deputy Directors (all have very limited personnel under their command, shown in the hierarchy) to Control EOs indicate that, these managers also directly contact the Control EOs when they need assistance at a local level. This demonstrates that at district level, EOs are confronted with a challenge of a complex hierarchical setup, to which they are supposed to satisfactorily respond in line with their duties.

Finally, selected parts of the provincial hierarchical structure of DRDAR is shown in annexure D with indications on which positions were existing in both eras, which positions existed in the second era were not existing in the first era, and the chief directorate in which AES is located. The Deputy Director: AES apart from reporting to the District Director, would also directly report to the Director: AES based at a provincial level. All the chief directorates shown in the provincial organisational structure to a greater or lesser extent need assistance from EOs to fulfill their functions.

4.7 A comparison of findings from of the two eras (2006 – 2009 and 2010 – 2013)

The table below summarises the findings per era based on the two eras – 2006 to 2009 and 2010 to 2013.

Table 6. Comparison of findings from two eras

| First era – 2006 to 2009 | Second era – 2010 to 2013 |
|--|---|
| Largely characterised by positive developments in extension. | Largely characterised by negative developments in extension. |
| EOs felt confident and motivated to do their work as they felt recognised and included by the MEC in activities of the department. | Dented image of the department caused by neglect of EOs and farmers' needs. |
| Budgets allocation was adequate to cater for needs of EOs as well as farmers. | Service delivery got compromised due to unfulfilled promises and a sudden discontinuation of some farmer support programmes with no replacements. |
| The provision of working tools such as vehicles, ICT gadgets, protective gear grew rapidly. | Provision of working tools started declining. |
| There was consultative and visible leadership to the ground. | Allocation of funds for farmer support programmes declined. |
| Political (MEC) and administrative (HOD) leadership had a collaborative relationship which ensured smooth running of the department. | A culture of bossiness and bullying from managers saw a rise. |
| Planning was participatory and needs based, considering inputs from EOs and farmers. | The MEC and HOD became authoritative in their approach not entertaining inputs from the ground. |
| | Multiple conflicting instruction resulting from an increase in number of senior managers with no staff under them. |
| | Extension became more politicised focusing more on the quantity of beneficiaries reached than the quality of the service. |

4.8 Discussion of the overall findings in relation to the hypotheses

The study has the following two hypotheses, which are both not refuted as the findings detail:

- i. When governance is good in the DRDAR, the AES can be rendered in a good manner.
- ii. An effective rendering of the AES will develop productive farmers.

In relation to the first hypothesis, it has been found that between 2006 and 2009, the DRDAR through a collaborative relationship between the MEC and HOD was run in a good manner. In comparison, between 2010 and 2013 the department was characterised by a bullish, dictatorial and authoritarian leadership style, which led to dissatisfaction on the ground level. In the second era, the consultative and inclusive approach used by the MEC in the first era was abandoned for a more dominant style. The inclusive approach prevalent in the first era ensured that EOs and farmers felt that they were part of the decision-making processes of the department as they were given opportunities to make inputs. The visible leadership style adopted by the MEC in the first era made him more popular to EOs and farmers. This resonates well with two features of good governance identified by the UNDP (1996) of political accountability and legitimacy as well as accountable bureaucracy. Good governance has outlined quality of governance, effective government policy, accountability and transparency as some of the governance indicators (Worldwide Governance, 2014). EOs felt confident and motivated, which is a critical factor for productivity in the workplace also emphasised by Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee (2001) stating that, a positive mood is very important in the workplace and it is largely driven by the leaders' emotional intelligence.

Regarding the second hypothesis, the first era of the provision of AES boasted a policy and strategy-based service which was underpinned in the "Six Pegs Policy" of the department. These pegs were; the provision of fencing infrastructure, dipping tanks, tractors, stock water dams and boreholes, rehabilitation of irrigation schemes, and human resource development (EC-DoA, 2006). Whereas in the second era, much of the delivery was not strategy or policy based.

However, regardless of the challenging circumstances underwhich EOs operated during the second period, they managed to emerge with some encouraging farmer development initiatives. These may be related to what Levy (2014) refers to as "islands of effectiveness" described as an incremental platform for growth in a dysfunctional organisational setting, yielding results in a short term while preparing ground for long term benefits. The gains made by EOs were in a form of public-private-partnerships (PPPs) mainly in grain production. Private sector companies brought in their expertise in this commodity to support farmers, production guided by scientific recommendations resulting in increased yields for farmers. The extension

services in the first era were carried out in a manner recommended by Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock (2017) that development practitioners should execute their duties in a manner that gains functionality and legitimacy at the same time. This is done to ensure that those authorising the work EOs do get to be recognised as legitimate owners of what has been achieved.

Chapter 5: Recommendations

5.1 Recommendations of the study

The following recommendations are made based on the findings above:

- A planning mechanism inclusive of EOs and farmers when necessary should be adopted by the DRDAR to ensure a needs or problem based planning for effective implementation and policy development. Davies (2011) argues that Evidence-Based Policy-Making (EBPM) makes use of existing evidence to incorporate it in the expertise of decision makers to make informed and better decisions for the realisation of better outcomes.
- Resuscitation of engagement platforms for leadership and EOs to reflect progress made in the service of extension. Düvel (2000) asserts that the highest level of participation can only be facilitated by organisational linkage structures when they are close to the ground.
- Leadership must lobby for adequate funding to sufficiently cater for the needs of agricultural extension and its programmes. According to Feder *et al* (2001) agricultural extension fails to attract enough funding because the senior management often has no will and commitment to do that, negatively affecting implementation of extension programmes.
- Appointment of extension qualified personnel particularly in managerial positions. Düvel (2000) regards poor institutional management as the most serious challenge confronting agricultural extension in South Africa. He further argues that for extension managers:

The insights and knowledge of extension and its process should be even more extensive and more detailed than that of their subordinates and frontline Extensionists.

- As uncovered by the findings of this study, there is a glaring breakdown of meritocratic, impersonal bureaucratic functioning in the DRDAR, therefore, a variety of potential remedies should be developed, with the final decisions regarding the preferred option still requiring further analysis and experimentation. These remedies include amongst others, legislation, meritocratic rules governing bureaucratic appointments, transparent feedback mechanisms from farmers as service users, etc.

- Refocusing of agricultural extension approach used by the DRDAR (following it being disregarded between 2010 and 2013) to the participatory approach (PPEA) recommended by Düvel in 2000 and adopted by DAFF in 2005. This approach also emphasises the importance of consequence-based monitoring and evaluation, which is likely to ensure that there is a culture of ethical leadership and public accountability.
- Formalisation of public-private-partnership (as they have proved in cases given in this study to be possible and value adding) to share expertise and limited resources, ultimately improving farmer productivity.

5.2 Possible areas of further research

Based on the evidence found in conducting this study, the following areas of possible further research have been noted:

- It has been discovered in this study that EOs who worked in the private sector or non-governmental extension view effective rendering of extension differently from those who only worked in public sector extension and also given the fact that there is documented evidence from authors such as Vink and Kirsten (2003) suggesting that public sector extension is weaker compared to that of the private sector. It may be important to undertake a study looking at the true meaning of effective extension services in the public sector.
- With evidence presented by the study participants and shown in EC-DoA (2006) and DRDAR (2013) regarding bloating of the organogram at the top echelons of the DRDAR, a study may be necessary looking at the effects this increase in SMS positions between 2006 and 2013 had on the delivery extension services, and
- In relation to Düvel's recommendation that extension managers should possess more qualifications and expertise than their frontline extensionists. A study looking at the qualifications held by extension managers in the DRDAR, to measure this against the effects it has on the ultimate quality of extension services may be a worthwhile undertaking.

Chapter 6: Conclusions and policy implications

6.1 Conclusion

The DRDAR in JGD as influenced by changes in political and administrative leadership, moved from a state of improved delivery of extension services between 2006 and 2009, and regressed to a messy state of poorly rendered extension services between 2010 and 2013. When relating this situation to Levy's (2014) in his "Development Typology", it can be concluded that the DRDAR in JGD moved from a dominant political settlement with impersonal institutions called *rule-by-law dominant*, to the one referred to as *dominant discretionary* with a political setting organized around a political party, with a firm grip on power and operating in personalized institutions.

It is evident that a collaborative relationship between political and administrative leadership of an organisation can translate itself into two different situations, as the case in point in the DRDAR for the period reviewed in this study. The department moved from a culture close to that of good governance between 2006 and 2009 to the opposite direction between 2010 and 2013. A flexible organizational approach is required in the DRDAR to ensure that leadership and frontline extension personnel are open to regular scrutiny, so that deviations from the core business of the department are arrested as soon as they start occurring.

6.2 Policy implications

The degree to which policy is able to hold its makers and implementers to account on the proper and effective implementation thereof, seems to be where the problem lies for the DRDAR. As indicated in the recommendations above, a mechanism embedded on legislation, impersonal and meritocratic bureaucracy, as well as the active inclusion of farmers should be developed and adopted as a framework for the implementation of an adequately resourced (financially and otherwise) evidence-based policy for extension services.

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ANNEXURE A: CONSENT FORM

Title of the study: Changes in the Quality of Agricultural Extension Services (AES) in the Department of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform (DRDAR) between 2006 and 2013: An Exploration of Joe Gqabi District

I understand what the study is about as it has been explained to me in a clear manner and I knowingly agree to participate.

I understand that anonymity and confidentiality will be maintained for my protection and that if I feel uncomfortable at any stage of the study, I may withdraw my participation with no repercussions.

Participant's Name.....

Participant's signature.....

Witness.....

Date.....

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ANNEXURE B: LIGHTLY STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

**Changes in the Quality of Agricultural Extension Services (AES) between 2006 and 2013
in the Department of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform (DRDAR): An Exploration
of Joe Gqabi District**

1. Looking at the period under review, can you recall who the Member(s) of Executive Council (MECs) were in the department?
2. Can you recall how many times were the Head(s) of Department (HODs) changed?
3. In your understanding, how would you describe an extension service that is rendered properly?
4. Which period between 2006 and 2013 would you say the extension service was properly rendered and why?
5. Which period would you say was the worst in as far as rendering extension services?
6. Are there any good or bad leadership driven practices that developed around this period in the DRDAR that affected the rendering of AES.
7. Yes/No. Did you at any stage feel like as an Extension Officer (EO) you were not getting the necessary support from the leadership to properly deliver the AES?
8. If yes, please explain.
9. Are there any specific successes you can flag as being EO led during this period?
10. If yes, please elaborate.
11. What proposal if any, would you make to the leadership of the DRDAR that can be effected to improve the rendering of the AES?

ANNEXURE C: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Changes in the Quality of Agricultural Extension Services (AES) between 2006 and 2013 in the Department of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform (DRDAR): An Exploration of Joe Gqabi District

Date: _____

Please mark with an X or √ in an appropriate box that best matches your response

What is your gender?

- Male
 Female

What is your race?

- African
 White
 Coloured
 Indian

What is your age?

- Below 30 years
 30 – 40 years
 40 – 50 years
 Above 50 years

How long have you been working for the DRDAR?


- 12 years
 13 - 20 years
 21 – 30 years
 Over 31years

What is your highest academic qualification?

- Diploma
 Undergraduate Degree
 Honours
 Masters
 PhD

CHANGES IN THE QUALITY OF AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND AGRARIAN REFORM BETWEEN 2006 AND 2013: AN EXPLORATION OF JOE GQABI DISTRICT

ANNEXURE D: PROVINCIAL ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF DRDAR



Adapted from: EC-DoA (2006) and DRDAR (2013)

CHANGES IN THE QUALITY OF AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND AGRARIAN REFORM BETWEEN 2006 AND 2013: AN EXPLORATION OF
JOE GQABI DISTRICT